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I. INTRODUCTION
Thou shalt obey doctor's orders...
Thou shalt not partake of alcohol or drugs potentially harmful to the fetus...
Thou shalt do whatever the state deems necessary during pregnancy to produce
a healthy baby...
Thou shalt be a Good Mother.
These commands issue from the Code of Perfect Pregnancy, which is
ostensibly premised on the social good of "fetal interests." There is no Code of
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Perfect Pregnancy in the strictly legal sense. However, there is outstanding the
idea and practice of controlling women with regard to conception, gestation,
and childbirth in ways that express dominant cultural notions of motherhood.
The "Code" has long roots in the way that patriarchy has constructed women
as mothers and as wombs. What is new is that increasingly these subordinating
social norms are being institutionalized as legal duties. The result is the
regulation of pregnant women.
I use "Code of Perfect Pregnancy" not only to describe the subtext of
recent cases and statutes that there "ought to be a law" to control the behavior
of pregnant women, and not only to invoke the more apparently normative,
historically-based social code of good motherhood, but also to suggest other
meanings of the word "Code." "Code" can refer to a restricted, controlled
form of communication, one used to limit access to power to the few who hold
the key.' Because the Code defines motherhood, it excludes only women.
Further, the Code operates by institutionalizing the dilemma of
disempowerment. Under the Code, women bear the responsibility of
"motherhood," but are not deemed entitled to the authority to define it.2 The
Code is double-edged. It operates by distinguishing between good mothers and
bad mothers, incorporating some women into the subordinating ideology while
subtracting from their power to claim alternative norms by making them moral
exemplars to other women.
According to other fronts of patriarchy, motherhood is color-coded, class-
coded, and culture-coded. 3 Women of color, those who live in poverty, and
those made outsiders by virtue of cultural or religious practices are stigmatized
by the dominant society and are never presumed good mothers, as are white
middle- and upper-class women. In addition, even while outsider women are
subject to the white-middle-class-good-mother standard, direct and indirect state
actions expressing patriarchal norms deprive these women of the material,
political, and social resources to conform to the Code. The Code says that these
women do not and cannot have the key to opening the door of "good
motherhood" or defining pregnancy in other terms.
A "Code" word is also a masked word, a word that has another function.
In the past few years "fetal protection policy," "forced cesarean," "court-
ordered hospital detention," "fetal abuse," and "fetal personhood" have
become familiar terms. They are part of the new vocabulary being formed by
I See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 12-14, 147-65
(1991).
2 See MARGARET ATwOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE 79 (1985) (describing a cautionary
tale of a future totalitarian society in which "[tihere are only women who are fruitful and
women who are barren, that's the law").
3 This Article does not provide a full analysis of the ideology of motherhood. In
particular, it only suggests the complex race-based description of motherhood that needs
revealing. That project is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the Code of Perfect Pregnancy. Jennifer Johnson, Kimberly Hardy, Pamela Rae
Stewart, Angela Carder, Jessie Mae Jefferson, Ayesha Madyun, and Brenda
Vaughn have become familiar names. These are some of the women deemed
punishable at law by the Code. Certain phrases have also become familiar: "A
child has the right to be born sound and healthy"; "Eleven percent of the
babies born in hospitals test positive for drugs. There is a serious problem that
can be addressed by punishing women who use drugs during pregnancy"; and
"There must be something wrong with a mother who would not submit to
surgery in order to insure the health of her child." These stories of the Code
tell of an inevitable maternal-fetal conflict, of the sacrifice and submission of
good mothers, and the selfishness and willfulness of bad mothers. More
specifically, the Code speaks of protecting fetal interests from bad mothers. Yet
the stories say little or nothing about the lack of access to prenatal care for poor
women, or the dearth of addiction treatment for pregnant women, or the high
miscarriage rate among imprisoned women, or the very conservative nature of
the male-dominated mainstream obstetrical practice, or the religious and
cultural integrity of women whose medical decisions differ from the doctor's,
or the physical and emotional impact of pregnancy on women who feel their
powerlessness. 4 The Code inserts the qualifier "but... in order to protect the
fetus" after any mention of these facts. Within the Code, "but" has the job of
denying social reality. Denying social reality makes it possible to escape the
necessity of explaining how the subordination of women protects fetal interests
and why less restrictive alternatives need not be used.
Because social reality is patriarchically constructed, patriarchal assumptions
about gender, race, class, and culture implicitly shape the stories. Those
assumptions are the social facts not put into words but present in the Code. The
effect of the Code then is to direct the power of the state at women along race,
class, and culture lines in the name of "protecting fetal interests." The resulting
narrow standard for good motherhood has an effect beyond that of taking from
women the authority to construct pregnancy and motherhood for themselves; it
also eliminates the possibility of difference.
In this Article, I try to reveal the denial of social reality and the failure of
explanation, and to show that the concept of "fetal interests" serves not to
protect fetuses, but to enforce subordination. Accordingly, in Part 11, I begin
the process of challenging the stories of the Code by locating their roots largely
in the historically-based, socially constructed ideology of motherhood, 5 in its
late nineteenth and early twentieth century form. In Part I, I describe the
developing regulatory scheme in terms of the ideology of motherhood in its
4 See RrTA TOWNSEND & ANN PERKINS, BrrrER FRUIT: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES OF
UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, ABORTION, & ADOPTION (1992) (containing interviews, poems,
and visual art expressing the personal experience not recognized in law).
5 See infra notes 6-7.
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current form. In doing so, I take heed of the particular effects of the Code-it
devalues women of color, poor women, and culturally stigmatized women as
mothers. I also follow the call of others to challenge the ways in which
normative theories are formed and expressed, 6 to locate and thus dislocate the
floors and ceilings of the stories that require regulation of women as
childbearers and that devalue motherhood along patriarchal lines. In Part IV, I
explain that the Code of Perfect Pregnancy is the result of three particular
manifestations of the dominant, authoritarian culture-the ideology of
motherhood, the practice of defaulting to science, and the interventionist
mindset of law. And in Part V, I elaborate upon the broad effects of a
universal, decontextualized standard of good motherhood.
II. THE IDEOLOGY OF MOTHERHOOD DURING THE LATE NINETEENTH
AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES
The ideology of motherhood 7 has a very particular and complex form,
drawn along patriarchal lines of race, class, and culture. In that sense the
6 See bell hooks, Feminisnm A Transformational Politic, in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES
ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 185, 186 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) ("Emphasizing paradigms
of domination that call attention to woman's capacity to dominate is one way to deconstruct
and challenge the simplistic notion that man is the enemy, woman the victim; the notion that
men have always been the oppressors. Such thinking enables us to examine our role as
women in the perpetuation and maintenance of systems of domination."); CATHARINE A.
MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINST THEORY OF THE STATE 244 (1989) ("The first step is to
claim women's concrete reality .... The next step is to recognize that male forms of
power over women are affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law."); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MicH. L.
REV. 2411, 2413-14 (1989) ("Ideology-the received wisdom-makes current social
arrangements seem fair and natural .... The cure is storytelling.... ."); Mad Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom. Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 323, 324 (1987) ("Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of those who have
seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist critical legal scholars in the task of
fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice."); Patricia
Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and Gendered
Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81, 89 (1990) ("This commercialization of the fetus, this
reduction of poor people of color to an owned relation to their body parts, this dispossession
of the self through alienation therefrom can be tracked in other fetal rights and fetal abuse
cases as well.").
7 I use the term "ideology" loosely. At the least, "ideology" refers to what Richard
Delgado calls "the received wisdom." It is an attempt to explain and justify the social
reality. Delgado, supra note 6, at 2415. Or, as Clifford Geertz stated, "Whatever else
ideologies may be-projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives,
phatic expressions of group solidarity-they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic
social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience." CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
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ideology of motherhood may be as old as patriarchy. But in this section I focus
on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries version of the ideology. I do
so for two reasons. First, the post-civil war, industrial-age lines of patriarchy
were clarified during that period.8 Second, the legal mechanisms of control
being enforced against women today echo those used at the turn of the century.
In addition, as I discuss in Parts M and IV, medical science, and medical
obstetrics in particular, came into being at that time as a source of authority and
privileged knowledge in society.
The ideology of that period distinguished between privileged motherhood
and devalued motherhood. Motherhood within the world of privilege-the
white, middle and upper classes-was where the "Good Mothers," those who
held a sacred social trust, lived. In this section, I explore the notion of social
duty described by the ideology. This older understanding of the social role of
motherhood informs today's version of the ideology. Although I spend less
time on devalued motherhood, it was certainly not less significant. The
important development during this period, for purposes of this Article, was the
emergence of the white middle class as a normative force that dominated by
casting all others in a negative light. The current version of the ideology,
detailed in Part III, clearly extends the negative and truncated aspects of the
motherhood construct.
A. Privileged Motherhood
The Good Mother ideology begins on an essentialist note. It goes
something like this. By biology, women are mothers. It is women who have the
capacity to carry the conceptus, give birth to the baby, and nurse the child
through infancy. This premise then supports the norm that women should have
the primary responsibility for childrearing9 and, concomitantly, that certain
characteristics-nurturing, tenderness, compassion, and selflessness-are
TIlE INTERPRETATION OF CULTUREs 220 (1973). See also LINDA GORDON, WOMAN's BODY,
WOMAN's RIGHT: A SoCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 10-11 (1976)
(describing the "ideology" of motherhood, a phrase I adopt, which "made the biological
processes of motherhood symbolic.. ."); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
8-10 (1987) (explaining gender as a social construct).
8 See ANITA LEvy, OTHER WOMEN: THE WRITING OF CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER,
1832-98 (1991) (making a similar point with regard to late nineteenth century England).
9 For an early critique of this role assignment, see Leta S. Hollingworth, Social
Devices for Impelling Women to Bear Children, 22 AM. J. Soc. 19, 19-20 (1916-17) ("An
exceedingly important and interesting phase of social control [is], namely, the control by
those in social power over those individuals who alone can bring forth the human young,
and thus perpetuate society... there has been a consistent social effort to establish as a
norm the woman whose vocational proclivities are completely and "naturally" satisfied by
child-bearing and child-rearing, with the related domestic duties.").
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natural to good mothers.10 Further, the female reproductive system signifies
that women are naturally suited to the role of producing a sound, healthy next
generation by giving birth, milk, and moral guidance.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it became
particularly clear that the ideology defined motherhood in ways that make
women buffers against social disorder. During the Victorian and early
industrial periods the world became increasingly divided between the private
and public spheres." The private sphere was where virtue, morality, and
tradition were founded. White middle- and upper-class women were confined
to the private sphere and to the duty of maintaining virtue, morality, and
tradition largely by inhabiting the "good mother" role.12 More specifically,
motherhood, as an institution, had the charge of transmitting social rules. Good
mothers were responsible for conceiving, giving birth to, and raising children
who would grow up to contribute to the social order and not detract from it.13
Motherhood as a calling was fulfilled by individuals who were noble,14
benign, 15 and self-sacrificing.' 6
Social problems, then, could be explained as a failure in the private
sphere-the failure to sustain motherhood as an institution, and the failure of
individual women to meet the standards of the calling. As a result, fear of
social disorder has often been expressed by regulating women as mothers.' 7
10 See GORDON, supra note 7, at 10-11.
11 Ellen DuBois, The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement: Notes Toward the
Reconstruction of Nineteenth-Century Feminism, in WOMEN, THE LAW AND THE
CoNsTrruTIoN 266, 266-69 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth
Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE PoLrrIcs
OFLAW 118-24 (D. Kairys ed., 1982).
12 The good mother role and the ideology of motherhood were closely linked to the
ideal of true womanhood that prevailed at that time.
13 It was woman's duty to give "bias to the brain cells and soul impulses of ante-natal
and post-natal infantile life," and to transmit to their children "fine ennobling sentiments,
the solid truths of social relations, and the sterling principles of rightness, honor, honesty,
and fraternal love." JOHNS. HALLER & RoBIN M. HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALrrY
IN VICrORiAN AMERICA 80 (1974).
14 But see BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD, IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 43-50 (1989) (discussing how the woman's role in
reproduction is first narrowly defined, and then devalued).
15 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
16 See GORDON, supra note 7, at 128-29; Hollingworth, supra note 9, at 21. For an
interesting account of how these traits were both defined and commercialized as Mother's
Day, see Leigh Eric Schmidt, The Commercialization of the Calendar: American Holidays
and the Culture of Consumption, 1870-1930, J. AM. HIST. 887, 900-13 (Dec. 1991).
17 See Hollingworth, supra note 9, at 21. Concern for maintaining population size has
resulted in a variety of social controls to encourage childbearing. The means of social
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That is, society responds to problems in ways that elaborate upon the ideology
of motherhood. One traditional way of regulating women is fairly
straightforward-by promulgating laws that restrict women to the private
sphere roles of mother and wife.
In Bradwell v. Illinois,18 the Illinois Supreme Court denied Myra
Bradwell's application for a license to practice law because she was a woman.
"That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it
belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an
almost axiomatic truth." 19 The idea that women could participate in the making
and administering of laws was dismissed "rather as abstract speculation than as
an actual basis for action." 20 In Justice Bradley's now infamous concurring
opinion,21 he supported the court's judgment by referring to the private
sphere/public sphere distinction as fact. 22 The state, he asserted, can restrict
women to the private sphere by declaring them unsuited for responsibilities in
the public. Justice Bradley's opinion not only makes express the idea that the
state could restrict women to the roles of wife and mother, but asserts that the
state should do so for the good of society:
[Tihe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman .... The
control described and critiqued by Hollingworth include personal ideals, law, belief,
education, art, and illusion.
18 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
19 Id. at 132.
20 Id. In affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to exclude Myra Bradwell
from the bar, United States Supreme Court Justice Miller relied on the argument that the
right to be admitted to the state bar is not protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. "This right in no sense depends on citizenship in the United States." Id. at 139. The
lower court decided that excluding Myra Bradwell from the practice of law accorded with
legislative intent; however, it raised the broader question of "[w]hether, in the existing
social relations between men and women, it would promote the proper administration of
justice, and the general well-being of society, to permit women to engage in the trial of
cases at the bar." Id. at 132. It is noteworthy that while Justice Miller used feminine
pronouns in the opinion, in no other way did he acknowledge gender as an issue.
21 For a critical discussion of the Bradley opinion, see Taub & Schneider, supra note
11, at 125-27; D. Kelly Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal Education in
the United States, 1870-1890, in 2 WOMEN AND THi LAw: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL
PERSPECrIVE 231, 238 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982); Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status
of Women in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in WOMEN, THE LAw AND
THE CONsTrrUTION 357, 361-65 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
22 This is the type of social fact that Professor Faigman refers to in his discussion of
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional
Fact-Finding". Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 541 (1991). Justice Bradley's view of the nature of society guides his finding
that the Illinois Bar could exclude Myra Bradwell solely because of her gender.
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constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as
that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. 23
The family is important to society. Women, as wives and mothers, are key to
maintaining the "family institution." Because society has an interest in women
as wives and mothers, women can be regulated as such.24 So the syllogism
goes.25
The United States Supreme Court restated this syllogism in Muller v.
Oregon.26 The Court upheld state restrictions on working hours for women,
while striking down similar restrictions for men.27
Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual rights were
taken away.... it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest
upon and look to them for protection; that her physical structure and a proper
discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect
her .... The limitations... are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also
largely for the benefit of all. 28
23 Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
24 See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875). Lavinia Goodell sought admission to the
Wisconsin Bar under a statute requiring applicants to meet certain age, residency, and
character requirements. Although the court conceded that Goodell met the statutory
requirements, it concluded that the statute applied only to males, and refused to apply
traditional rules of statutory construction in order to bring women within the scope of the
statute.
We cannot but think the common law wise in excluding women from the profession of
law .... The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and
nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and
their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent
with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are
departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.
Id. at 244-45.
25 The current version of the motherhood ideology also uses law to regulate pregnant
women by defining them as mothers of society.
26 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
27 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ('invalidating maximum hour
legislation for bakers as a violation of the liberty of contract).
28 Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
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The Court relied on two physical distinctions-lack of strength relative to man
and the ability to give birth. As a matter of ideology, these biological
distinctions signify woman's cultural function-producing and nurturing
children in order to ensure the future well-being of the race.29 As a matter of
cultural practice reflected in law, the economic freedom of women can be
restricted to protect the unborn child and society. 30
Further, the footnotes to the Muller opinion and the original "Brandeis
brief'31 offered four justifications for restricting the workday for women: "(a)
the physical weakness and difference of women relative to men, (b) her
maternal functions, (c) the rearing and education of children, [and] (d) the
maintenance of the home .... [Each justification is] so important and so far
reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be discussed." 32 The first
reason listed arguably protects the woman's interests. 33 But the other three
reasons speak of the ideology of motherhood and of protecting the interests of
others, not those of the woman.34 The message is clear: Although women are
responsible for the next generation, they are not entitled to make certain
choices, to take certain risks that men can take, because women lack the ability
to make decisions necessary for protecting the next generation. Hence, even
though women bear the broad responsibility of motherhood, they are not
29 See NANCY REEVES, WOMANKIND: BEYOND STEREOTYPES 90-91 (2d ed., 1982)
(citing Muller and Bradwell as illustrations of the "unquestioned norm" that woman's
biological capacity to bear children and man's superior physical strength indicate their place
in the cultural order); Wilson, supra note 21, at 364 (characterizing the Muller decision as
"the worst of all possible legal arguments in terms of equality of treatment of women"
because "the Court concentrated on her procreative functions and those of all American
working women").
30 For a feminist critique of this point, see Nancy Erickson, Historical Background of
"Protective" Labor Legislation: Muller v. Oregon, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAw 155, 157 (D.
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982) (The justification "is even more objectionable because it treats
women as objects: as means rather than ends."); Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon
to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1219, 1224-25 (1986) (listing several
troubling aspects of the argument in the context of a larger evaluation of sex-specific
employer protection policies). Among the problems listed are, "[flirst .... [w]omen were
seen as uniformly dependent on men, and women's financial contributions to their families
as less important than their biologic and domestic contributions. Second, women were not
regarded as individuals .... Instead, all women were seen only in terms of the biologic
and domestic responsibilities associated with motherhood." Id. Until recently, employers
used "fetal protection policies" to exclude women from jobs. See infra notes 412-23 and
accompanying text.
31 Erickson, supra note 30, at 159, nn.35-38.
3 2 Muller, 208 U.S. at 420, n.1.
33 In 1973, the Court condemned this type of "romantic paternalism." See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
34 Erickson, supra note 30, at 159.
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entitled to the authority to define it.35 Recent cases in which judges side with
physicians to override a pregnant woman's medical treatment decision and
cases that more generally punish women for prenatal behavior without
acknowledging their social reality effect this dilemma of disempowerment.
A less direct way of maintaining social order is to impose laws that treat
women who do not fit the norms as deviants, as the cause of disorder. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many church and political figures
feared that industrialization was destroying the established order.36 Lecturers
and editorial writers preached that the power of the family as an instrument of
control was waning, resulting in a future of moral and physical degeneracy.3 7
During the late nineteenth century this fear expressed itself as the Social Purity
Movement.38  Supporters crusaded against prostitution, alcohol, and
pornography. The movement united a wide variety of interests by highlighting
the idea that reinstating the family as the primary vehicle of social control
would save America,39 and that preserving true womanhood and good
motherhood40 would achieve that rescue.
35 The story of Fanny Kemble, told by Eleanor Boatwright, illustrates how this part of
the ideology affected women in marriage and upon divorce. Fanny Kemble was a successful
English actress who married a southern plantation owner, Pierce Mease Butler. She held, in
her husband's words, "peculiar views... that marriage should be a companionship on
equal terms-partnership, in which if both partners agreed all is well-but at no time has
one partner a right to control the other." Mr. Butler, on the other hand, believed in "the
customary and pledged acquiescence of a wife to marital control-nothing more." Pierce
M. Butler, Mr. Butler's Statement, Originally prepared with the aid of is Professional
Council 9-10 (Philadelphia, 1850) (quoted in Eleanor Boatright, The Political and Civil
Status of Women in Georgia 1783-1860, 25 GA. HIST. Q. 301, 315 (Dec. 1941)). At the
child custody determination upon divorce, she was confronted with the common law's
expression of her husband's views, that "a mother as such is entitled to no power but only to
reverence and respect." Id. at 315 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES
§ 454).
36 DuBois, supra note 11, at 266-67.
37 The demands placed on the family as a socializing institution increased during this
period. "On the one hand, the family remained, at least throughout the nineteenth and first
half of the twentieth centuries, the primary means of socialization of children into adults
with personalities appropriate to the demands of industrial capitalism .... On the other
hand, the family was called upon to absorb the heavy strains that the economy placed upon
individuals." GORDON, supra note 7, at 20. The belief that acquired characteristics were
hereditary intensified "the cult of motherhood." Id.
38 See GORDON, supra note 7, at 116-20; Anita L. Morse, Pandora's Box: An Essay
Review of American Lmv and Literature on Prostitution, 4 WIS. WOMEN's L.J. 21, 38-39
(1988).
39 See GORDON, supra note 7, at 116-35; Morse, supra note 38, at 23. During the
1992 presidential election campaign, "family values" became a focal point for defining
political views. It raised debate about the meaning and content of "family values," and
which candidate had the best "family values." At least in part, the debate among the general
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As an example, the Social Purity Movement's crusade against prostitution
expressed in various ways the idea that, for the good of society, women must
remain in their private sphere roles of wife and mother. Social mores cast
prostitutes as "fallen women," weak women who in betraying the norms had
placed social order in jeopardy. Prostitutes contributed to social disorder in a
variety of ways, including purportedly spreading syphilis. 41 Because prostitutes
were presumed to be both morally and intellectually inferior, and because both
types of inferiority were believed hereditary, prostitutes tainted the race by
having substandard children. 42 Furthermore, prostitution contributed to the
population indicated that many perceive a strong correlation between the strength of the
institution of family and control of societal problems. See Lance Morrow, Family Values,
TIME, Aug. 8, 1992, at 23-27. Cf Catherine McClay, The Way We Were, CALIFORNIA
MONTHLY, Feb. 1992, at 10, 12 (reviewing ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATTLED PARADISE
(1991) and citing Professor Skolnick's point that family change is the result of, not the cause
of, social change).
40 Morse, supra note 38, at 48.
41 Kay Ann Holmes, Reflections by Gaslight: Prostitution in Another Age, in WOMEN,
THE LAW AND THE CoNsTrTrioN 367 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987). Venereal disease statutes
also contained the assumption that prostitutes spread syphilis. New York's Venereal Disease
Act of 1918 is excerpted below:
Every citizen arrested for vagrancy as defined under subdivision 3 or 4
section 887 of the code of criminal procedure (prostitution clause) of the tenement
house law or under any statute or ordinance for any offense of the nature specified
in subdivision 4 of section 887 of the code of criminal procedure, or arrested and
charged with a violation of section 1146 of the penal law or 1148 of the penal law
or any person arrested for living in a disorderly house or house of prostitution,
shall be reported within 24 hours by the court or magistrate before whom such
person is arraigned to the board of health or health officer and shall be examined
in accordance with the provisions of the proceeding section. For the purpose of
the examination such person may be detained until the results of such an
examination are known. No such person if convicted shall be released from the
jurisdiction of such court or magistrate until the person so convicted has been
examined as provided for in the proceeding section.
Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
42 GORDON, supra note 7, at 121-22; Holmes, supra note 41, at 374-76. There were
calls for the sterilization of prostitutes based on the heredity argument. At the 1911 annual
meeting of an anti-syphilis, anti-prostitution organization, The American Society of Sanitary
and Moral Prophylaxis, Dr. John N. Hurty, Secretary of the Indiana State Board of Health
and State Health Commissioner, cast sterilization of the morally and physically degenerate
as necessary for the future of the nation.
We are filling our almshouses, hospitals, jails, penitentiaries and homes for
the morally and physically unfortunate by our refusal to meet the social question,
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corruption of minors. 43
Reformers believed that criminalizing prostitution would protect children
and families from harm. For example, social crusaders declared syphilis an
epidemic by 1890. According to reports, seventy percent of all female patients
in New York hospitals were married women infected by their husbands and
ninety percent of men with syphilis were infected by prostitutes. 44 Crusaders
also blamed syphilis for all miscarriages and all cases of blindness at birth.45
Because prostitutes were the purported source of syphilis, 46 restricting
prostitution would eliminate the effects of syphilis on innocent, pure women
and children. 47 According to Darwinian notions it would also prevent
deterioration of the gene pool and reduce the likelihood of corrupting minors.
More importantly, crusaders held that prostitutes created social disorder
because their existence contradicted the ideal of female asexuality and
passivity. 48 Prostitutes acted outside the home in an outlaw marketplace and,
most significantly, they were not "virtuous" according to the strict moral
standards of the time. Because virtuous women, in their role as universal
nourisher, 49 bore the responsibility of maintaining and transmitting family
the sex question, the prevention of the procreation of degenerates in an honest,
sensible, pure-minded manner....
Would it not be worth something to this nation in dollars and cents to raise
men and women who are physically sound? Does not the future and the perpetuity
of our nation, politically and commercially depend upon a generation that is clean
limbed and clear-headed, possessed of brain, brawn, nerve, and are free from
taint and weakness?
John H. Hurty, The Sterilization of Criminals and Defectives, 3 Soc. DISEASEs 1, 17 (1912).
43 Hurdy, supra note 42, at 38-44. Many believed that a widespread White Slave
Trade existed which depended upon a constant supply of young girls who had been
kidnapped and seduced. So, eliminating prostitution would protect young girls. It would
protect boys from the corrupting influences of sex. By law, a boy "found of his... own
free will and knowledge in a house of prostitution or assignation of ill fame... may be
deemed a wayward minor." Id. at 38-39. See also CYRUs WILLOUGHBY WATERMAN,
PROSTrrUTION AND ITS REPRESSION IN NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1931, reprinted in HISTORY,
EcoNOMICs, AND PUBLIC LAW 38-39 (Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University
eds., 1968) (1932) (quoting New York's Wayward Minors Act).
44 Holmes, supra note 41, at 370.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 370-71.
47 Id. at 371.
48 Morse, supra note 38, at 24; GORDON, supra note 7, at 118-19. Note that in reality
most prostitutes were not autonomous with the capacity to negotiate the commercial sphere
on their own behalf. Their "bad" behavior was mediated through the power of men directly
or through female overseers or "madams" whom men allowed to maintain control over
these "bad" women.
49 See GORDON, supra note 7, at 10 (using the term "universal nourisher").
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values, and because family values were the source of social order, it was the
non-virtuous woman who was most directly responsible for disorder. The
crusade against prostitution thus reinforced the idea that when women failed to
participate in the ideology of motherhood, physical and moral evils
proliferated. 50
Condemning prostitutes as "bad" women reinforced the idea that the role
of women in upholding virtue for the sake of others is a natural one. Women
who failed to accept that role were abnormal and in need of control.51 This
conclusion was reached by a complex logic. There were at least two views as
to why women became prostitutes. First, many asserted that women became
prostitutes by choice.52 Second, others believed that women who became
prostitutes did so because of a sudden misfortune, poverty, or other unfortunate
circumstances. 53 Under either view, these women were weak and in need of
control for the sake of the innocent women and children, the institution of
family, and the future of the nation.54
The secondary moral justification for regulating prostitution was the same
one offered for regulating working hours for women-the protection of
children.55 Regulating prostitution would not only protect children from
syphilis, genetic degeneracy, and corruption, it would also tell women to stay
at home and be good mothers, as the emerging science of early childhood
development dictated. It strengthened the ideology of motherhood by restating
the thesis that today's well-nurtured children would lead us into a moral
tomorrow. 56 The crusade against prostitution presented the syllogism described
50 Today, the "problem" of drug- and alcohol-addicted pregnant women is
characterized similarly. The women are assumed to have control over their behavior, so
they are blamed for willfully spreading social disorder and giving birth to addicted infants.
See infra notes 316-42 and accompanying text.
51 Morse, supra note 38, at 24-25. For a contemporary (1916-1917) explication of the
forces used "to keep [women] childbearers and child-rearers," see Hollingworth, supra note
9.
52 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 41, at 372 (citing Report by Committee of 15, formed
in 1910, to study the "problem" of prostitution). "Women are attracted rather than forced
into prostitution-the earnings, the rich attire, and more luxurious mode of life is a strong
attraction." Id.
53 See, e.g., J. ADDAMS, NEW CONSCIENCE AND AN ANCIENT EvIL (1912) (Arno Press
ed., 1972); W. SANGER, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION: ITS EXTENT, CAusEs AND EFFEcrs
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 488-89 (1897) (reprint 1976).
54 Morse, supra note 38, at 25 (noting that laws against prostitution included
prosecuting the male customers, but male customers were "very seldom arrested because
male purchase of sex was acceptable legal and social behavior"). The rhetoric of control for
the sake of others is a prevailing theme of the Code of Perfect Pregnancy.
55 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BLACKWELL, ESSAYS IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 119-20, 164-74
(1902).
56 Morse, supra note 38, at 33-34.
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by Bradwell and Muller. The normal role for a woman is that of wife and
mother. The woman who forsakes these roles not only harms herself, but also
fosters disorder on a society-wide basis. Women, therefore, can be regulated
for the purpose of preventing these harms.
Even though the rhetoric from earlier times may now seem exaggerated 57
and women are no longer entirely restricted to the private sphere,5 8 the Code
contains haunting parallels. 59 The cultural practice of regulating women as
mothers and making them responsible for the next generation, as a way of
expressing fears of social disorder, still occurs. That is, the part of the
motherhood ideology that characterizes women as naturally virtuous, tender,
and compassionate is less prominent today. 60 The assumption that women are
more naturally suited to the role of childraising than men is also less strong.
But, the idea of a "normal" mother as nurturing and self-sacrificing remains
deeply entrenched in today's society. The law still reflects the ideology by
restraining women to be mothers and by penalizing women who are not
"good" mothers.
B. Devalued Motherhood
Patriarchy devalued motherhood in at least three ways during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. First, it operated on a class basis by
presuming that the "Good Mother" model, derived from middle- and upper-
class values and experiences, should apply regardless of class. Second, it used
negative stereotypes of recent immigrants to devalue motherhood on ethnic
lines. Third, it offered race-based mother models for women of color that
truncated their roles or that described women of color as "natally dead." 61
The three examples in subpart A rest on the public sphere/private sphere
distinction. But that public/private construct described (and proscribed) the life
57 See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 8-4, at 573,
n.20 ("From a modem and less sexist perspective, the... concern with the proper role of
women can be understood partly as an attempt to freeze women within the role of wives and
mothers, and partly as reflecting the then-popular conception that the genetic composition of
humanity would be adversely affected should women become too involved in the labor
force."); Becker, supra note 30, at 1219; Faigman, supra note 22; Fran Olsen, From False
Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, llinois 1869-1895,
84 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1518 (1986).
58 Historically, the legal disabilities placed on women, in conjunction with the
prevailing social norms, ensured that women remained confined to the private sphere. As
these disabilities were removed and women entered the marketplace and became a
significant voice in the community, they ceased to be defined solely as wives and mothers.
59 See generally SUSAN FALuDI, BACKLASH (1992).
6 0 But see CAROL GILLIcAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
61 TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK 21 (1992).
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of middle- and upper-class women. Economic necessity generally mandated
that poor women and women of color worked outside the home. 62 So these
women were held to a Good Mother standard that had little to do with their
economic reality. Not surprisingly, the use of state power described in
Bradwell, Muller and by the Social Purity crusaders-disallowing access to
public sphere power, imposing economic restrictions, and blaming and
prosecuting "bad" women, all for social good-to enforce the ideology fell
most heavily on non-privileged women. These women were least able to
comply with expectations of round-the-clock caretaking, nurturing, and moral
guidance. The denial of their economic reality put the focus on their personal
traits. It also set economic standards for motherhood, thus commodifying it,
making good mothering something one could buy.
The jingoistic response to the southern and eastern European immigrants
who arrived from the 1880s made it clear that good motherhood was
economically and educationally privileged, and that it had ethnic content as
well. 63 Juvenile delinquency became a social and political issue during the early
twentieth century. 64 Stereotypes assumed the inherent sexual immorality of
immigrant women. 65 Courts blamed the mothers of these girls. 66 Thus,
immigrant girls or daughters of immigrants were disproportionately punished
for juvenile delinquency, and immigrant women were disproportionately
blamed for the social problem. Negative ethnic stereotypes fed the crusade
against prostitution as well. 67 One stereotype of the woman who became a
prostitute depicted her as ethnic. Ethnicity was part of her immoral, socially
destructive character.
The ideology also devalued motherhood on racial lines. It defined
mothering roles for Black women in subordinated positions within white
households. Black women could be nannies and wet nurses. 68 They were
trusted with performing the physical tasks of motherhood, but not the moral
duty of inculcating children with proper values. Thus, it was assumed that they
should and could leave their own children at home in order to care for white
62 See Phyllis Marynick Palmer, White Women/Black Women: The Dualism of Female
Identity and Experience, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 167, 170-71 (Ronald Takaki ed., 1987).
63 See Maxine S. Seller, Beyond the Stereotype: A New Look at the Immigrant Woman,
in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHiNIcrrY IN AMERICA 197
(Ronald Takaki ed., 1987).
64 Stephen Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality:
Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, in UNITED STATES CONSTITuTIONAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 65, 68 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 75.
67 Holmes, supra note 41, at 83, 88.
68 Palmer, supra note 62, at 167.
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children. The children of Native American women were sent to boarding
schools in large part so they could not learn from their mothers. 69 Because
racial stereotypes described Black women and Native American women as
more like animals than rational beings, it was said that they would not feel the
pain of these racially and economically forced separations as "normal" women
would. They were considered "natally dead." 70 But at the same time they were
blamed for failing to meet the Good Mother standard and hence for
reproducing social problems.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century version of the ideology
forecasts the current regulation of pregnant women. It explains why women as
mothers can be held responsible for social problems. It describes a Good
Mother model that speaks from a particular class, race, and ethnic experience
and then universalizes that model as a standard that should apply in disregard
of other particular realities. And it devalues motherhood on race, class, and
cultural lines.
III. THE CURRENT IDEOLOGY: THE REGULATION OF PREGNANT WOMEN
In this section, I will discuss the aspect of the current version of the
motherhood ideology that focuses on pregnant women. I will use certain
historical comparisons to show four things. First, the ideology of motherhood
is most clearly expressed in law with restrictions that speak to women's
biological capacity to conceive and bear children, not with laws confining
women to the private sphere. However, while these laws and proposals most
directly affect women's reproductive liberty and the twin values of bodily
integrity and decisional autonomy, they also proscribe our larger understanding
of liberty, integrity, and autonomy. This effect in turn solidifies assumptions of
subordination and prevents liberating ideology. Second, over the past century,
these laws have begun to take the shape of an increasingly comprehensive
regulatory scheme. There is not yet a Code per se. But there is a growing sense
that there ought to be a Code. Third, the law is invading a set of choices not
regulated before and it is doing so largely in the name of "fetal interests" and
social good. These are the current code words for subordination. Finally, the
ideology now defines good motherhood largely by negative example, and the
devalued mother continues to be drawn on race, class, and culture lines.
69 EVELYN C. ADAMS, AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION: GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS AND
ECONOMIC PROGRESS 54-58 (1971); NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, 213-24 (Peter
Nabokov ed., 1991); REPORT OF THE INDIAN COMMISSIONER, 1886, xxiv IN U.S. OFFICE OF
EDUCATION, INDIAN EDUCATION AND CIVILIZATION, 48th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Exec. Doe.
No. 95 (1888).70 MORRISON, supra note 61.
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Reproductive liberty can serve as the starting point for analysis. It is often
described in terms of the procreative process: Conception, gestation, and
childbirth. 71 Until recently, attempts to regulate the woman as childbearer have
been aimed primarily at controlling choices surrounding conception. That is,
regulations have taken the form of state laws that restrict a woman's ability to
determine whether to conceive, how to conceive, and whether to terminate the
pregnancy. These regulations elaborate upon the ideology of motherhood by
stating preferences about who should and who should not become pregnant and
hence become mothers.
In the past few years, however, state regulations have emphasized a
different question: To what extent can the state restrain a woman during
pregnancy? The regulation of pregnancy has been premised on a singular
construct: the maternal-fetal conflict. This oppositional description of
pregnancy frames the legal issue in either/or terms and suggests that there must
be a winner and a loser. Hence, the legal issue becomes whether the state
should protect maternal or fetal interests. The use of the construct of conflict to
the exclusion of all other descriptions of pregnancy also precludes women from
defining pregnancy and the choices surrounding it for themselves. And the
ideology of motherhood invests certain "choices" with greater moral weight.
This proscribes the social and political reality of choice. And it justifies legal
intervention to prevent "bad" choices and punish "bad" mothers.
A. Control of Conception
1. Restrictions on Contraception
In terms of biological processes, the first locus of control is the decision of
whether or not to conceive. 72 Birth control by contraceptive is an ancient idea
and practice.73 Birth control as a political movement in the United States began
71 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983).
72 At least one commentator has suggested regulating women before conception. See
infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
73 Ancient and pre-industrial women invented and utilized numerous birth control
methods. Although coitus interruptus, or male withdrawal, was the most common method,
its success hinged on the skill of the male. Thus, in order to achieve reproductive control, it
became necessary for women to create other devices. Herbal brews and potions were
among the first contraceptives, but proved to be almost a complete failure. A far more
effective method was the pessary, a technique dating back to 1850 B.C. A pessary was a
vaginal suppository, or in some cases, a solid object, used to obstruct the path to the cervix,
and was particulary effective when used in combination with some type of spermicidal
substance. Douching, external manipulations of the uterus, and even rudimentary surgical
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in the late nineteenth century. 74 For reasons largely tied to maintaining narrow
roles for women, birth control was considered immoral. Since families were
considered the primary mechanism for social control, society placed a
premium, through the motherhood ideology, on large families. 75 To many,
only large white families were desirable; the privileged, white middle and
upper classes feared birth control would prove "racially devastating" because it
would be used primarily by their own. 76 In addition, they associated birth
control with prostitutes and female sexuality.77 So birth control was believed to
be anathema to social control. 78 By 1873, law contained the social
sterilizations were other common methods of contraception in pre-industrial society.
GORDON, supra note 7, at 40-46.
Although birth control has existed for centuries, it has always been socially regulated.
Id. at 3. For example, coitus interruptus and the use of condoms were the most widely
practiced methods of birth control in the nineteenth century. However, both practices were
condemned by the medical profession, which recommended contraceptive techniques only
when health reasons required that the woman avoid pregnancy. Although the medical
profession was clearly aware of simple and effective contraceptives, it believed that
dissemination of this information would encourage prostitution and cause a decrease in the
number of marriages. HALLER & HALLER, supra note 13, at 114, 122-23 (1974).
Since even legal prohibitions could not stop the private practice of birth control,
religious ideology became the dominant force in convincing couples that birth control was
immoral. GORDON, supra note 7, at 5. Early Christianity viewed sex as inherently evil, and
justified only for purposes of procreation. Thus, any methods employed to avoid
procreation were condemned. Although Protestant church officials attempted to ignore the
issue, the Catholic Church remained steadfast in its condemnation of prevention techniques.
So deeply ingrained were these views, that by the nineteenth century, spreading information
about birth control was not only immoral, but also illegal. Id. at 3-9.
74 GORDON, supra note 7, at 3. The supporters of voluntary motherhood (suffragists,
moral reformers, and free-love advocates) promoted birth control as a means of social
reform. Id. at 95.
75 GORDON, supra note 7, at 10. Many viewed birth control as a "rebellion of women
against their primary social duty-motherhood." Id. at 137.
76 DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 88 (1985). The term "race suicide" referred in part to the fear that "Yankee
'stock,' which displayed the lowest birth rates, would be overwhelmed, numerically and
hence politically, by immigrants, nonwhites, and the poor." Id. See also GORDON, supra
note 7, at 137. President Theodore Roosevelt spoke of race suicide in 1903: "Among
human beings, as among all other living creature[s], if the best specimens do not, and the
poorer specimens do, propagate, the type [race] will go down." BARBARA EHRENREIC14 &
DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OwN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN
135 (1979).
77 GORDON, supra note 7, at 21-22.
78 But see Hollingworth, supra note 9, at 21. In 1916, Hollingworth challenged
"maternal instinct" as a myth used to encourage women to be childbearers. She also
identified "public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion, education, custom, social religion,
personal ideals, art, personality, enlightenment, illusion, and social valuation" as "devices
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condemnation of birth control. Congress passed the Comstock Act, which
prohibited distributing or advertising obscene material, including
contraceptives. 79 The law banned access to both male and female
contraceptives, s° but its effect was to legislate a preference for pregnancy.
Statutes restricting access to contraceptives have been declared
unconstitutional restraints on individual choice in the twentieth century.81 So
women could choose sexuality without motherhood. But recently, political
opposition to abortion has been expressed by limiting or threatening to limit
access to birth control methods, such as RU-486, the "weak" pill, and the
IJD.82 These statutes represent the expansion of traditional reproduction
for impelling women to maintain a birth rate sufficient to insure enough increase in the
population to offset the wastage of war and disease."
79 Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 598 (1873), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461,
1462 (repealed 1971). The Comstock Law made it a misdemeanor to sell, lend, give away,
exhibit, offer to sell, knowingly deposit in the mails, and import "any article whatever, for
the prevention of conception." While the Comstock Act repealed the prohibition against
transmittal of contraceptives, it prohibited the mailing of unsolicited birth control
information or material unless sent to persons listed in the statute, such as physicians and
nurses. Act of Jan. 8, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-662, §§ 3, 4, 84 Stat. 1973.
80 See HALLER & HALLER, supra note 13, at 114-15. Withdrawal, condoms,
diaphragms, and vaginal douches were among the more popular types of contraception used
during this period. Id.
81 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). "If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on the distribution [of contraceptives] to unmarried persons would be
equally impermissible .... If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
82 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Supreme
Court upheld a Missouri abortion restriction. The plurality declined to address the validity
of the statutory preamble that declared, "[t]he life of each human being begins at
conception.... ." Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 1.205-1(1), (2), 1.205-2 (1986). However, five of
the justices found that the provision "unconstitutionally burdens the use of contraceptive
devices, such as the IUD and the 'morning after' pill...." 492 U.S. at 541 n.1 (I.
Blackmun, with whom J. Brennan, and J. Marshall join, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, and with whom J. O'Connor on this point joins); 492 U.S. at 561-64 (J. Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See aLso Benton v. Kessler, 112 S. Ct. 2929
(1992) (denying Leona Benten's application to vacate the Court of Appeals stay of a
preliminary injunction. The injunction would have compelled the Food and Drug
Administration to return a single dosage of RU-486 that she imported from France in order
to terminate her 7 week pregnancy.); Mindy J. Lees, Note, I Want a New Drug: RU-486
and the Right to Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1113 (1990). On January 23, 1993, the
anniversary of Roe v. Wade, President Clinton revoked prohibitions on the importation of
RU-486 pending Food and Drug Administration approval. Karen Tumulty & Marlene
Cimons, Clinton Lifts Restrictions on Abortion, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al.
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regulation. The access restrictions to birth control seem to state a preference at
law for motherhood-the idea that a woman's purpose is reproduction and
childrearing. Criticisms of teenage pregnancy and single motherhood, aimed
largely at women of color, 83 qualify that preference. When viewed in social
context, then, the contraception restrictions state a preference for motherhood
that is white, married, and probably middle class.
2. Restrictions on Abortion
Statutes restricting abortion are probably the most well-known form of
reproduction regulation. Highly publicized and often volatile debates have
taken place between pro-choice and pro-life forces over abortion statutes. 84 In
some ways, these debates continue discussions that began when the abortion
issue became part of the nineteenth century birth control movement. Anti-
abortionists argued then, in part, that abortion violates "natural law."85 Early
birth control supporters, like today's supporters, articulated claims to
reproductive control by casting the issue in terms of male privilege and male
sexual domination.86
83 CONSTANCE WILLARD WILLIAMS, BLACK TEENAGE MOTHERS: PREGNANCY AND
CHILD REARING FROM THEIR PERSPECriVE 9 (1991); see also Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The
Negro Family: 77e Case for National Action, OF-ICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1965) (characterizing Black families as woman-centered and
linking that family structure to joblessness, illegitimacy, poverty, and other issues).
84 See, e.g., Robin Toner, Abortion Fight Goes On, State by State by State, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1991, at A18. More recently, Operation Rescue, the pro-life group founded
by Randall Terry of Binghamton, New York, mounted a vigorous anti-abortion protest in
Wichita, Kansas. The protest began July 15, 1991. Over two thousand protesters had been
arrested by early August. Judge Kelly, whose orders kept the three area abortion clinics
open, received death threats. By mid-August, both protester tactics and police responses
began to escalate. One journal reported, "[flor the first time Friday, children as young as 8
years old lay down in front of cars entering the clinic. And the marshals and police who
arrested 99 protesters, including a 13-year-old, no longer let them shuffle: They were
dragged or, in the teen's case, carried." Judy Lundstrom Thomas, 'Swmmer of Mercy'Rally
Escalates; Abortion Tug-of-War Rends Wichita, NEWSDAY, Aug. 11, 1991, at 17; see also
U.S. Judge in Abortion Case is Target of Death 77treats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1991, at
A16.
85 GORDON, supra note 7, at 35.
86
Is it "proper," "polite," for men, real he men, to go to Washington to say, by
penal law, fines and imprisonment, whether women may continue her natural
right to wash, rinse, or wipe out her own vaginal opening-as well as legislate
when she may blow her nose, dry her eyes, or nurse her babe .... Whatever she
may have been pleased to receive, from man's own, is his gift and her property.
Women do not like rape, and have a right to resist its results .... To cut a child
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Resulting state statutes restricted a woman's decision whether to terminate
a pregnancy. 87 Before that, physicians were prohibited by common law from
performing an abortion after "quickening." 88 Before it "quickened," the fetus
was considered a potential for human life, but not a human being. The law did
not interfere with the woman's abortion decision before that time.89 With
increased understanding of the gestational process, "viability" became the legal
point at which state interests in protecting potential life outweighed those of the
pregnant woman so that the state could restrict or prohibit the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. 90
Since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, the ability of
women to choose abortion has been narrowed considerably, 91 always in the
up in a woman, procure abortion, is a most fearful, tragic deed; but even that does
not call for man's arbitrary jurisdiction over woman's womb.
Angela F.T. Heywood, Body Housekeeping-Home Thnift, 20 THE WORD 2-3 (March
1893).
87 See JAMEs C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINs AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, 20-45 (dating the first wave of abortion legislation to the
period between 1821 and 1841). But see Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Marzen, Abortion
and Midwifery: A Footnote in Legal History, in NEw PERSPECrIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION
199 (Thomas W. Hilgar et al. eds., 1981) (arguing that restrictions on midwives dating back
to at least a 1716 New York law represent earlier attempts to restrict abortion by
legislation).
88 Before abortion legislation was enacted in the United States, courts referred to
British common law. Under the common law, a fetus did not exist until it had quickened.
"Quickening" occured when the pregnant woman herself first perceived fetal movement.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-33 (1973); MOHR, supra note 87, at 3-4.
89 "It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before 'quickening'-the
first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the
18th week of pregnancy-was not an indictable offense." Roe, 410 U.S. at 132.
90 Id. at 163.
91 States can restrict the ability of minors to choose abortion. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the Supreme
Court invalidated state statutes requiring parental consent to abortion for minors, but at the
same time set out guidelines for valid parental consent requirements. In H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Court also upheld a statute requiring a physician to notify the
parents of a dependent, unmarried minor before performing an abortion.
States can restrict the ability of poor women to choose abortion. In Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), the Court upheld a state welfare regulation that authorized Medicaid
reimbursement for medical services related to childbirth but not for nontherapeutic
abortions. In Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977), the Court allowed the City of St.
Louis to impose the same type of economic restrictions when it held that there was "no
constitutional violation... in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed
hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic
abortions." And the federal government may refuse federal Medicaid funds to states for
abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
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direction of reinforcing the preference for women as childbearers. For
example, the Supreme Court, in upholding restrictions on federal funding of
abortions, declared: "the 'government may validly choose to favor childbirth
over abortion and to implement that choice by funding medical services relating
carried to term." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980) (quoting the Hyde
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976)).
More recently, a broader range of restrictions has been held valid. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court held constitutional a
Missouri statute that requires all state laws be interpreted to accord unborn children the
same rights enjoyed by other persons, that requires a physician who has reason to believe a
woman may be 20 or more weeks pregnant to conduct viability tests before performing an
abortion, that bans use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist abortions
unless necessary to save the woman's life, and that bans use of public funds, employees, or
facilities to counsel a woman to have an abortion. In Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991), the Court validated Public Health Service Act regulations specifying that a "Title X
project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning," even upon a specific request for information about abortion providers, but
requiring that every pregnant client be referred "for appropriate prenatal and/or social
services by furnishing a list of available providers that promote the welfare of the mother
and the unborn child." Id. at 1776-77. Through this decision, the government's power to
restrict abortion by limiting women's access to information was recognized.
The Senate and the House of Representatives responded immediately to the Rust
decision by introducing legislation to lift its so-called gag rule and permit federally financed
clinics to offer "non-directive" counseling on abortion and birth control. Philip J. Hilts,
ainics Seek to Overturn Rule on Abortion Advice, N.Y. TIMEs, May 25,1991, at A9. Also,
the American Medical Association, which traditionally distanced itself from the abortion
debate, issued a strongly worded statement condemning Rust, and went on record in favor
of legislation designed to overturn it. James A. Barnes, New Clash on Abortion, NAT'L.
JOURNAL, June 8, 1991, vol. 23, at 1353; Anne Kornhauser, Aborton Groups Try to Recruit
AMA, LEGAL TIMEs, June 3, 1991, at 5; John Deardourff, John Sununu and the Abort'on
Gag Rule, WASHINGTON POST (editorial), Nov. 6, 1991, at A25. President Clinton issued an
administrative order on January 23, 1993 lifting the federal "gag rule." 58 Fed. Reg. 7455
(1993).
In the meantime, several state legislatures have proposed or enacted laws to restrict
access to abortion except for victims of incest or rape, or when necessary to save the life of
the woman. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1 (1991). Most tellingly, the Supreme
Court demoted the right to decide from a fundamental right to something less. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court held that the state can impose regulations that promote the
state's interests in protecting the woman's health and potential life, unless the regulations
have "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus." In applying this "undue burden analysis" rather than strict
scrutiny, the Court held valid a potentially over-exclusive statutory definition of "medical
emergency," a requirement that a physician must include in the informed consent process
certain information intended to dissuade women from choosing abortion, a twenty-four hour
waiting period, a parental informed consent requirement, and a recordkeeping and reporting
requirement. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2819-33 (1992).
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to childbirth but not those relating to abortion."' 92 More recently, the Justice
Department intervened in abortion disputes in Virginia and Kansas. In both
cases women's clinics targeted by anti-abortion protesters invoked the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 for the proposition that it is illegal for two or more persons
to conspire "for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons" from
exercising their Constitutional rights. The Justice Department fied briefs in
both cases contending that the 1871 law does not protect women seeking
abortions. 93 These developments represent, in part, an expansion of the moral-
legal position taken by the federal government in the abortion debate-that the
state may prefer one ideological position and define motherhood. 94
The legal disputes reflect the public debate which has centered on the
meaning of motherhood. The pro-life arguments are tied to traditional white,
middle class beliefs and values, which include the assumptions that immutable
biological traits indicate our natural moral roles-motherhood for women-and
that motherhood should only occur within a marriage.95 The stigmatized
"choices" are abortion and single motherhood. Because single motherhood is
often described as a black community problem, the pro-life arguments suggest
that the Good Mother model is both married and non-black.
3. Sterilization Abuse
A less visible type of conception regulation than abortion restriction is
sterilization abuse. A person who voluntarily chooses to be sterilized opts not
92 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766 (1991) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d
401, 410 (2d Cir. 1989)).
93 In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 1871 civil rights law could not be
used to prosecute anti-abortion protesters from demonstrating on or near clinic grounds.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). See also Gwen Ifill,
1871 Rights Law at Issue In a Dispute on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1991, at A10.
94 planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Justice O'Connor's opinion
for the Court in Casey describes the right to decide as a motherhood issue. She defines
motherhood with clear reference to the Ideology, then concludes on an inconsistent note:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles
her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.... The destiny of the
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.
Id. at 2807.
95 KRISTIN LuKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLrrIcs OFMOTHERHOOD 193-215 (1984).
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to conceive, a decision fully within the scope of reproductive liberty. But if a
woman is forcibly sterilized, she is deprived of that liberty. 96 As Part H1
explains, it is cultural practice to restrict the autonomy of women, and it is the
ideology of motherhood that makes the practice seem both natural and morally
correct. The facts indicate that women have been and are forcibly sterilized
because they have violated the ideology; they have been deemed "bad"
mothers.
Not suprisingly, the first forcible sterilization laws were passed as part of
the Social Purity Movement. 97 It was during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that sterilization was looked to for the control of hereditary
characteristics.98 "Purity" referred to race, culture, class, and intelligence as
well as to morals, and each of these traits was considered to be hereditary. 99
Accordingly, forcible sterilization laws were seen as attempts to purify society
by keeping those with weak traits from breeding. 1°° Those with weak traits
96 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In writing for the court,
Justice Douglas stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating
effects.... There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches.... He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty.
Id.
97 KEVLES, supra note 76, at 100-07; James B. O'Hara & T. Howland Sanks,
Eugenic Stetilization, 45 GEo. L.J. 20 (1956).
98 "The best minds of today have accepted the fact that if superior people are desired,
they must be bred; and if imbeciles, criminals, paupers, and [the] otherwise unfit are
undesirable citizens they must not be bred." KEVLEs, supra note 76, at 85 (quoting
VICrORIA WOODHULL, THE RAPID MULTIPLICATION OF THE UNFrT (1891)); see also
GORDON, supra note 7, at 120-22.
99 GORDON, supra note 7, at 120-21. Environmental factors were not distinguished
from hereditary factors in human development. All traits were assumed to be hereditary.
100 See KEVLES, supra note 76, at 277. The idea of achieving social purity is still being
expressed in terms of heredity. For example, genetic screening may be conducted to
identify persons carrying deleterious genes. Testing is used to discourage those carrying
genes for Tay-Sachs, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, and cystic fibrosis from conceiving.
They are considered unfit, in a sense, to become biological parents. The process can be just
as stigmatizing as the prosecution of prostitutes or the sterilization abuse of poor women of
color, because of the moral weight assigned to parenthood in our society. "ITMhe freedom of
parenthood is a freedom to good parentage, and not a license to produce seriously defective
individuals to bear their own burdens." PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN 98 (1970)
(Ramsey made this statement in support of his proposal that the state refuse marriage
licenses to those who would transmit genetic diseases.). Interestingly, persons are
stigmatized before the harm occurs-before persons who are carriers conceive a child with
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were likely to be persons of color, whites of southern or eastern European
stock, persons with intellectual or emotional disabilities, 10 1 persons addicted to
alcohol or drugs,102 and/or persons of immoral character according to the rigid
social code of the day. 103
The story of Carrie Buck is well-known.104 Perhaps less well-known is
that sterilization laws were used against prostitutes to prevent them from
transmitting the traits that made them "bad" women.105 Many women were
institutionalized because they did not, like prostitutes, fit the ideal of true
womanhood. Women who expressed their sexuality, 106 women who suffered
Tay-Sachs or sickle cell anemia. Because of their potential to have defective children,
carriers are treated as a risk to their would-be children and to society. Moral and legal
deterrents to conception have been created as a result.
101 See, e.g., KEVLES, supra note 76, at 100 (describing Indiana's marriage law of
1905). The statute "forbade the marriage of the mentally deficient, persons having a
'transmissible disease,' and habitual drunkards; required a health certificate of all persons
released from institutions; and declared void all marriages contracted in another state in an
effort to avoid the Indiana law."
10 2 Id. at 99.
103 Id. at 107.
104 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Supreme Court upheld a Virginia
sterilization statute as applied to Carrie Buck. It was established that Carrie Buck, her one-
month old infant, and her mother were all feeble-minded. The Court took this as proof that
feeble-mindedness was hereditary. In writing for the court, Justice Holmes concluded,
"Three generations of imbeciles is enough." A few years later, Carrie Buck's daughter,
Vivian, died. According to her second grade teachers, she was quite bright. For further
background and discussion of this case, see KEvLEs, supra note 76, at 110-12; Charles
Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CAL. L. REV. 917,
920-21 (1974); O'Hara & Sanks, supra note 97, at 28-32; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Havi Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1473-76 (1991); Susan Stefan, Whose Egg is It Anyvay?:
Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Insitutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L.
REV. 404, 413-16 (1989).
105 GORDON, supra note 7, at 121 (summarizing the rationale for sterilizing women
who engaged in prostitution: "[B]ad heredity created lust which created prostitution; if
prostitutes could be prevented from bearing children their ranks would not be
replenished."); Holmes, supra note 41, at 374-76.
106 Other legal practices expressed stereotypes about female sexuality in a punitive
manner.
In the Progressive period the abundant literature on delinquency was riddled with
stereotypical assumptions about women and, in particular, about immigrant women.
These stereotypes laid a basis for more punitive treatment of delinquent girls than
delinquent boys. Girls were prosecuted almost exclusively for 'immoral' conduct, a
very broad category that defined all sexual exploration as fundamentally perverse and
predictive of future promiscuity, perhaps even prostitution.
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from postpartum depression, 107 and women of color10 8 were more often
deemed disturbed and in need of institutionalization. Since sterilization laws
were aimed at the institutionalized, these women were more likely to be
forcibly sterilized. These women did not fit within the ideal of motherhood,
and so were prevented from becoming mothers.
It is still poor women of color who are most likely to be deemed unfit and
subjected to sterilization abuse.10 9 Ethnic elitism, classism, and racism all
Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Cime Of Precocious Sexuality: Female
Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, in WOMEN, THE LAW, AND THE
CoNsTrruTIoN 448 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
107 Postpartum depression was understood to be an unnatural reaction to motherhood.
It was taken as an indication that a woman's moral character was flawed. Thus, it seems
that women suffering from postpartum depression were institutionalized as immoral women,
not as women in need of medical care. Ellen Dwyer, The Weaker Vessel: Legal Versus
Social Reality in Mental Commitments in Nineteenth-Century New York, in 1 WOMEN AND
THE LAW 94-97 (1982); see also Robert T. Roth & Judith Lerner, Sex-Based Discrimination
in the Mental Institutionalization of Women, 62 CAL. L. REv. 789 (1974) (describing how
psychiatry today reflects the dominant society's belief in a rigidly defined female role in a
way that justifies the retention and application of that belief by society and the law).
108 "[J]udged by the evolving nineteenth-century ideology of femininity, which
emphasized women's roles as nurturing mothers and gentle companions and housekeepers
for their husbands, Black women were practically anomalies." ANGELA DAvIs, WOMEN,
RACE, AND CLASS 5 (1981); see also Dwyer, supra note 107, at 88.
109 Several cases of widespread sterilization abuse of women of color have been
exposed in the past twenty years. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of
Color, and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCrIVE LAws FOR THE 1990S 23, 46 (Sherill
Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989). In 1974, a federal district court found that 100,000 to
150,000 poor women had been sterilized under federally funded programs. An indefinite
number of poor people were told that their welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they
submitted to sterilization. See Relfv. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974),
modification denied sub nom. Relf v. Mathews, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated,
565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In response to the widespread publicity of Relf, the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued interim regulations protecting an
adult's right of informed consent to sterilization in April 1974. But a survey conducted by
the American Civil Liberties Union in 1975 revealed that 70 of the responding hospitals
were ignoring these regulations.
Today, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-8 provides that public officials and authorities cannot force
sterilization on beneficiaries. However, the practical effect of recent enactments is to do just
that. Subchapters XIX and XX of the Social Security Act authorize matching Medicaid
reimbursement for sterilization. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (West 1991); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1397a(a)(2) (1988). But Congress and state legislatures have restricted use of public funds,
public facilities, and public employees for abortion through the Hyde Amendments. See
Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976). Moreover, under Title X, information
about abortions cannot even be discussed. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). So,
as Dorothy Roberts points out, "sterilization is the only publicly-funded birth control
method readily available to poor women of color." Roberts, supra note 104, at 1444.
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contribute to the fact that the sterilization rates for poor women and women of
color are higher than for white women. 110 The attitude underlying some of
these reasons is that "excessive childbearing" by poor women of color is
undesirable." 1 In the words of Justice Holmes, "We have seen more than once
that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would
be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
state for these lesser sacrifices.., in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence."112 At the same time, sterilization has been touted as fiscally
good for society. The racial conservationists posit that sterilization reduces the
number of persons on Medicaid who will need obstetrical services or
contraceptives, and therefore reduces the demand for public resources. 113
The court in Relf v. Weinberger, for example, found "uncontroverted
evidence in the record that.., an indefinite number of poor people have been
improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that
various federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they
submitted to irreversible sterilization." 114 An estimated thirty to forty-two
Although statistics indicate that direct sterilization abuse may have ceased, indirect
means are still being used against poor women of color. See Adele Clarke, Subtle Forms of
Sterilization Abuse: A Reproductive Rights Analysis, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE
FOR MOTHERHOOD? 188, 200 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1984); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note
109, at 47-48; see also Murdock, supra note 104 (describing how another group of
women-the mentally retarded-are also vulnerable to sterilization abuse); Stefan, supra
note 104, at 419-27. Health Research Group, a Ralph Nader-affiliated consumer
organization in Washington, D.C., reported in 1973 that sterilizations were being coerced
throughout the United States. The report described one method of indirect sterilization
abuse-in the words of one ob/gyn, "women seem to accept the procedure more readily if
the word 'operation' is not used," and the sterilization is described merely as a "stitch in the
vagina." See GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS
WOMEN AS PATIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 182 (1973).
110 Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 109, at 47. By 1982, 34 percent of married black
women aged 15 to 44 had been sterilized, as compared with 25 percent of white women.
High sterilization rates have also been reported for Hispanic and Native American women.
Ill See Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 109, at 47; Roberts, supra note 104, at 1436-44.
Gena Corea reports a conversation with Dr. C., chief of surgery in a northeastern hospital:
"The doctor feels that a girl with lots of kids, on welfare, and not intelligent enough to use
birth control, is better off being sterilized." "Not intelligent enough to use birth control" is
often a Code phrase for "black" or "poor." COREA, supra note 109, at 180-81.
112 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
113 CORBA, supra note 109, at 181 ("As physicians we have obligations to our
individual patients, but we also have obligations to the society of which we are a
part .... The welfare mess ... cries out for solutions, one of which is fertility control.");
Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 109, at 47 (citing Martha Eliot Health Center, Reproductive
Health Report, 1985).
114 372 F. Supp. 1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
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percent of all Native Americans have been sterilized.115 A recent controversy
in Los Angeles, California concerned allegations of excessive sterilization of
Hispanic women at public hospitals, many of whom did not speak or
understand English.' 16
A disturbing message is sent by the excessive sterilization of poor women
of color: there is an ideal for motherhood that is narrow and not easily met by
those on society's fringe. 117 In addition, federal funding of involuntary
sterilization sends the message that if anyone is to sacrifice for the good of
society, it should be women; and it should be women because they are
childbearers. Thus, the ideal for motherhood is still synonomous with the idea
of social good, and social good is based on constructs of race and class.
4. Surrogate Motherhood
Other means of restricting the woman's choices surrounding conception
echo the same messages, but arise from more recent advances in medicine.
Reproduction by surrogacy has triggered the strongest articulations of the
motherhood ideology. 118 Judges, religious leaders, reporters, and others have
condemned women who have acted as surrogates as babysellers," 9 as
reproductive prostitutes, 120 and as surrogate uteri121 because these women have
115 ALLIANCE AGAINST WOMEN'S OPPRESSION, CAUGHT IN THE CROSSIRE: MINORITY
WOMEN AND REPRODUCTrIVE RIGHTS 5 (1983).
116 Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV-75-2057-JWC (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1978)
(judgment for defendants in unreported case); see also Carlos G. Velez-I, The
Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican Women in Los Angeles, in TWICE A MINORITY:
MEXICAN AIERICAN WOMAN 235 (Margarita B. Melville ed., 1980); Helen Rodriques-
Triaz, Sterilization Abuse, in BIOLOGICAL WoMAN-THE CONvENiENT MYTH 147, 151
(1982).
117 On the other hand, those women who resemble the ideal described by the dominant
culture may have trouble choosing sterilization. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Aborion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. Rav. 1011, 1067 n.196
(1989) ("[The] ... physician's actions reflect the dominant social message-that a healthy
(white) woman should want to bear a child.").
118 For a full discussion of the legal and ethical implications of surrogate motherhood,
see MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988).
119 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242 (N.J. 1988) ("The negative consequences of
baby-buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential for
placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest of the child or the natural
mother."). But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)
(holding that paid surrogacy arrangements do not violate anti-baby selling laws because the
arrangement is made before the child is conceived).
120 FIELD, supra note 118, at 28.
121 Robert Hanley, A Reporter's Notebook- Tactics in Baby M Trial, N.Y. TMEs, Feb.
9, 1987, at B3.
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separated biological motherhood from the role of social motherhood described
by the ideology. 122 These speakers have vilified women acting as surrogates
despite the claim by many that they find satisfaction in enabling other women
to become mothers; 123 altruism, lauded as a maternal virtue in other contexts,
is devalued when women act in ways that contradict the ideology.
The famous Baby M case124 was publicly discussed and legally judged in
ways that expressed condemnation of Mary Beth Whitehead, the woman who
acted as surrogate, and Elizabeth Stern, the would-be adoptive mother.
However, the discussion left the public image and legal standing of William
Stern intact. The media and counsel for William and Elizabeth Stem portrayed
Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother, as a disturbed woman. 125 Yet, if
one disregards the reproductive method used, Mary Beth Whitehead acted in
ways for which we normally praise mothers. She risked being held in contempt
of court, she left the state of New Jersey, and she took physical risks by
climbing out through a motel window to escape with her daughter. 126 In short,
she went to great extremes to preserve the mother-child relationship. 127 Yet the
New Jersey Supreme Court, citing the best interests of the child standard,
awarded custody to the Sterns. 128 Elizabeth Stem was not as badly portrayed as
Mary Beth Whitehead. 129 Yet her reason for not choosing pregnancy-fear that
122 The more substantial basis for regulating surrogacy is that it creates opportunities
for degrading women, particularly poor women of color, and for commodifying human life.
See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1227; Digest of Amicus Brief of Foundation on Economic
Trends et al., In re Baby M, at 6-10 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARv. L. Rv. 1849, 1928-36 (1987).
123 See FIELD, supra note 118, at 20-21.
124 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
125 Bergen County Superior Court Judge Harvey R. Sorkow criticized Ms. Whitehead
for not being able to separate her children's needs from her own. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d
1128 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, attributed the potential harmful effects of surrogacy to children to the
natural mother, particularly, "the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that
she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money." In re Baby M,
537 A.2d at 1250.
126 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
127 Compare the positive portrayal of Elizabeth Morgan, the woman who was jailed
for hiding her child. Marlene Cimons, Elizabeth Morgan: Life After Jail, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
24, 1989, at El.
128 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1258.
129 The different treatment arose, in part, from class distinctions between the two
potential mothers. See Katha Pollitt, Contracts and Apple Pie: The Strange Case of Baby M,
244 THE NATION 667, 682 (1987). The Stems were professionals. Elizabeth Stern was a
professor of pediatrics and her husband was a biochemist. Their combined yearly income
approached $90,000. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249. Mary Beth Whitehead was a 27-
year-old housewife and mother of two, whose husband was a garbage collector. Pam
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it would aggravate her multiple sclerosis-was denigrated as exaggerated. 130
Although Elizabeth Stem did seek to adopt the child legally, the court denied
this petition. 131 The idea seemed to be that there was something wrong with a
woman who would not take the risks of pregnancy. 132
The Baby M case became yet another opportunity to elaborate upon the
description of bad mothers. It sought to discourage women from deciding how
to conceive and when to conceive by surrogacy. And the practice of regulating
women as childbearers by restricting the choices surrounding conception
continues. In the next subsection, I will describe how recent regulations
implicate the choices a woman makes during pregnancy-after conception takes
place, and after the decision to terminate the pregnancy becomes irrelevant.
B. Control of the Pregnancy
Historically, the law did not restrict women's behavior during pregnancy.
Pregnant women have curtailed their activities in response to the social norms
of proper pregnancy behavior or the dictates of physicians. In the past few
years, the state has begun stepping in to reinforce the idea that a woman should
act in particular ways and for particular reasons during pregnancy. The
message used to justify state intervention is that a pregnant woman is a mother
who should think and act first and foremost to protect the health of the fetus
she carries, and that she should do so not only to ensure a good future for the
fetus, but also for society.
I have divided my discussion of restrictions into the categories of direct and
indirect pregnancy regulations. Direct regulations deny the possibility that the
woman has a choice. Indirect regulations suggest that the woman has a choice,
but provide legal penalties if the woman makes the "wrong" choice.
Murphy, Outcry over 'Baby M' Ruling-Feminists Blast Decision as E&ploiting Poor
Women, CHICAGO TRIBuNE, April 2, 1987, at 4. "At the time of trial, the Whitehead's net
assets were probably negative.... ." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
130 "Her anxiety appears to have exceeded the actual risk, which current medical
authorities assess as minimal." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. The court characterized
the effect of Elizabeth Stem's fears on Mr. Stem more sympathetically: "The decision had a
special significance for Mr. Stem. Most of his family had been destroyed in the Holocaust.
As the family's only survivor, he very much wanted to continue his bloodline." Id.
131 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1244-45.
132 The tone in which these remarks were made is reminiscent of the earlier criticisms
of educated, upper middle class women as too delicate to be good childbearers. Too much
thinking apparently weakened the constitution of such women and made them less fit to be
mothers.
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1. Direct Regulation of the Pregnant Woman
Direct regulations of the pregnancy are usually imposed by the state via the
doctor-patient relationship. That is, the state steps in to enforce the doctor's
opinion that medical intervention is necessary despite the woman's decision to
refuse treatment. Accordingly, I begin this section on direct regulation by
describing how the decisionmaking process promotes "consent" as the choice
of good mothers and refusal as the choice of unnatural women. I then discuss
direct regulations.
Note that in organizing my discussion of the types of direct regulation, I
have inverted the biological order of events in pregnancy. I begin by discussing
regulations created in response to high risk deliveries and end by discussing
issues arising before conception. Although this reverses the order in which
these events occur, it does reflect the direction of the slippery slope built by
law and technology. The moral-legal arguments for restricting procreative
liberty which developed during the abortion debate first made a noticeable
appearance in high-risk, third-trimester pregnancy situations. The push is now
expanding toward requiring medical care earlier in the reproductive process
and more standard (non-emergency) therapies. This trend both describes and
prescribes an emerging norm-the completely regulated woman.
a. The Decisionmaking Process
A general rule of medical treatment is that doctors cannot act without the
patient's informed consent.133 Ideally, the doctrine of informed consent
promotes patient autonomy 134 and preserves the professional integrity of the
133 Early statements of this principle are presented in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.") and Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ("A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.").
134 "The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that
'[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.. . .' True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options
available and the risks attendant upon each." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); see also TOM L. BEAuCHAMP & JAMES F.
CmILDRESS, PRPNCIPLES oFBIoMEDIcALETHICs 67-113 (3d ed. 1989).
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physician. 135 Medical and legal experts describe the doctrine as a process, "an
invitation, asking for consent, seeking authorization to proceed, and not making
a demand under the guise of a symbolic egalitarian gesture." 136 When the
patient is pregnant, however, the consent process becomes more complicated.
The American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists recognize the fetus as a separate patient. 137 Yet
the woman is the only patient capable of giving informed consent.
Many of the fetal therapies available are new and their risks difficult to
anticipate.138 But so long as the decision to take the unknown risk is made
under cover of informed consent, "physicians feel justified in using new
'therapies."' 139 In addition, the physician who believes the proposed therapy to
be the better choice may describe it in a way that emphasizes its benefits and
minimizes its risks. For example, in the early 1960s doctors recommended
DES to diabetic pregnant women, 140 had pregnant women X-rayed, limited
their weight gain during pregnancy to thirteen pounds, and prescribed diuretics
to them. 141 Doctors made these recommendations in good faith, but did so
135 Health care providers have an obligation to promote the patient's welfare, "as
defined in part by the patient's own values." The informed consent process facilitates this
"principle of beneficence" by provoking the patient to identify her values. See BEAUCHAMP
& CHILDRESS, supra note 134, at 194-97.
136 ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 99 (2d ed.
1986) (quoting Jay Katz, The Regulation of Human Research-Reflections and Proposals,
21 CLINICAL REs. 785-91 (1973)).
137 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee Opinion Number
55, October 1987, Patient Choice Maternal Fetal Conflict.
138 Ruth Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal
Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 201, 206-10 (1982).
139 Id. at 207.
140 Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 277, 312 (1987-88).
141 SHEILA KITZINGER, WOMEN AS MOTHERS 73-74 (1978); see also Richard Graham
Law, Standards of Obstetric Care: The Report of the North-West Metropolitan Regional
Obstetric Survey, 1962-1964 146 (1967) ("Where a twin pregnancy is suspected an X-ray
examination of the abdomen is usually carried out in order both to confirm the diagnosis
and, to a lesser extent, for other reasons .... If, as shown for hospital booked patients, X-
ray examination of a twin pregnancy is deemed necessary, it is impossible to understand
why this course was not followed [in other situations]."). LAWRENCE Q. CRAWLEY,
REPRODUC[ION, SEX AND PREPARATION FOR MARRIAGE 45 (1964) ("She is usually advised
to limit the gain during pregnancy to between fifteen and twenty pounds . . . .Weight
control also minimizes the chances of complications during pregnancy. The additional load
that the needs of the developing child place on the mother's kidneys, heart, liver and
circulation in general might be dangerously increased by the added burden placed on these
same organs by sudden and excessive weight gain."); Sandra K. Danziger, Male Doctor-
Female Patient, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH 128 (1986); HELEN M. WALLACE ET AL.,
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despite their lack of complete information about the risks these therapies posed.
Women who refused to follow these recommendations were treated as
problems. 142 For example, many women were told that labor must be induced
"because they had put on too much or had not gained enough [weight]." 143 Yet
in 1970, research revealed that these restrictions on weight gain increased the
risk of low infant birth weight. And DES and X-rays were found to be toxic
both to women and to developing fetuses.
Many women faced with a treatment decision consent for the purpose of
promoting fetal health, even if doing so jeopardizes their own well-being.
These consents are not challenged. They meet our expectations of good
motherhood. But when a woman refuses treatment deemed by a physician as
best for the fetus, both doctors and judges impute bad motive or character to
her choice. 144 And by refusing consent she becomes a bad or "unnatural"
mother. 145 For example, four doctors, discussing the situation in which a
woman refused to consent to surgery intended to save the fetus, assumed that
"the patient hopes to be freed in this way of an undesired pregnancy." 146 A
similar article described the frustrations of the medical team: "they viewed the
patient's response as one of unreasonable insensitivity to the welfare of [the]
infant." 147 As the cases reveal, the woman may have religious reasons for
refusing treatment. 148 She may be afraid, 149 or she may simply disagree with
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PRACriCEs: PROBLEMS, RESOURCES AND METHODS OF
DELIVERY 324 (1973).
14 2 KITZINGER, supra note 141, at 73, 117; see also RICHARD W. WERTZ & DOROTHY
C. WERTZ, LYiNG-IN: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 168 (1977).
143 KITZINGER, supra note 141, at 73.
144 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced
Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REv. 487, 502-04 (1992) (reviewing
the text of forced medical treatment cases and finding that doctors and judges discount the
woman's voice by characterizing her as stubborn, guilty, or irrational).
145 K1TZINGER, supra note 141, at 117. Obstetricians can feel perplexed and threatened
by patients who do not cooperate. In response to the patient who questions his judgment, the
doctor may respond with "verbal threats that unless she relies on him she is endangering her
baby's life; 'You don't want to harm your baby, do you?' or even 'Do you want to kill your
baby?'"; see also Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 720
(1986). The woman who refuses treatment will be told that she "is acting contrary to the
natural bonds of affection between a mother and her soon-to-be-born child." Id.
146 J.R. Leiberman et al., The Fetal Right to Live, 53 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 515, 515 (1975).
147 Watson A. Bowes, Jr. & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical
and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209, 211 (1981).
148 See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
149 See Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147. This is the woman described in note 145
supra who was assumed to be an insensitive mother.
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the doctor's prognosis.150 The story of her imputed badness, however, is the
one that prevails at law. It justifies legally-sanctioned coerced consent and, as
seen in the next set of cases, court-ordered medical treatment.
The informed consent process is structured to allow or even facilitate
pressuring the woman into changing her mind. The Policy on Decision-Making
With Pregnant Patients at The George Washington University Hospital151
provides, "this hospital's policy is to accede to the pregnant patient's
preference whenever possible." 152 It also provides that "[i]n such a situation
[one in which the woman has refused medical treatment], the attending
physician should explore the reasoning behind the pregnant patient's
decision."1 53 It suggests "additional counseling (by the obstetrician and by
pediatric and other appropriate specialists)." 154 It raises the idea that the
decision might stem "from emotional or psychological difficulties," meriting
psychiatric counseling to "restore the patient's decision-making capacity." And
the physician is "encouraged to bring such matters to the attention of the
hospital ethics committee." 155 Presumably, the policy is intended to ensure that
the woman's decision is fully informed and that she is competent, but it also
assumes that the woman is choosing incorrectly. This assumption makes the
informed consent process a "demand under the guise of a symbolic egalitarian
gesture. "15
6
Doctors who feel strongly that the woman's choice is wrong 157 may do
more than seek authorization-they may attempt to persuade her to change her
mind in ways that amount to coercion. For example, the doctor may tell the
patient, very frankly, that by not consenting she places the doctor in a bind,
150 See infra note 165 and accompanying text. There is always a chance that a doctor's
diagnosis or assessment of risk may be incorrect. This is another factor that influences the
informed consent process.
151 This policy was developed as part of an out-of-court settlement ending a suit for
medical malpractice and civil rights violations. The lawsuit was initiated by the parents of
Angela Carder, who died at the hospital after undergoing a court-ordered cesarean section.
See infra notes 167-171 and accompanying text. Christine St. Andre, hospital administrator,
said the policy would serve to "keep these difficult decisions within the doctor-patient
relationship" and avoid "the unnecessary and sometimes detrimental resort to courts."
Linda Greenhouse, Hospital Sets Policy on Pregnant Patients' Rights, N.Y. T]MEs, Nov.
29, 1990, at B14.
152 Policy on Decision-Making with Pregnant Patients at The George Washington
University Hospital, at 4 (1992).
153 Id. at3.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 4.
156 See LnviNE, supra note 136.
157 See, e.g., Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147, at 211; Leiberman, supra note
146, at 515.
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and that to escape the bind the doctor will get a court order. 158 This may
influence the patient by intimidating her. Or, it may persuade her that the
doctor's opinion bears great weight. In either case, she would not be giving
informed consent, but acceding to authority. In some instances, the woman
changes her mind when literally faced with authority-when confronted by the
judge or when the court order has issued.159
b. Forced Cesarean Sections
When a judge steps into the delivery room and issues an order for a
cesarean section against the woman's wishes, the state regulates the pregnant
woman. 160 Few such cases are reported. 161 Of the reported cases, the barebone
facts are similar.162 The physician determines that a vaginal delivery might
harm the fetus and, sometimes, the woman. The physician then recommends a
cesarean section. The pregnant woman refuses to give her informed consent.
The physician consults with hospital administrators and attorneys. The
administrators, in turn, locate a judge for the purpose of obtaining a court order
158 The physician in this situation faces a difficult dilemma. She has an ethical duty to
care for each of her patients. If she respects the woman's decision to refuse treatment, the
doctor apparently fails to fulfill her duty to the fetus. Nelson, supra note 145, at 704.
159 See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEWENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987). Of 15 petitions for court-ordered cesarean sections,
13 were granted. Of the 13 court orders, 2 were not enforced "because the patient finally
agreed to the procedure." Id. See also Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147, at 210 (The
authors describe a woman who would not consent to a cesarean section despite decelerations
in the fetal heart rate: "Following the court's decision, the patient, although still reluctant,
became more cooperative and agreed to the induction of general anesthesia.").
160 For a detailed analysis of the cases, see Ikemoto, supra note 144.
161 Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951, 1951 (1986); Note, Rethdnking (M)otherhood:
Femdnist 77ory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1325, 1327
(1990); see Kolder, supra note 159, at 1192-93 (A national survey of court-ordered
obstetrical interventions yielded reports of over 40 attempts to override a woman's refusal
of therapy in a five year period, but revealed details sufficient for survey purposes in only
21 cases. Fifteen court orders sought were for cesarean sections.); see also Nancy
Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (discussing how hegemony and ideology operate in court ordered cesaeran sections).
162 See SHERMAN ELIAs & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCrIVE GENErICs AND THE LAW
253-62 (1987); George J. Annas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients, 316 NEv
ENG. J. MED. 1213 (1987); Denise K. Cahalane, Note, Court-Ordered Confinement of
Pregnant Women, 15 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 203,218-20 (1989).
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to perform the procedure. The judge rushes to the hospital, talks to the doctors
and the woman, and then, in most cases, issues the order. 163
The details of the women's stories often get lost in the legal analysis. The
stories vary, but the doctors and the judges tend toward a single approach:
intervention. The courts prefer a balancing test that accords great weight to
medical opinion and fetal interests and discounts the wishes of the pregnant
woman as unnatural or irrational. 164 The result is that widely disparate human
situations are treated as problems in conformity.
The woman in In re Madyun165 was a Muslim whose labor, according to
the chief resident, was not progressing satisfactorily. Ayesha Madyun and her
husband wanted to encourage the progress of a natural delivery by standing up
and walking around. The doctor approached the court with a request to
perform a cesarean in order to forestall an infection that could begin and cause
fetal brain damage or kill the fetus. There was no evidence of infection or other
risks to the fetus. But the court stated, "[n]either parent is a trained physician,"
and ordered the cesarean performed.' 66 The child was born healthy, with no
signs of infection.
The patient In re A.C. 167 was Angela Carder, a twenty-seven year old
woman. She had been diagnosed with leukemia at age thirteen. When she
became pregnant she was married and had been in remission for three years.
By the twenty-sixth week of her pregnancy she was hospitalized because a
163 See Kolder, supra note 159, at 1193. Courts granted 13 of 15 petitions for forced
cesarean sections.
164 This balancing reflects the patriarchal nature of the medical and legal professions.
Case reports authored by doctors and lawyers evidence assumptions that the doctor's desire
to intervene is rational and good, and that a woman who refuses therapy is wrong. See,
e.g., Leiberman, supra note 146, at 515-16. This article was authored by four doctors. It
begins with two case reports of fetal death following refusal of therapy by the pregnant
women. In both cases, the authors make a point of characterizing the nature of women's
refusal as irrational. For example, in Case 1, it is reported that "[c]esarean section was
proposed to save the life of the fetus. The patient, however, stubbornly refused to submit to
surgery." In the discussion section immediately following the case reports, the authors
attribute each patient's refusal of therapy to "her mens rea (guilty mind)." See also Bowes
& Selgestad, supra note 147, at 211 (discussing a case report of a forced cesarean section
describing the "frustrations and anxieties of the physicians and nurses who ... viewed the
patient's response as one of unreasonable insensitivity to the welfare of her infant" and who
were "bewildered and angered by her attitude and stubbornness").
165 114 DAILY WASH. L. RPTR. 2233 (1986) (D.C. Super. Ct.); George J. Annas,
Foreclosing the Use ofForce- A. C. Reversed, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27 (July/Aug. 1990).
166 The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the decision in an
unreported order. Martha A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAw,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 114, 126 n.19 (1989).
167 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988) (en banc),
later proceeding, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
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metastacized tumor had been discovered in her lung. And though physicians
believed that the fetus would have a better chance of survival if delivered at
twenty-eight weeks, Angela Carder's condition was declining rapidly. While
heavily sedated, she indicated that she did not want a cesarean performed. The
doctors stated that the surgery might shorten her life and that the fetus had a
slim chance of survival, with a possibility of being handicapped if delivered by
cesarean.
168
By court order, a cesarean was performed. Both Angela Carder and the
infant died soon after the surgery. Judge Nebeker, in writing the opinion that
denied the Carder family's motion for stay of the cesarean section, began by
stating, "[tihis opinion is written after the fact .... Condolences are extended
to those who lost the mother and child." 169 The opinion reviews the trial
judge's order and concludes, "the trial judge did not err in subordinating
A.C.'s right against bodily intrusion to the interests of the unborn child and the
state." 170 It concludes with the words, "we wish to express our appreciation to
counsel and the trial judge for a difficult task well done despite the pressures
created by time and tragic circumstances." 171
Jessie Mae Jefferson sought prenatal care at Griffin Spalding County
Hospital. 172 The doctor examined her and found that she had a complete
placenta previa. After the doctor informed her "that it is virtually impossible
that this condition will correct itself prior to delivery; and that it is a 99%
certainty that the child cannot survive natural childbirth," and that "the chances
of... surviving vaginal delivery are not better than 50%," 173 Ms. Jefferson
refused the recommended cesarean delivery. She cited her religious belief "that
the Lord has healed my body and that whatever happens to the child will be the
Lord's will." 174 The court found that the unborn "child is without proper
parental care and subsistence necessary for his or her physical life and health,"
and granted temporary custody to the state with full authority to consent to
surgical delivery. 175
When the superior court granted the petition of the Department of Human
Resources for custody of the unborn child, the Jeffersons brought a motion for
stay. In denying the motion, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's finding "that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson
and her husband, John W. Jefferson, is outweighed by the duty of the State to
168 Id. at 612.
169 Id. at 611.
170 Id. at 617. Upon rehearing en bane, the court stated that a substituted judgment
standard, not a balancing test, should be used.
171 Id.
172 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
173 Id.
17 4 Id. at 459.
175 Id.
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protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death before
being given the opportunity to live." 176 The lower court had also ordered her
to submit to a sonogram, and if the sonogram indicated a complete placenta
previa, a cesarean section. Jessie Mae Jefferson delivered the child vaginally
after the scan revealed that the condition no longer existed.
A Nigerian woman, name unknown, pregnant with triplets, refused to
consent to a cesarean although the doctor recommended that such a delivery
would be safer for multiple births. 177 This woman believed that a natural
delivery would be safe for her. In addition, she and her husband planned to
return to Africa, to an area where a cesarean delivery might not be possible
should they have children later. They wanted to prevent future complications
caused by use of cesarean section. The hospital obtained a court order to
perform a cesarean, but the woman was not told of it until she went into labor.
When she and her husband resisted, seven security officers forced the husband
from the hospital. The woman was tied to the bed while struggling and
screaming, and a forced cesarean was performed. The woman and the three
infants survived the surgery.
These cases continue the trend begun in the early twentieth century for
increased medical intervention during delivery. 178 Until 1938,179 most women
delivered their children at home, with the help of their mothers, sisters, female
friends, and sometimes a midwife.180 It was a time of women helping women,
and the woman giving birth was an active participant in the process.181 It was a
176 Id. at 460.
177 Kolder, supra note 159, at 1193; Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: Wat's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 9-10 (1987).
178 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 46-47. For a comprehensive history of
childbirth in the United States, see JUDITH W. LEAvrrT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING
IN AMERICA 1750 TO 1950 (1986). For discussions of the increased influence of the medical
profession in general, see GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 305-09 (1985); HALLER &
HALLER, supra note 13, at x-xii, and BARBARA EHRENREiCH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER
OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 69-98 (Anchor Books ed.,
1979) (By the late nineteenth century... science was well on its way to becoming a sacred
national value.).
179 "By 1938, half of American births occurred within medical institutions." LEAVrrT,
supra note 178, at 205. "By 1939 half of all women and 75 percent of all urban women
were delivering in hospitals." WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 133.
180 "Midwives traditionally played a noninterventionist, supportive role in the home
birthing rooms." LEAVT, supra note 178, at 38; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 11-
26.
181 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 13-18. For example, a woman usually
labored in the posture and place most comfortable to her. Unlike Ms. Madyun, she was able
to move about and assume a variety of positions to help her labors along. Midwives and
other female attendants often brought "food and drink for the laboring woman to keep up
her strength, offering such things as toast, buckwheat gruel, mutton, broth, and eggs." Id. at
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time when childbirth was individualized. The persons attending the birth
responded to the pregnant woman as daughter, sister, and friend.182 With the
advent of physician-attended hospital deliveries, control of the birth process
shifted to the physician, 183 childbirth became routinized, 184 and intervention
became standard. 185
History shows that intervention often occurs for the sake of intervention, 186
and, as in Madyun, with no specific evidence of necessity. The increase in
intervention has consistently been explained by referring to fetal interests. 187 In
1920, DeLee recommended that episiotomies and forceps be used to facilitate
every delivery to protect the fetus from risks created by compression of the
brain during labor. 188 DeLee made his recommendations despite evidence that
increased use of forceps during this period resulted in increased maternal
mortality rates. In 1981, the Jefferson court wrote, "Jessie Mae Jefferson is
Ordered to submit to a Caesarean section and related procedures considered
necessary by the attending physician to sustain the life of this child."189
Recognition of the fetus has reached the point where the fetus is considered a
15. And attendants were advised to "instruct and comfort the party, not only refreshing her
with good meat and drink, but also with sweet words, giving her good hope of a speedy
deliverance, encouraging and admonishing her to patience and tolerance .... " Id. at 17
(quoting THOMAS RAYNALDE, THE BYRTH OFMANKIND 97 (1626)).
182 LEAVITT, supra note 178, at 87.
183 "As long as birth remained a home-based event,.., women continued actively to
participate in the determination of confinement practices." LEAVrrT, supra note 178, at 87.
However, by the twentieth century, "women giving birth within hospitals found their
capacity to determine events in the birthing of their children severely limited by the hospital
environment." Id. at 205. For a personal account of this transfer of control over childbirth
and pregnant women from a lay midwife's perspective, see generally ONNIE LEE LOGAN,
MoTHERwrr: AN ALABAMA MIDWwE'S STORY (1991).
184 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 165. For a description of childbirth as an
assembly line, see ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 86.
185 "Interventions grew steadily in number after 1900." WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note
142, at 143. See also KITZINGER, supra note 141, at 116-34; COREA, supra note 178, at
304 ("'[T]he active management of labor necessitates that obstetricians take over, not just a
single aspect of responsibility but the whole process of parturition. Our control of the
situation must be complete.'" (citing Dr. John M. Beazley, The Active Management of
Labor, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, 161 (1975))).
186 "Many physicians felt pressed, if their time was limited and other patients were
waiting, to use forceps, anesthesia, or both to direct labor into patterns under their control."
LEAVrIr, supra note 178, at 120; see also WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 161.
187 Between 1915 and 1930, a time when hospital deliveries were increasing, maternal
mortality did not decline, and the number of infant deaths from birth injuries increased by
40-50%. Reports cited excessive intervention as one of the reasons. WERTZ & WERTZ,
supra note 142, at 161. Mortality rates did not begin to drop until 1936. Id. at 164.
188 See LEAVrrT, supra note 178, at 179; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 141.
189 Jefferson v. Griffith Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981).
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second patient. 190 But as this has happened, the idea that maternal and fetal
interests usually coincide has become more remote while the idea that maternal
and fetal interests often conflict has become the dominant picture. 191
Concurrently, the possibility that women can define pregnancy for themselves,
as something other than an inevitable conflict, is disappearing.
As the focus on conflict becomes sharper, it is being decided that the fetus
is to be the primary patient, and that intervention even in the face of the
woman's protest is the rule.192 The Madyun court wrote, "All that stood
between the Madyun fetus and its independent existence, separate from its
mother was, put simply, a doctor's scalpel." George Annas has interpreted the
statement to mean "that if a doctor believes a surgical procedure is necessary
[for the fetus], and has the means to perform it, he should be able to perform it
even if the woman competently refuses." 1 93 The Jefferson opinion yields the
same principle of subordination. In Jefferson, the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed the superior court's determination that "[b]ecause the life of defendant
and of the unborn child are, at the moment, inseparable, the Court deems it
appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it is
necessary to give the child an opportunity to live." 194 Cases like this make
clear the current trend: Fetal interests will continue to trump those of the
woman.
What is new about the stories of Ayesha Madyun, Angela Carder, Jessie
Mae Jefferson, and the woman from Nigeria is that judges have joined doctors
in the delivery room to referee the conflict. Underlying the court's balancing-
test language is a set of assumptions-that a normal woman would do anything
for the sake of her unborn child even if it endangered her own life; that there
must be something wrong with the woman who refuses consent; that doctors
and lawyers who call for intervention speak with authority and know better
than the woman who refuses consent to cesarean surgery. These assumptions
speak of subordination as natural and rational-women naturally subordinate
their own interests to others, and rational others may subordinate the interests
of those rare women who refuse to do it on their own. These assumptions lead
190 The fourteenth edition of Williams Obstetrics was issued in 1971. It described the
two-patient model for pregnancy. "Since World War I and especially in the last decade,
knowledge of the fetus and his environment has increased remarkably. As an important
consequence the fetus has acquired status as a patient to be cared for by the physician as he
long has been accustomed to caring for the mother." J. WHrrIDIE WILIAMS, WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS 199 (L.M. Hellman & J.A. Prichard eds., Meredith Publishing Corp., 1971);
Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147, at 209 ("The care of a pregnant woman involves 2
patients, the mother and the fetus.").
191 See infra notes 474-78 and accompanying text.
192 See also ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 85-86.
193 Annas, supra note 165, at 28.
194 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
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to the conclusion that we should and can intervene to protect the innocent fetus
from the bad mother. So, in the nineteenth century, women who reacted during
childbirth in fear, from personal belief or other reasons, were known as Ann or
Sally. From the late nineteenth century, they became known as patients or
problems.1 95 And since the 1980s, these women have become defendants.
c. Forced Hospital Delivery
Other attempts to restrict choices surrounding childbirth go to the birth
location and the level of standard medical intervention required. There are no
laws requiring that all births take place in a hospital. But the law has mandated
hospital deliveries for high-risk pregnancies. In Jefferson, the court awarded
custody of the fetus to the Department of Human Resources of Family and
Children Services as a way of making sure that Jessie Mae Jefferson would
deliver at the hospital. 196 In yet another forced cesarean case, a Michigan judge
ordered a woman to admit herself to the hospital by a certain date and time.
The order included directions to the local police to pick her up should she not
appear at the hospital and a mandate to the woman to submit to "whatever the
medical personnel deemed appropriate, including a cesarean section and
medication. " 197 Regulations on home births' 98 and use of midwives 199 are less
195 KITZINGER, supra note 141, at 72. The pregnant woman becomes a "patient" in the
same way that anyone who is ill or who suffers a handicap becomes the object of medical
attention. The recording and monitoring of the pregnancy is taken over by professionals
who are not themselves part of the community in which the mother lives, and family and
friends are powerless to affect it one way or another. See also MARGARETE SANDELOWSKI,
PAIN, PLEASURE, AND AMEwRICAN CHILDBIRTH: FROM THE TWILIGHT SLEEP TO THE READ
METHOD, 1914-1960 8 (1984); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 136.
196 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
197 Gallagher, supra note 177, at 47 (citing Flanigan, Fleeing the Law: A Matter of
Faith, DET. FREE PRESS, June 29, 1982, at 3A; Flanigan, Mom Follows Belief, Gives Birth
in Hiding, DET. FREE PRESs, June 28, 1982, at 3A). The woman and her family fled into
hiding. Two weeks later, a healthy boy weighing over nine pounds was born in a vaginal
birth.
198 Although home births account for only a small percentage of total births, an
increasing number of families are choosing homebirth over traditional hospital delivery.
Charles Wolfson, Midwives and Home Birth: Social, Medical, and Legal Perspectives, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 909, 911 (1986). Home birth not only allows the mother to deliver in a
familiar and comfortable setting, it also provides her with greater control over the birthing
process. Opponents of home birth argue that complications can arise, even in low-risk
pregnancies, which cause injury to the child, and which could have been prevented in a
hospital. Some critics go so far as to suggest that such an injury constitutes child abuse or
neglect. Id. at 935.
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direct, but have the same effect. These regulations tell women that they have
little or no control over choices surrounding childbirth. The regulations also
tell women that they have little or no authority over their lives.
d. Forced Life Support
The right to refuse treatment includes, for most persons, the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment.200 One way of exercising that right is to use a living
will. Authorized by a natural death act,20 1 a living will directs the caregiver to
refrain from using artificial life support should the person become terminally ill
or enter a persistent vegetative state. The purpose of the instrument is to effect
a person's decisional autonomy and maintain her bodily integrity. However,
most of the natural death acts suspend the right of pregnant women to refuse
life-prolonging treatment. Most of the twenty-seven statutes containing
pregnancy clauses suspend the right through the entire pregnancy. As a result,
a woman who has just conceived and who is terminally ill or enters into a
persistent vegetative state could be forced to undergo treatment for the next
nine months of her life.202 Such a woman forfeits the power literally to control
her life.
Although no state actually requires a woman to give birth in a hospital, recent notions
of fetal rights and the threat of civil or criminal liability, make home birth a disfavored
alternative, both legally and socially. Id. at 931-34.
199 Prior to the 1800s, childbirth was traditionally an experience shared by women and
attended by midwives who supervised the labor and delivery. LEAvrrT, supra note 178, at
36-37. Because birth was viewed as a natural process, midwives were not required to have
any special training, and there were few, if any, rules regulating their practice. Kerry L.
Reilley, Note, Midwifery in America: The Need for Uniform and Modernized State Lmv, 20
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1117, 1118-20 (1986). However, as the birthing process moved from
the home into the hospital, the demand for midwife services decreased. Thus, the
elimination of the practice of midwifery was a corollary to the increase of physician control
of the birth process. See EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 94; KTZINGER, supra
note 141, at 95-97; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 144-48.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many states required some form of
licensing or registration for midwives. In many states, however, the licensing requirements
were so strict that although the practice of midwifery was not directly prohibited, it was
effectively eliminated. Reilly, supra at 1123-24. See Charles Wolfson, supra note 198, at
958-60 for a state by state summary of laws regulating midwifery.
200 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
201 The California legislature enacted the first natural death act in 1976. California
Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-94 (West Supp. 1991).
202 To date, there are no reported cases in which a court has enforced or refused to
enforce the living will of a pregnant woman. In DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 684 P.2d
1297 (Wash. 1984), Joann DiNino sought a declaratory judgment that the pregnancy clause
in Washington's natural death act was unconstitutional in light of Roe v. Wade. The court
refused to determine the statute's constitutionality because Ms. DiNino was neither pregnant
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e. Forced Prenatal Treatment
i. Current Law
Court-ordered pre-birth medical intervention reflects the same history and
is based on the same legal analyses as the forced cesarean cases. Again, the
courts have proven uniformly willing to step into the delivery room and remain
there. In a 1987 national survey, Kolder, Gallagher, and Parsons found that
court orders had been obtained for cesarean sections in ten states, for hospital
detentions in two states, and for intrauterine transfusions in one state. Among
twenty-one cases in which court orders were sought, the orders were obtained
in eighty-six percent of the cases. In eighty-eight percent of those cases, the
orders were received within six hours.203
Judge Lonschein's opinion in In re Jamaica Hospital204 describes, in terms
of procedure and the mindsets and daily lives of judges and physicians, how
court orders are often obtained. As the first point of interest, note that the judge
wrote the opinion entirely in first person. This device invites reader empathy,
as well as reader alliance, with the judge and other professionals in the story.
The invitation is strengthened by his practice of referring to the attorney and
doctors by name, but to the woman as "the patient." Judge Lonschein begins
his opinion with the words "[tihis past Saturday evening..., while I was
getting dressed for a dinner engagement, I received a telephone call at my
home ... ."205 He goes on to say that the call was from an attorney
representing Jamaica Hospital. A half hour later, Judge Lonschein is at the
hospital. He then meets with the attorney and doctor, orders a bedside hearing,
hears the doctor again, speaks with the woman, and appoints the doctor as
special guardian to the fetus with "discretion to do all that in his medical
judgment was necessary to save its life, including the transfusion of blood into
the mother." 20 6
It is not clear from the written opinion whether this order was issued
within six hours. The opinion does indicate the relative weight given the
doctors' and the woman's views. Four long paragraphs are used to describe the
medical opinion. In these four paragraphs, Judge Lonschein repeats that the
woman was eighteen weeks pregnant (twice), suffering from internal bleeding
nor terminally ill. For further discussion on the constitutionality of pregnancy clauses in
natural death acts, see Elizabeth Carlin Benton, Note, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1821 (1990); Janice MacAroy Snitzer,
Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1280 (1987).
203 Kolder, supra note 159.
204 In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
205 Id. at 898, 899.
206 Id. at 900.
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(twice), and in need of a blood transfusion to save her life (three times), and the
fetus' life (four times). 207 In one short paragraph, the judge describes the
patient's view: "I spoke with the patient and advised her who I was and the
purpose of the hearing. I asked her if she would consent to a blood transfusion.
She told me, in effect, that because of her religion she would not." 208 He
describes the woman as a single mother of ten children whose only next of kin
was a sister who was unavailable.20 9 He describes the eighteen-week fetus as
"a potentially viable human being in a life-threatening situation" 210 and as "a
human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae." 211 Also, as in the
majority of cases, the judge determined that "the state has a highly significant
interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs the patient's
right to refuse [medical treatment]." 212
In addition to ordering blood transfused into pregnant women, the courts
have also ordered women to undergo the cerclage or "purse string" surgery213
and detention during pregnancy. Kolder, Gallagher, and Parsons found that
three court orders for hospital detention were sought in Colorado and Illinois.
The courts granted one order in each state.214 The women subject to the orders
were both diabetic and in their third trimester. The woman not ordered
detained in a hospital was possibly in her second trimester.215 These results
indicate that the courts considering hospital detention may be balancing
maternal-fetal interests in light of Roe v. Wade.216 In other cases, however, it
207 Id. at 899.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 900.
2 12 Id.; see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d
537 (N.J.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
state's interest in the life of the fetus justified the order of a blood transfusion for the
mother).
213 Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983) (husband sought a court order to force
a woman in her fourth month of pregnancy to submit to surgery to have her cervix sewn
closed to prevent a probable miscarriage. The woman objected based on religious beliefs as
a "born again Christian." The lower court ordered surgery. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court vacated the order, stating that no state interest had been presented which justified
restricting the woman's right of privacy. The opinion implies that the state's interest might
have been established if enough evidence had been presented. "The record is devoid of
facts .... [N]o findings, based on expert testimony, describing the operative procedure,
stating the nature of any risks .... [No showing of the degree of likelihood that the
pregnancy will be carried to term without the operation," id. at 397.).
214 Kolder, supra note 159, at 1193.
215 Id.216 Id. at 1194; see also Cahalane, supra note 162, at 204, 209-10, 212-17, 221-22.
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appears that the state is simply acting to protect fetuses from women the state
has deemed bad.
In In re Steven S.,217 the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social
Services (DPSS) filed a writ to have Kay S. involuntarily committed to receive
intensive psychiatric treatment, and filed a dependent child petition for her
fetus. The juvenile court dropped the former for lack of evidence. But it went
ahead and ordered "the unborn fetus, and accordingly [Kay S.],
detained .... "218 The mental health commitment would have been ordered
"for no more than 14 days." 219 The juvenile court's order continued until Kay
S. gave birth on June 23, 1980, nearly two months after the order issued. On
appeal, the court determined that "DPSS should not have been permitted to use
a dependent child petition in the juvenile court as a basis for confining appellant
to protect the unborn fetus." 220 But by then Kay S. had already been detained
and the child born.
In United States v. Vaughn,221 Brenda Vaughn pled guilty to forging
several checks. Because this was her first offense, the prosecutor recommended
probation. But she was pregnant and had tested positive for cocaine. The judge
sentenced her to jail for 180 days. He also provided for a reduced sentence
after the baby was born. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Peter Wolf told Ms.
Vaughn, "You've got a cocaine problem and I'm not going to have this baby
born addicted."'222 He then announced, "I'm going to keep her locked up until
the baby is born because she's tested positive for cocaine when she came before
me. She's apparently an addictive personality, and I'll be darned if I'm going to
have a baby born that way." 223 After thirty days in jail, Brenda Vaughn
reported that she had lost weight in jail and that she had refused "a couple of
opportunities to go get high" in jail. 224
A consistent refrain that runs through these cases is that, in order to protect
the fetus, the state may subordinate the interests of the woman even by
imprisonment. Yet in a significant percentage of these cases, the efforts to
protect the fetus have proven pointless or even harmful. Ms. Madyun's child
was born without infection. Angela Carder and her twenty-six-week-old fetus
died. Jessie Mae Jefferson delivered naturally. The father of the Nigerian
triplets committed suicide a few weeks after being ejected from the hospital.
Kay S. disappeared after being released and losing custody of Steven S.
217 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Ct. App. 1981).
218 1d. at 526.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 528.
221 117 DAiLYWASH. L. RPP. 441 (1989) (D.C. Super. Ct.).
222 Debra Cassens Moss, Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at
20.
223 Id.224 Id.
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Brenda Vaughn retained access to drugs and lost access to prenatal care when
Judge Wolf sent her to jail. It seems clear that forced intervention does not
provide any degree of real protection for fetuses. 225
What becomes clear, however, is that direct pregnancy regulations are a
way of labeling certain women "bad mothers." These are women who have
failed to act selflessly for the sake of others, as a good mother should. In
addition, many of these women violate the motherhood ideology by reason of
their race and social status. Of the women subject to the court orders reported
in a 1987 survey, eighty-one percent were black, Asian, or Hispanic. Forty-
four percent were unmarried. Twenty-four percent did not speak English as
their primary language. All were seen at a teaching-hospital clinic or were
receiving public assistance. 226 These facts echo the evidence regarding women
subject to sterilization abuse,227 and indicate that while the concern for
protecting fetuses is beneficent, the state is more likely to regulate women as
childbearers when the women do not fit the socially-constructed ideal of
prosperous white motherhood.
ii. Proposed Regulatory Extensions
Case law and scholarship indicate that direct regulation of pregnant women
will continue, 228 and the regulatory scheme will continue to express the
ideology of motherhood. The same legal analyses used in the forced cesarean,
forced transfusion, forced cerclage, and forced detention cases could be used to
support other court-ordered fetal therapies. For example, if courts are willing
to order women to undergo blood transfusions, courts might also be willing to
225 In some cases, it is difficult to believe that protection of the fetus was really
intended. Judge Wolf stated loudly and clearly that he wanted to protect the child from
Brenda Vaughn's addictive personality. But he must have known, especially as a judge in a
metropolitan area, that drugs are readily available in jail. Both the case law and the media
have made it clear that jails are unhealthy places for fetuses. See Elizabeth Ross, State's
Limited Drug Treatment for Women Mirrors Problem in Nation, CHmSTIAN SCi. MONrrOR,
Dec. 21, 1990, at4.
In the cases initiated by doctors and hospitals, much of the discussion of the forced
treatment cases has been devoted to potential liability. See Bowes & Selgestad, supra note
147, at 211 (The authors describe administrative concerns in a forced cesarean case: "In
addition there was concern that the patient's family would bring charges of professional or
institutional negligence in the event the infant or the mother died or was seriously injured as
a result of inaction. On the other hand, there was serious concern over possible charges of
criminal assault or violation of the patient's rights of privacy if an operation were performed
against her will.").
226 Kolder, supra note 159, at 1193.
227 See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
228 See Gallagher, supra note 177, at 37-41 (discussing the "trend" toward fetal
rights).
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order women to submit to vitamin therapy to correct vitamin-dependent enzyme
deficiencies. If courts are willing to order women to hospitals for delivery, or
to jail until delivery, courts may order women with high risk pregnancies to
hospitals throughout pregnancy. This is no mere fanciful slippery slope. During
the nineteenth century, strict sexual mores and fears about "prenatal
impressions" 229 manifested themselves as the social custom of requiring
pregnant women to stay home during pregnancy. Today, it seems possible that
strict pro-fetal mores may manifest themselves with a similar legal requirement.
It was noted earlier that the courts appear to decide these cases by
balancing maternal and fetal interests in light of Roe v. Wade. Legal scholars
have produced a variety of legal analyses that elaborate upon the Roe balancing
test.23 0 These analyses yield regulatory schemes that vary in scope. But the
analysis always begins by describing the interests of woman and fetus, and by
constructing a conflict in which those interests weigh against each other.23 1 The
weighing is performed in a way that labels all women as "childbearers." The
result of the weighing is that women marginalized by the dominant culture are
more likely to be labeled "bad mothers."
(A) Weighted Balancing: The Analytical Framework
The balancing test is usually articulated in constitutional terms-as a
weighing of the woman's interests in decisional autonomy and bodily
integritY23 2 against the interest of the state in protecting fetal life. Roe v. Wade
is sometimes used to support the idea that the state can intervene to protect fetal
rights. 233 Justice Blackmun, writing for the court in Roe v. Wade, said that the
state's interest in protecting potential human life outweighed the woman's
interests upon viability. 23 4 Using this part of the opinion, courts could order a
variety of fetal therapies during the third trimester. In order to be consistent
229 See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 79, 80. "The term 'confinement' by
which Victorians commonly described pregnancy and lying-in, expressed the shame and
impropriety of exposure during pregnancy, for the expectant woman separated herself and
kept to her home...." Id. See infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
230 But see Field, supra note 166, at 123-24 (explaining "why the trimester system
that applies to abortion has no application to controls on the mother-to-be").
231 For further discussion on how and why this conflict is constructed, see infra notes
473-78 and accompanying text.
232 See Maxwell Stearns, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 21 NEwENG. L. REv. 595, 606-09 (1985-86).
233 But see Gallagher, supra note 177, at 16 (arguing that "Roe is more appropriately
viewed as a patient's rights precedent than as establishing a state interest in the fetus").
234 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). Viability
ordinarily occurs at the beginning of the third trimester. Id.
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with the Roe trimester analysis, however, intervention would not be permitted
when it threatened the life of the woman.23 5
A stronger version of this argument states that if a woman forgoes the
abortion decision she waives her own interests and acquires an affirmative duty
to protect the fetus.23 6 Some would find a waiver only upon viability, the point
at which the state can prohibit abortion. 23 7 Even stronger versions of the
argument, however, would find a waiver as soon as the woman made an
unequivocal decision to not terminate the pregnancy. 23 8 If this decision occurs
at the time of conception, the state could enforce a duty to the fetus throughout
the entire pregnancy. Some would find a maternal duty to the fetus before
viability and before the abortion decision had been made.
Academics have detailed the description of maternal duties and fetal rights
with reference to cases they consider related, such as cases concerning the right
to refuse medical treatment. In particular, cases in which the courts must decide
whether a person should donate an organ to another have been deemed relevant
to the maternal-fetal conflict. Fetal rights proponents use Hart v. Brown23 9 and
Strunk v. Strunk240 for the proposition that one person may be compelled to
undergo medical treatment for the sake of another. "It can thus be argued that
Strunk provides a legal precedent for compelling parents to undergo invasive
medical procedures, including organ donation and fetal surgery, for the sake of
their children." 241 However, maternal rights proponents cite McFall v.
Shimp242 and In re Guardianship of Pescins "243 to make the opposite point.
235 Id. at 163-64 ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother."); Stearns, supra note 232, at 624.
236 But see ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 162, at 259-63 (opposing forced treatment for
a number of reasons and explaining why the waiver argument is not persuasive).
237 Stearns, supra note 232, at 624.
238 John Robertson, 77w Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal 77rerapy, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 333, 361 (1982).
239 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972) (The Connecticut court used substituted judgment to
decide that parents of a seven year old identical twin could authorize a kidney transplant
necessary to the other twin's survival.).
240 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (The court authorized a kidney transplant
from a twenty-seven year old man who was institutionalized in a state school for the
"feeble-minded" to his twenty-eight year old brother.).
241 Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State
Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 19, 44 (1985). Counsel for the
Colorado hospital, mentioned in Bowes & Selgestad, also cited Hart and Strunk as authority
for a forced cesarean. Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147, at 212-13.
242 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (A thirty-nine year old man terminally ill with aplastia
anemia petitioned for a court order to compel a cousin to be tested for tissue compatibility
and to donate bone marrow if compatible. The trial court denied the petition.); see also
Nelson, supra note 145, at 754-55.
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"If our society will not compel someone to undergo a bodily invasion such as
organ or tissue transplantation for the benefit of another, how can society view
pregnant women refusing treatment any different?" 244
Another line of arguments has developed from the rescue doctrine or bad
samaritan principle of tort law. 245 The rule is that there is no duty in tort to
rescue another from risk of injury or death. It is the "common-law principle
that an individual is not ordinarily obligated to volunteer aid to another who is
in need of assistance, even if the failure to act proves fatal to the imperiled
person and the aid necessary to avert the tragic outcome would have involved
little inconvenience for the potential rescuer."246 Those who cite the rescue
doctrine in support of maternal rights refer to the general rule as an example of
"the importance of freedom of choice." 247 Those who cite the rescue doctrine
in support of maternal duties concentrate on its exceptions and limitations.248
The Roe balancing test may have a variety of doctrinal reference points.
However, it remains a construct of conflict in which one set of interests will
predictably lose. And it remains a test in which interests are weighted by the
preferences of those describing the balancing process. As the cases above
demonstrate, those doing the balancing are doctors and judges enmeshed in a
culture where the wisdom they receive about good motherhood excludes the
experiences of poor women, particularly women of color.
(B) Applying the Weighted Balancing Test: Intrusive Fetal Therapy
Many types of fetal therapy are considered experimental. 249 Nevertheless,
innovative procedures present another point of maternal-fetal conflict and
243 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975) (The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to authorize
a kidney transplant from an institutionalized mental patient to a sister.).
244 Nelson, supra note 145, at 755; see also Gallagher, supra note 177, at 23-24, 26-
28 (distinguishing Strunk and Hart). "The Pescinski decision continues to stand for refusal to
countenance nonconsensual bodily invasions for the sake of another." Id. at 28.
245 Compare this line of argument to that of Donald Regan, Rewiting Roe v. Wade,
77 MIcH. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (Regan argues that if we forbid abortion, we compel a
pregnant woman to be a good samaritan. This would violate equal protection because the
law burdens other potential samaritans with duties in lesser ways, although there are better
reasons to burden them.).
246 Nelson, supra note 145, at 753.
247 Id.
248 Mathieu, supra note 241, at 48.
249 ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 162, at 252. Federal Regulations impose requirements
on methodology, selection procedure, and informed consent for experiments involving
human fetuses. 45 C.F.R. § 46, 201-11 (1991). These regulations apply to institutions and
researchers that receive federal funds. Many states also have legislated restrictions on fetal
research. Most of the state statutes allow therapeutic fetal experiments. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (Deering 1984); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 112, § 121
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another point of direct regulation of pregnant women. Gene therapy, enzyme
replacement therapy, and bone marrow transplantation have been suggested as
ways to correct fetal defects.250 Hydrocephaly and urinary tract obstructions
have been treated by fetal surgery.251 Scientists have proposed surgical
procedures that could correct congenital diaphramatic hernias. 25 2 Surgery on
the fetus, however, also requires surgery on the pregnant woman. Since
surgery poses risk to the fetus and to the woman, violates religious beliefs, or
may be undesirable for other reasons, some women will refuse to consent. As
the preceding paragraphs indicate, references to abortion and contraceptive
cases, to informed consent cases, and to bad samaritan cases have led to a
variety of proposals for direct pregnancy regulation with regard to intrusive
fetal therapies.
Maxwell Stearns would authorize forced in utero therapy when the fetus
would die but for the procedure. Yet, following the Roe trimester analysis, a
court order could only be supported if the fetus is viable.253 If tests reveal that
the fetus has a correctable defect that is not fatal, forced intervention, according
to the rescue doctrine, cannot be compelled. This is true even if the fetus is
viable.254
Deborah Mathieu argues that the rescue doctrine is inapt; she would allow
"a woman's limited obligation to prevent serious harm to her future child, even
in the early stages of pregnancy." Mathieu gives "receiving innoculations or
(1983); but see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1989); Oi-o REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.14 (Baldwin 1987).250 See EvE NIcHOLs, HUMAN GENE THERAPY 58 (1988).
251 Frank A. Manning et al., Catheter Shunts for Fetal Hydrocephrosis and
Hydrocephalus, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 336 (1986) (In 1986, 114 reports of fetal surgery
from 21 medical centers were reviewed by the International Fetal Surgery Registry.
Seventy-three cases involved fetal urinary tract obstructions. Surgery was used to implant
catheters that drained urine into the amniotic fluid. The fetal death rate attributable to the
procedure was 4.8%. Forty-one cases involved fetal hydrocephalus. Doctors attempted to
drain fluid from the dilated ventricles. The fetal death rate was 9.8%); see William H.
Clewall et al., A Surgical Approach to the Treatment of Fetal Hydrocephalus, 306 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1320 (1982); Michael R. Harrison et al., Fetal Surgery for Congenital
Hydronephrosis, 306 NEwENG. J. MED. 591 (1982).
252 Margery W. Shaw, Condtional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. OF LEGAL
MED. 63, 79 n.105 (1984) (citing Harrison, Jester & Ross, Correction of Congenital
Diaphragmatic Hernia in Utero, Part " 77e Model: Intra-Thoracic Balloon Produces Fetal
Pulmonary Hypoplasia, 88 SURGERY 174 (1980); Part II Simulated Correction Pennits
Fetal Lung Growth with Survival at Birth, 88 SURGERY 260 (1980); Part III: Development of
a Succesfl Surgical Technique Using Abdominoplasty to Avoid Compromise of Umbilical
Blood Flow, 16 J. PEDIATR. SURG. 934 (1981)).
253 Stearns, supra note 232, at 624.
254 Id. at 625.
1992] 1255
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tablespoons of safe medications" as examples of "minimal sacrifices." 255
Intrusions into the woman's bodily integrity rest on the same principles as
Strunk and Hart, the kidney donation cases. These principles are invoked
within the framework on the waiver theory. "[A]fter she has foregone the
exercise of her legal right to have an abortion... [a] woman may be required
to undergo more than minimally invasive therapies to prevent significant harm
to the child-to-be, and she may be required to accept significant limitations on
her freedom of action in order not to cause harm to the child." 256
John Robertson would go one step further. "If the parents elect not to abort
a child, it is reasonable to anticipate that they would have a duty to the unborn
child to employ an available medical procedure that would prevent it from
being born in an avoidably unhealthy state," 257 whether tests reveal risk of
defect or risk of death. Robertson would then authorize in utero surgery before
viability.
(C) The Completely Regulated Woman
Margery Shaw has probably suggested the most extensive regulatory
scheme.258 She has categorized a vast array of potential legal duties into time
periods: before conception,25 9 early in pregnancy, 260 during mid-pregnancy,261
and after viability.2 62 Many of these time periods would give rise to indirect
state regulation. A child born with a defect may have a cause of action in tort
against its mother for breaching these duties. However, Shaw also indicates
that direct state regulation might be an appropriate way of enforcing several of
these duties.
As an example of a duty beginning before conception, Shaw proposes,
"[t]he only suggested remedy [for women born with phenylketonuria] is to
return the women to a low phenylalaline diet before they become pregnant and
rigorously monitor them throughout pregnancy." 263 She would require
involuntary prenatal testing in some cases. "If the courts decide to mandate
prenatal diagnosis in selected cases where there is a significant risk of a very
burdensome disease that would cause the child severe pain and suffering and
255 Mathieu, supra note 241, at 49.
256 Id.
257 Robertson, supra note 238, at 352.
258 See Shaw, supra note 252.
259 Id. at 81-83.
260 Id. at 83-86.
261 Id. at 86-88.
262 Id. at 88-89.
263 Id. at 85 (citing MATERNAL PKU: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE, DHHS PuB.
No. [SHA] 81-5299 (1981)).
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early death, there are precedents available." 264 For women whose
amniocentesis indicates that the fetus has such a disease, Shaw prescribes
selective abortion. "[Imt could be argued that the fetus should be 'allowed to
die' if it is suffering a fatal disease."265 After viability, "the state could order
fetal therapy and choose a method of birth in the interests of the fetus if such
intervention posed little or no harm to the mother." 266 Finally, she proposes
fetal abuse statutes that would authorize courts to "compel parents and
prospective parents to enter alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation programs,
and, in the extreme, to take 'custody' of the fetus to prevent mental and
physical harm." 267
(D) Women with HIV
Women who are HIV positive present special and perhaps more extensive
possibilities for regulation. According to reports, twenty to sixty percent of
infants born of women who have tested positive for HIW are themselves HIV
positive.268 Restrictions may be triggered by attempts to treat the mother, by
attempts to treat the fetus in utero, and by attempts to prevent maternal-fetal
transmission. Within the analytical framework of the balancing test, each of
these situations raises the question of whether treatment can be compelled.
At least three forced treatment scenarios have been suggested. First,
researchers have suggested that treating pregnant women with AZT may
strengthen the chances of children born HIV positive.269 However, AZT has
adverse effects on some adults; so, treating the fetus with AZT may harm the
mother. However, as the lower court decision in In re A. C. indicates, the case
for subsuming the woman's interests to that of the state may be more
persuasive where the woman's life expectancy is short. Second, the forced
cesarean problem may also arise. According to reports, the AIDS virus can be
transmitted during vaginal birth; cesarean delivery would be safer.270 The
argument would be that the risks that cesarean surgery poses to the woman are
greatly outweighed by the benefits of an HIV-free child. Third, Shaw's
proposals set out an additional scenario. If her arguments are acted upon,
women infected with AIDS could be forced to abort their fetuses in order to
prevent "a significant risk of a very burdensome disease." 271
264 Id. at 87.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 88.
267 Id. at 100.
268 Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant: Are AIDS-
Transmission Liavs Encouraging Abortion? 76 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 77.
269 Id.
270 Shaw, supra note 252, at 68.
271 Id. at 87.
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Because of the stigma attached to AIDS, history suggests that women who
are HIV positive, particularly poor women and women of color, are more
vulnerable to state regulation. The standard explanations for poverty, color,
and HIV put blame on the victim. HIV, the story goes, harms innocent
others-unborn children and society-by putting their health and pocketbooks
at risk. The way to prevent this greater harm is to impose a smaller harm on
the pregnant woman.
ii. Law and Ideology
The above-cited proposals would continue the trend toward forced
intervention. They also continue two parallel stories. One is the current version
of the ideology of motherhood. In the 1990s, we can laugh at the century-old
medical theory of "prenatal impressions." According to this theory, a woman
must avoid all "shocking, painful or unbeautiful sights," all intellectual
stimulation, angry, or lustful thoughts, and also her husband's alcohol or
tobacco-tainted breath in order to prevent her baby from being deformed or
stunted in the womb. 272 We know better now. But the premise behind the
prenatal impressions theory is the same as the premise behind current and
proposed regulation of pregnant women: Women are childbearers, first and
foremost. As such, their lives can be restricted in extraordinary ways. The
ideology has established the premise of subordination; it leaves only the
medical facts in dispute. If we accept, as did nineteenth century society, that the
brain and the fetus competed for energy and phosphates so that a pregnant
woman's mental efforts could deprive the fetus of nutrients, then mental
activity can be discouraged by preventing access to higher education. 273 If we
accept, as we did in the mid-twentieth century, that weight gain will harm the
developing child, then pregnant women can be ordered to diet.274 If we accept
that Ms. Madyun's doctor may choose the principle of physician control rather
than patient choice because it is medically safer, then a pregnant woman can be
272 EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 111; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note
142, at 22. (The Colonial, puritan-influenced version of the theory was that "[t]he abnormal
child was a 'sign' from God before the whole community, indicating the parent's spiritual
[failure].").
273 EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 127; HALLER & HALLER, supra note
13, at 60-61; see also EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION, OR A FAIR CHANCE FOR
THE GIRLS (James R. Osgood, 1873. Reprint ed. Arno Press Inc. 1972) (Dr. Edward H.
Clarke concluded that higher education would cause women's uteruses to atrophy.); A.L.
Smith, "Higher Education of Women and Race Suicide," POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY,
LXVI, 466, 467 (1905).
274 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 168 (noting that after 1970 research revealed
that placing strict weight gain restrictions on pregnant women created a higher risk of low
birth weight babies); KrZINGER, supra note 141, at 73.
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forced to submit to cesarean delivery. If we accept using experimental in utero
surgery to correct a fetal defect, then courts can order surgery against the
woman's will. This is the practice of justifying regulation by defining women
as the perfecting agents of society275 and as mere vessels for the next
generation.
The second story is both inextricably linked to the old and entirely new.
The new and proposed regulation of pregnant women treats women as wombs
as a matter of law. Aristotle believed that the male, during intercourse,
implanted the fetal form into the female. The female role in reproduction was
merely to provide the material. 276 Aristotle was a philosopher. He has been
influential as such-but the Greek state never enacted his theory into statutory
law. In 1870, J.L. Holbrook wrote, it was "as if the Almighty, in creating the
female sex, had taken the uterus and built up a woman around it." 277 J.L.
Holbrook was a doctor. He may have patronized his women patients, and as a
professor he may have influenced his students to do the same, but he never
issued a court order. In 1981, the state of Georgia took temporary custody of
the fetus carried by Jessie Mae Jefferson. It was so ordered by the Georgia
Supreme Court. The second story is the regulatory scheme.
Although the scope of the proposed regulatory scheme varies, the
proposals are all premised on the idea that maternal interests must be weighed
against fetal ones. Balancing tests all imply that one set of interests can be
subordinated to the other. Here, consistent with cultural practice and with legal
precedent, the interests of the woman are subordinated to those of another-the
fetus. The balancing test says that preventing harm to the fetus justifies
restrictions on the woman's decisional autonomy and invasions of her bodily
integrity. In the case of proposed preconception duties, the woman's rights
would be subordinated to a nonexistent being. The potential for grave harm to
the might-be fetus, according to this argument, outweighs the woman's liberty
interests.
The balancing test also expresses the corollary notion that regulation of
women as childbearers will yield positive results for the rest of society. For
one thing, it saves money. Prenatal care and therapy cost less than treating
children born with defects.27 8 It also produces more money. Children born
without defects will presumably have a better chance at being productive
members of society. Another good is that forcible therapy preserves the
275 HALLER & HALLER, supra note 13, at 80.
276 NANCY TUANA, THE WEAKER SEED: THE SEXIST BIAS OF REPRODUCTIVE THEORY
IN FEMINISM AND SciENcE 147, 150 (1989).
277 EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 120.
278 For example, the cost of treating a child born with cystic fibrosis as of 1990 is
approximately $27,000 per year, depending on the amount of care required and the severity
of attendant problems. Telephone interview with Dr. Stacey Fitzsimmons, epidemiologist,
Cystic Fibrosis Foundation.
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integrity of the medical profession.279 It allows doctors to do what they think is
best. It also allows them to forestall the legal liability posed by fetal defect or
injury. 280 And forcible therapy allows us to put costly advances in science and
technology to use, so that we can justify our investment. Technology has a sort
of momentum of its own.
In short, for the sake of the next generation, and for that of society as a
whole, the state can regulate women as childbearers. If cultural practice
remains consistent, that regulation will continue to fall disproportionately on
poor women of color. This prediction is based not only on precedent, but also
on common sense. Enforcing the regulatory scheme requires monitoring and
reporting. 281 Women using public health facilities and public monies are
subject to that monitoring and are more likely to be reported to authorities. 282
It is poor women of color who are most likely to have contact with government
agencies and use public hospitals.
Poor women of color are reported at disproportionately higher rates for
drug use.283 It seems logical to conclude that poor women of color will be
reported for other behavior at disproportionately higher rates. Private
physicians who generally treat white middle- and upper-class women, on the
other hand, are not likely to oppose their patients, whose continued patronage
they want to preserve. 284 The doctors are more likely to respect these patients
as individuals. 285
279 See Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147; Kolder, supra note 159; Leiberman,
supra note 146, at 515. Note that the individual's right to die is weighed against four state
interests, including the integrity of the medical profession.
280 See Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 147, at 211 (counsel for the Colorado hospital
expressed concern about professional liability when the patient refused to undergo cesarean
section, after fetal distress occurred during labor).
281 See Stearns, supra note 232, at 627.
282 For example, most drug testing occurs in public hospitals. Kary L. Moss, Legal
Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartun Women and Newborns as the Basis for Gvil and
Crninal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1406, 1407 (March 1990).
283 Ira j. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During
Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322
NEwENG. J. MED. 1202-05 (1990) (researchers reported that levels of substance abuse by
pregnant women were consistent across racial and economic lines; however, black women
were reported to public health authorities ten times more often than were white women);
Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to
Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745, 753, 782 (1989-90).
284 Roberts, supra note 104, at 1433.
285 Id.
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2. Indirect Regulation of the Pregnant Woman
In this section, there are fewer specific historical comparisons to make.
Nor are the interventions medical, although medical knowledge about fetal
development often serves as evidence in these cases. There is little precedent
for restricting women by imposing penalties at law on choices that fail to
promote fetal interests. But, the indirect regulations do continue the cultural
practice of requiring self-sacrifice by punishing "unnatural" maternal
selfishness as defined by the ideology of motherhood. The parallel stories
continue. As the fetus gains recognition as a person, the construct of conflict
expands. This story is accompanied by the old one, the subordination of
women. In the indirect portion of the regulatory scheme, this story is told
primarily in terms of tort liability, criminal prosecution, and findings of child
neglect based on conduct during pregnancy.
More particular to the indirect regulatory scheme is that it highlights the
aspect of the motherhood ideology raised by the criminalization of prostitution
and by sterilization abuse. That is, women are not only responsible for
maintaining and perpetuating social order, they are also to blame when disorder
prevails. Society expresses its fear of disorder by regulating women as bad
mothers.
a. Tort Liability: The Reasonable Pregnant Woman
The Parental Immunity Doctrine emerged in the late nineteenth century, 286
but has since broken down.287 Some jurisdictions have abolished it entirely; 288
others have limited it so that children can sue their parents for injuries caused
after birth.289 Parents have long been able to recover for third party acts that
harmed or killed a fetus. 290 Since 1946, courts have recognized tort actions
286 Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983) (summarizing the history of the
parental immunity doctrine in the United States). "The English common law did not
recognize the doctrine of parental immunity. The doctrine emerged later in this country in
three state court decisions, sometimes referred to as 'The Great Trilogy.'" Id. at 1147. See
also Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664
(Tenn. 1903), overnded by, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Roller v.
Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overrded by, Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952).
287 See Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963) (This was the first case to
limit parental immunity. The Wisconsin court maintained immunity for acts constituting an
exercise of parental authority or parental discretion in providing care.).
288 See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245
N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971).
289 See, e.g., Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983).
290 There is a split in authority over the issue of whether to recognize a wrongful death
action for a stillborn viable fetus. W.P. KBETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
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brought by children for pre-birth injuries caused by third persons. 291 More
recently, children have been able to recover for third party acts that resulted in
their "wrongful life." 292 Now it is becoming likely that a child could recover
against her parents for harms caused by conception or during pregnancy.
In Grodin v. Grodin,293 Randy Grodin sued his mother, Roberta Grodin,
for taking Tetracyline during pregnancy. Because his mother took this
antibiotic while pregnant with him, Randy Grodin's teeth were discolored. The
trial court granted summary judgment for Ms. Grodin. However, the Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded so that the reasonableness of taking
Tetracycline for the mother's health in light of the risk to the unborn child
could be determined. The court said, "[a] woman's decision to continue taking
drugs during pregnancy is an exercise of her discretion. The focal question is
whether the decision reached by a woman in a particular case was a 'reasonable
exercise of parental discretion."' 2 94 A woman can choose, then, but she had
better not choose wrongly.
A child was also the plaintiff in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories.295
There, the California Court of Appeals held that a child born with Tay-Sachs
OF TORTS § 55, at 368-69 (5th ed. 1984). However, even in jurisdictions that do not
recognize wrongful fetal death as actionable, courts have been willing to compensate
parents for harm caused by fetal death or injury. Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va.
1986) (upholding award of $750,000 for physical and emotional suffering caused by
physicians negligent treatment of toxemic mother and unborn child); Craig v. JMT Ins. Co.,
407 N.W.2d 584 (Iowa 1987) (permitting recovery for loss of consortium for death of
unborn but viable child killed in automobile accident).
291 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (the first case to allow recovery
for prenatal injury); see Honorable Tom Rickhoff & Curtis L. Cukjan, Protecting the Fetus
from Maternal Drug & Alcohol Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.. 259,
277-81 (1989); see also Karen Crockett & Miriam Hyman, Note, Live Birth: A Condition
Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 805, 825 (1976) ("Since the
purpose of recovery in cases of prenatal injuries is to provide compensation for a child
burdened with life-long infirmities, courts do allow recovery for prenatal injury if there is
subsequently a live-birth .... Recovery is not.., a recognition that the prenatal child has
legal rights.").
292 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (child born with hereditary deafness
granted recovery for special damages from the doctor who failed to inform parents that
condition of plaintiff's elder sister was hereditary); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) (child born with Tay-Sachs may recover from doctors who failed
to inform parents that they were carriers of Tay-Sachs disease); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (granting child recovery for extraordinary expenses
incurred during her lifetime due to congenital defects that arose when Air Force doctors
fuiled to inform parents of dangers of Dilantin, a drug prescribed for the mother's epilepsy).
293 301 N.W.2d 869 (Miech. Ct. App. 1980).
294 Id. at 870-71.
295 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
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disease had a cause of action against two laboratories that had failed to identify
the parents as carriers of the disease. In dicta, the court said:
If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in
transmitting the necessary warnings, parents made a conscious choice to
proceed with a pregnancy, with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant
would be born, that conscious choice would provide an intervening act of
proximate cause to preclude liability insofar as defendants other than the
parents were concerned. Under such circumstances, we see no sound public
policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain,
suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring. 296
Tort liability would give the notion of maternal-fetal conflict a new meaning.
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, if maternal liability for prenatal
injuries were recognized, "mother and child would be legal adversaries from
the moment of conception until birth." 297 A fetal right in tort would make
pregnant women the legal, as well as the moral, insurers of the next
generation's health and happiness.
This is, in essence, what Shaw proposes-broad-based tort liability for
maternal failures that result in defect and suffering.298 She describes three
general sources of actionable harm. The first is posed by environmental
teratogens and embryotoxins. 299 Failure to seek treatment for illness, exposing
oneself to certain chemicals and occupational hazards, and taking certain
prescription drugs may be actionable. The second source of harm is the
woman's lifestyle decisions. 300 Women addicted to alcohol or drugs whose
children are born with fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal narcotic addiction would
be liable. The third is genetic defects, arising from either environmentally-
296 Id. at 488. But note that in response to Curlender, the California legislature enacted
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1981):
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that
the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been
allowed to have been born alive.
(b) The failure of refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child
shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal
be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section, "conceived" means the fertilization of a human ovum
by a human sperm.
2 97 Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (111. 1988).
298 Shaw, supra note 252, at 90-98. But see ELLAS & ANNAS, supra note 162, at 260-
61 (criticizing the use of tort actions).
299 Shaw, supra note 252, at 66-73.
30 0 Id. at 73-75.
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caused mutagens or from existing deleterious genes. 30 1 Failure to seek genetic
testing and counseling, and failure to use contraceptives or to abort a defective
fetus, could be actionable.
Some women, in other words, should not become mothers at all. Professor
Shaw's message echoes Justice Holmes' baleful commentary in Buck v. Bell-
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 30 2 It is not simply a concern for
sparing children from painful lives, nor is it simply preventive medicine. It is,
rather, a way of designating certain persons as dangerous agents, of treating
certain pregnancies as controlled substances, and of saying that humanity at its
fullest is not desirable.
More generally, actions giving rise to tort liability become a part of the
profile of a bad mother. A woman who becomes pregnant must act solely as a
good mother. More accurately, a woman who becomes pregnant must make all
decisions with regard to her womb. Since Shaw proposes pre-conception
negligence, 303 a woman who might become pregnant must act first for her
womb. Any act or omission not made with the fetus or would-be fetus foremost
in a woman's mind would expose her to liability. Thus, maternal tort liability
to fetuses becomes a more oppressive version of the nineteenth century ideal of
a pregnant woman as a "soul gardener." 304 The idea then was that it was the
pregnant woman's moral duty to provide "good soil" for the child during its
prenatal life. "[T]he pregnant woman was to direct herself to the goal of
creating the best possible child." 30 5 Today, if maternal liability in tort expands,
it could be the state who directs the woman.
b. Criminal Transmission of HIV
The Institute of Medicine has identified transmission from mother to fetus
during gestation, birth, or breastfeeding, as one of the three major means of
infection. 306 It is not clear if they intended it, 307 but Arkansas, 308 Illinois, 309
301 Id. at 75-78.
302 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
303 Shaw, supra note 252, at 91-95.
304 HALLER & HALLER, supra note 13, at 133.
305 Id.
306 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, CONFRONTING AIDS:
UPDATE 1988 43 (1988); see also Donald P. Francis, MD, DSC & James Chinn, MD,
MPH, The Prevention of Acquired Inmmnodeficiency Syndrome in the United States, 257
JAMA 1357, 1358-59 (Mar. 13, 1987). The other two major means of transmitting AIDS
are through sexual contact where semen or vaginal secretions are exchanged and through
the sharing of unsterilized needles by intravenous drug users.
307 Closen & Isaacman, supra note 268, at 77.
308 ARK. CODE ANN., § 5-14-123 (Miechie Supp. 3, 1991).
309 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 12-16.2 (Supp. 1992).
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Louisiana, 310 and Missouri31' have enacted statutes that make it illegal for
HIV-infected women to have children. These statutes criminalize the knowing
transmission of HIV. The Illinois statute provides, "[a] person commits a
criminal transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is
infected with HIV, engages in intimate contact with another." 312 The statute
defines "intimate contact" as "the exposure of one person to a bodily fluid of
another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV."3 1 3
Studies show that twenty to sixty percent of children born to HIV positive
women are HIV-infected. 314 If a woman knows she is HIV positive, carries her
pregnancy to term, and gives birth to an HIV-infected child, she may well have
committed a felony.
It has been pointed out that HIV criminal transmission laws encourage
abortion and "outlaw motherhood." 315 If prosecutors were to use these laws
against women who give birth to HIV-infected babies, the criminalization of
motherhood under these statutes would not be an isolated event. In the next
subsection, I describe the trend toward penalizing women for transmitting
drugs or alcohol to their fetuses. The prosecution of women with HIV would
not be unlike the prosecution of addicted women who have babies. AIDS, like
3 10 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1992).
311 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(1)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("It shall be unlawful for
any individual knowingly infected with HIV to ... [djeliberately create a grave and
unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV through sexual or other contact when an
individual knows that he is creating that risk.").
312 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38 12-16.2 (Supp. 1992).
313 Id. 12-16.2(b).
314 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra note 306, at 52;
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS, 12
(June, 1988); Peter A. Selwyn, MD, MPH et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and
Decisions to Continue or Teminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA
3567 (1989).
315 Closen & Isaacman, supra note 268. Compare the approach under federal family
planning policy, which promotes education and counseling:
All Title X clinics must offer, at a minimum, education on HIV infection and
AIDS, counseling on risks and infection prevention, and referral services. Other
services such as risk assessment, counseling about testing and administering tests may
also be provided. If other resources are unavailable, Title X funds may be used to
support these services. Of particular importance is the role of Title X projects in
offering effective methods of family planning to sexually active HIV-infected women
who run a high risk of perinatal transmission in pregnancy and who run a significant
risk of transmitting HIV to other sexual partners.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, MEMORANDUM FROM NABERS CABINESS, OFFICE OF
POPULATION AFFAIRS PROGRAM INSTRUCTION SERIES OPA-87-4: AIDS EDUCATION,
COUNSELING AND TESTING IN TITLE X (1987).
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substance abuse, is considered a major social problem, triggering the same type
of sympathy for infants born infected. The same concern for the public interests
predominates in both issues. Pregnant women are the designated transmitters in
both situations-rendering them prime suspects for the label "bad mothers" and
for legal penalties. Good mothers transmit morality and social order by their
maternal nature; they transmit good genes by their physical capacity to bear
children. Bad mothers transmit bad values and disorder; they transmit HIV and
harmful substances by their physical capacity to bear children. Good mothers
have healthy children. Bad mothers have sick children who will be burdens on
society.
c. Criminal Prosecutions of Pregnant Women Who Are Addicts
In the past few years, women have been prosecuted for a variety of crimes
that all amount to the same offense: behavior during pregnancy that creates risk
or harm to the fetus. The criminal prosecution of women for acts against
fetuses is the strongest form of reinforcing the ideology. The message that bad
mothers should be punished is express when criminal law is utilized.
The widely publicized story of Jennifer Johnson illustrates this point.3 16
Jennifer Johnson, an addict, took cocaine during her two pregnancies. When
her son was born on October 3, 1987, he tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a
cocaine metabolite. Jennifer Johnson admitted using cocaine the previous night.
During her second pregnancy, Ms. Johnson suffered a crack overdose. A
month later, while in labor, she used rock cocaine. She gave birth to a
daughter. Both births were normal, with no complications nor signs of fetal
distress.317
Following the birth of her daughter, Jennifer Johnson was prosecuted.
According to the complaint and to the court, Ms. Johnson was guilty of
delivering a controlled substance to a minor. Infants are persons, under the
statute, but fetuses are not. The prosecutor's theory was that Ms. Johnson had
delivered cocaine to her children between the time the child emerged from the
birth canal and the moment the doctor severed the umbilical cord. 318 Medical
experts testified that it is theoretically possible that a woman could smoke
cocaine at 10:00 p.m. and that, during the next afternoon, the metabolized
derivatives could diffuse to the placenta and pass to the baby through the
umbilical cord during the thirty to ninety seconds after birth and before the
umbilical cord was cut. 3 19 Experts also testified, however, that cocaine has a
half-life of one hour, that blood flow through the umbilical cord is restricted
316 Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
3 17 Id. at 421-22 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
3 18 Id. at 419.
319 Id.
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during childbirth, and that it is impossible to tell whether metabolites passed
before or after birth.320 In July 1989, the court sentenced her to 15 years of
probation.321 She was ordered to submit to random drug testing for the first
year and follow a supervised program during future pregnancies. 322 The
Supreme Court of Florida finally overturned the conviction on July 23,
1992.323
The lower court decisions can be criticized on a number of legal
grounds. 324 But understanding the case as an elaboration upon the ideology of
motherhood is important. The easier point to be made is that the lower Florida
courts identified Jennifer Johnson as a bad mother and were willing to regulate
her as such for the next fifteen years. This point needs elaboration; it is more
complex than it appears. It is not simply that the prosecutor's theory was
absurd or that the use of criminal law to address the harms of addiction is
inappropriate. Rather, this decision sends a complicated message about how
women's roles are defined. The women most likely to be labeled bad mothers
are those whose behavior implicates points of social disorder. One can identify
a society's current concerns by reviewing its current regulatory scheme. In a
society's direct regulations, one can detect influences from the pro-life
movement325 and the growing faith in biological determinism. Biological
320 Id. at 422.
321 Tamar Lewin, Drug Verdict Over Infants is Voided, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at
B6. 322 ld.
323 Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
324 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Sharp disputed the applicability of the criminal
statute to the birthing process, and argued that even if the statute was intended to apply,
there was no medical testimony to support the trial court's finding that "delivery" of
controlled substances occurred during the birth. Id. at 421-22. Nor was there any evidence
that Johnson timed her dosage of cocaine so as to be able to transmit some small amount
after her child's birth. Id. at 421. Judge Sharp noted that prosecuting women for using
drugs and "delivering" them to their newborns is an ineffective response to the problem of
substance abuse by pregnant women. "Rather than face the possibility of prosecution,
pregnant women who are substance abusers may simply avoid prenatal or medical care for
fear of being detected." Id. at 426. "Prosecution of pregnant women for engaging in
activities harmful to their fetuses or newborns may also unwittingly increase the incidence
of abortion." Id. at 426-27 (citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court's opinion cites
Judge Sharp's dissent extensively.
See also Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal
Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & F.Mm 239 (1990); Kary Moss, Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 278, 284-92 (1990); Roberts, supra
note 104; McNulty, Note, supra note 140; Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The
Case Against the Criinnalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1988).
325 Fetal rights proponents include those who take the pro-life position in the abortion
debate. Fetal rights proponents take Roe v. Wade out of the abortion context to advocate
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determinism is most apparent in the scheme of indirect regulations.326 The
concern that dominates the criminal prosecutions has been raised by the "War
on Drugs." 327 The message that these prosecutions convey is not simply that
women who use drugs or alcohol are bad mothers, but, more importantly, that
it is at least partly the failure of the institution of motherhood that has led to
this disorder.
One response to this perceived failure is to call for reinforcement of the
institution. Thus, while advances in medicine have encouraged us to
comprehend the fetus as an entity separate from the pregnant woman, the fear
of failure adds the regulation of pregnant women to the idea of fetal
personhood. In other words, one answer to the call for reinforcements is
increased medical intervention; another is erecting a civil standard of
reasonable pregnancy behavior; and yet another is the criminal prosecution of
pregnant women. 328
The Johnson case is not unique. More than 160 women have been arrested
in twenty-four states for drug use during pregnancy. Most of them have
pleaded guilty. Of those who contested, none have been convicted. 329 In
Michigan, Muskegon County Prosecutor Tony Tague filed a two-count felony
complaint against Kimberly Hardy for using cocaine during pregnancy. 330 Ms.
recognition of "potential life" in a way that overrides the woman's interests. See Gallagher,
supra note 177, at 15, 31, 41-42.
The forced prenatal treatment cases and proposals reflect, in part, a belief that the state
may not only protect fetal life, but can guarantee that the fetus be born whole and sound. If
the state takes this to its extreme, as Professor Shaw does, a woman who gives birth to an
unhealthy or seriously defective infant has violated moral and legal duties. See supra notes
298-305 and accompanying text.
326 The tort cases and the laws punishing women for alcohol and drug use during
pregnancy do not express concern for protecting the life of the fetus per se, but for
maximizing the fetus's chances for social, economic, and emotional success by preventing
defects that would threaten those chances, and for protecting society from the costs of
social, economic, and emotional failures.
327 The "War on Drugs" reflects the Reagan-Bush efforts to address the growing drug
crisis. From 1988, the Bush administration allocated over $10 billion annually towards
curbing the drug problem. Under the direction of federal "drug czar" William Bennett and
his successor, former Florida Governor Bob Martinez, approximately 70% of this allocation
was earmarked for law enforcement, prosecution of drug dealers and users, and building
new prisons. The major emphasis of the national drug strategy has been on reducing supply,
rather than on programs directed toward education, prevention, and treatment.
328 See Berrien, supra note 324; Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs:
Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
179 (1989); Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies:
Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1990); Moss, supra note 282;
Roberts, supra note 104; Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 324.
329 Lewin, supra note 321, atB6.
330 People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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Hardy, a Black woman and an addict, had smoked crack cocaine less than
thirteen hours before giving birth. Her son, Areanis,331 exhibited signs of drug
ingestion at birth-small size for gestational age of 7-1/2 months, distended
abdomen, and spitting up. Tague charged her with delivery of less than fifty
grams of a mixture containing cocaine. He used the umbilical cord delivery
theory. 332 In addition, he charged Kimberly Hardy with second-degree child
abuse. He alleged that by ingesting cocaine while pregnant, she caused serious
physical harm to her minor child. He argued, without supporting authority, that
a fetus is a "person" because it is a "legal entity." 333 Both felony counts were
quashed. In fact, many of these charges are being dismissed and the convictions
overturned. 334 These statutes, according to the courts, are simply not intended
to regulate pregnant women. However, the concept of fetal personhood has
been added to the ideology, and attempts to add it to the legal construct persist.
As of 1987, there were at least fifty other "fetal abuse" cases in twenty
jurisdictions. 335
In terms of court victories, prosecutors are also having slight success under
criminal child neglect and endangerment statutes. 336 In these cases, the theory
331 Andrea Stone, Mother aeared of Giving Cocaine to Cild at Birth, U.S.A.
TODAY, April 4, 1991, at 2A. He is now healthy.
332 See People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct., Jan. 31, 1991) (When
newborns tested positive for cocaine metabolites, the mother was charged with delivery of
cocaine. The Circuit Court held that the Michigan Legislature never intended the delivery
statute to apply in this situation. The court also rejected the prosecutor's contention that
charging women for delivering illegal drugs to newborns provides a strong deterrent to drug
use and prompts women to seek drug treatment. Note that the court in Johnson cited this
case.); State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 WL 125695 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1990) ("To
construe the statute in this manner would mean that every expectant woman who ingested a
substance with the potential for harm to her child, e.g., alcohol or nicotine, would be
criminally liable under R.C. 2919.22(A), [the child endangering statute]. We do not believe
such a result was intended by the General Assembly."); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No.
87970 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1990).
333 Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 53 (Reilly, J., concurring). Ms. Hardy was charged under a
statute that provides, "a person shall not manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to
deliver a controlled substance .... MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(1) (West 1980).
"Delivery" is defined as the transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another.
Id. § 333.7105(1). "Person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, cooperative
association, private corporation, personal representative,... or any other legal entity." Id.
§§ 333. 7109(1), .1106.
334 See Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 19, 1990,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 32, 35; Stone, supra note 331.
335 Hoffman, supra note 334.
336 People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego, Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987)
(Pamela Rae Stewart was charged with child abuse under California Penal Code § 270 for
willfully omitting to furnish medical services. It was alleged that she abused the fetus by
using amphetamines during pregnancy, by engaging in sexual intercourse, and by failing to
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focuses on the idea that a fetus is a person rather than that a mother used the
umbilical cord voluntarily to deliver drugs to the newborn. 337 Although the
conviction rate is low, and although these cases have provoked the same type
of criticism as the Johnson and Hardy cases,338 criminal prosecutions have
succeeded in hardening the assumption of a maternal-fetal conflict. The
prosecutor and the attendant publicity have built sympathy and support for
infants born with fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal drug addiction, but have also
cast these infants as burdens placed on society by selfish, destructive
mothers. 339 Very few, on the other hand, have questioned the use of
prosecutorial discretion in pursuing these cases.340
seek medical attention when bleeding began, all despite the doctor's advice. The child, born
brain damaged, died a few weeks after birth. The court dismissed the charges because the
statute was intended to enforce child support arrangements, not to penalize certain behavior
during pregnancy.); State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 WL 125695 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
31, 1990) (The charges under the criminal child endangerment statute were dismissed. The
court affirmed the trial court's determination that the statute did not create a duty of care to
a fetus.); State v. Gethers, No. 894454 CF10A (Cir. Ct., Broward Co., Fla. 1989) (The
court dismissed a criminal child abuse charge based upon alleged maternal cocaine use and
delivery of a child who tested positive for cocaine. A "person" within the meaning of the
statute does not include a fetus.); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App.
1977) (Margaret Velasquez continued to take heroin during her pregnancy despite warnings
from a public health nurse. She gave birth to twins who suffered withdrawal symptoms. The
court held that the statutory definition of "child" did not include a fetus and set aside both
counts of felony child endangering.). See Bruce Henderson, Mothers ofInfant Addicts: Does
Prosecution Help?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 26, 1989, at IA (Prosecutor charged
Candace Woolery with criminal neglect after Woolery gave birth to a baby who tested
positive for heroin); Moss, supra note 324 (women have also been arrested in Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Michigan).
337 See also Leiberman et al., supra note 146, at 517 (arguing that a woman's decision
to refuse medical treatment on behalf of the fetus should be a felony). Leiberman suggests
that the woman's refusal to consent is analogous to child abuse.
338 See Berrien, supra note 324, at 239; Laurie Rubenstein, Prosecuting Maternal
Substance Abusers: An Unjustified and Ineffective Policy, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130
(1991); Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 324, at 1009-12; see also Note, Regdating
Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on haldbirth Decisions and
Women of Color, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523, 525-29 (1991).
339 See, e.g., Rickhoff & Cukjan, supra note 291, at 286 (describing the issue as a
conflict between good and voluntary evil-the right of "children, who are helpless at
birth... to be born free of health problems caused by the mother's misconduct, to be
nurtured, and to be free from abuse at birth" versus the pregnant woman's "right to use
drugs and alcohol to the detriment of her fetus"); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 55
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (summarizing the prosecutor's argument "that the strong
enforcement of our drug laws is the first step in protecting the newborn from the mother's
selfish and destructive conduct").
340 Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the
Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BuFF. L. REV. 737, 779 (1991).
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Other efforts to criminalize bad motherhood have been based on charges of
manslaughter. 341 These cases also concerned alcohol or drug use by the
pregnant woman. Again, it appears that prosecutors are losing these cases.
However, the willingness to penalize women for behavior during pregnancy is
the prevailing spirit. Judges, like Wolf, who sentenced Brenda Vaughn to 180
days in jail for fraud after she tested positive for cocaine, and prosecutors, like
Tague, are getting help in their efforts342 to reinforce good motherhood by
punishing bad versions of motherhood. It is the legislators who are providing
that help.
State and federal legislators have proposed criminal "fetal abuse" bills. 343
These proposed laws describe certain activities during pregnancy as a form of
child abuse. Senator Pete Wilson (now Governor) of California introduced the
"Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989"344 in the United
States Senate. Although unenacted, the bill may yet serve as a model for state
laws against substance abuse during pregnancy. The bill defines substance
abusO 45 as a form of child abuse and provides for "testing of newborn infants
for the effects of maternal substance abuse so that infants addicted or otherwise
injured or impaired by the substance abuse of their mothers will be brought to
the attention of the proper authorities." 346 Its stated purposes are to prevent
341 Patrick Reardon, Grand Jury Won't Indict Mother in Baby's Death, CHI. TRIB.,
May 27, 1989, at 1 (describing failed prosecution of Melanie Green, a black woman, for
manslaughter after her child died soon after birth. It was alleged that the child's death was
caused by Ms. Green's use of cocaine during pregnancy.).
342 Some of the judges who refuse to apply these statutes to pregnant women have
called upon the legislatures to provide appropriate means of penalizing drug- or alcohol-
addicted women who have babies. See State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990 WL 125695, at
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1990). But see Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 426 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("[pirosecuting women for using drugs and 'delivering' them to their
newborns appears to be the least effective response to this crisis").
343 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 90, 57th Gen. Sess. (1990 Colo. Laws) (criminalizing child
abuse for reasons including abuse of a controlled substance and assisting a pregnant woman
in use of a controlled substance); H.R. Res. 1146, Reg. Leg. Sess. (1990 Ga. Laws) (would
have criminalized the distribution of a controlled substance to an unborn child); H.R. Res.
90-976, Reg. Sess. (1990 La. Laws) (would make it unlawful to give birth to an infant
addicted to heroin or cocaine); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-511 (1989) (makes the birth of a
child with fetal alcohol syndrome a misdemeanor); see also, Note, When Self Abuse
Becomes Child Abuse: 77Te Need for Coercive Prenatal Government Action in Response to
the Cocaine Baby Problem, 11 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 73 (1990).
344S. 1444, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
345 "Substance abuse" is defined as "the use of controlled substances. . . the
possession or distribution of which is unlawful under such Act, or excessive or injurious
ingestion of legal substances, including beverage alcohol." Id. § 3(a)(1). Tobacco and
caffeine could also trigger this law.
346 Id. § 2(a)(12).
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substance abuse by pregnant women by outreach and intervention during early
pregnancy and by mandatory rehabilitation of women who give birth to
addicted or otherwise impaired infants. 347
Grants to the states for outreach and education would fund the projects
proposed by the bill. 348 To obtain a grant, a state must certify that it is a crime
to abuse a child by giving birth to an addicted or impaired infant. The state
must also certify that "on a conviction... the female so convicted shall be
sentenced to a period of three years of mandatory rehabilitation in a custodial
setting. " 3 49 The state may provide one exception to this crime. If a woman in
the first trimester of her pregnancy "voluntarily submit[s] to rehabilitation for
such term and under such conditions as competent medical authorities shall
prescribe.., such female shall not be charged with criminal child abuse if she
completes the term and conditions prescribed." 350 Other statutes do not
specifically provide for criminal prosecution, but do provide for infant testing
and reporting of toxicology screens to the state.351 If the tests indicate maternal
substance abuse, the woman can be prosecuted on this information. Only a few
bills or statutes provide immunity to the woman so that women will not be
afraid to seek prenatal care. 352
Efforts to make drug use during pregnancy a substantive crime should be
examined for what they do and do not accomplish. Fetal abuse laws or other
criminal laws will not help the fetuses of convicted mothers. According to the
American Academy of Pediatrics, "[p]unitive measures taken toward pregnant
women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven
benefits to infant health." 353 In fact, "such involuntary measures are likely to
discourage mothers and their infants from receiving the very medical care and
social support systems that are crucial to their treatment." 354 Further,
3 47 Id. § 2(b).
3 48 ld. § 3(b).
349 Id. § 3(c)(4)-(5).
350 Id. § 3(c)(5).
351 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 1991); S.B. 657 Maryland (1991), H.B.
1000 Maryland (1991); S.B. 1197, Reg. Sess., Pa. (1991); H.F. 2564 Iowa (1990); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.0255 (West 1991); see also, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.503(9)(a)(2), .504
(West Supp. 1989) (requiring doctors to report women who abused drugs during their
pregnancies to health authorities and broadening definition of injury to child to include
newborn dependency on controlled substances). For results of a study conducted to
determine physician compliance with this reporting requirement, see supra note 283 and
accompanying text.
352 See S.B. No. 1197 Penn. (1991).
353 Abigail English, Prenatal Drug Exposure & Pediatric AIDS: New Issues for
Chidren's Attorneys, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 452, 454 (1990) (quoting Provisional
Comm. on Substance Abuse, Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Drug Exposed Infants,
PEDIATRICS (Oct. 1990)).
354 Id.
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prosecution and incarceration of pregnant women can be directly detrimental to
fetal health. 355 Prosecution for drug or alcohol use during pregnancy does seek
to deter other women, although, as noted above, this attempt to deter others is
not only counterproductive, it is also counterintuitive. 356 As a last-but-not-least
note on what the criminalization of pregnancy does accomplish, using criminal
law to declare certain behavior as nonmaternal defines ideal motherhood by
negative implication. The ideal, in this mode, does not purport to be
constructive; rather, it is overtly punitive.
In terms of the war on drugs, the prosecution of women as mothers is
telling. A significant front of the "war" has been an attack on drug dealers and
drug "lords." 357 The overt message is that women are responsible for society's
drug problem. Women are an enemy in the war on drugs. Jennifer Johnson,
Kimberly Hardy, and the fifty other pregnant women charged with drug
offenses were prosecuted under laws intended for drug dealers. The covert
message here is that failed motherhood is the cause of the problem; i.e., the
selfish and destructive conduct of mothers is creating a new generation ofdrug
and alcohol abusers. Mothers are as bad as the drug dealers whose actions are
devastating our cities and an entire generation of youth.
The corollary to the covert message is that women who are tempted to take
drugs should not be mothers. These women are not capable of fulfilling the
ideal; they breed disorder. Those women labelled "bad mothers" are the same
women deemed bad mothers and subjected to sterilization abuse and forced
medical intervention. Poor women of color are disproportionately subject to
criminal prosecution. 358 They are being punished not for drug use, but for
becoming childbearers. 359 Motherhood by women of color and poor women is
355 Stress caused by prosecution may harm fetal development. Imprisonment may
actually increase harm to fetal development. A study of three California prisons revealed
that more than one-third of the pregnancies of incarcerated women ended in late-term
miscarriages. In one prison, only 21% of inmate pregnancies ended in live births. The
conditions in all three prisons were found to be substantially below minimum standards set
by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. See Susan LaCroix, Birth of a
Bad Idea: Jailing Mothers for Drug Abuse, THE NATION, May 1, 1989, at 585, 585-88;
Moss, supra note 324. In addition, as reported by Brenda Vaughn after serving the first
thirty days of her sentence, drugs are available in jail. See supra note 224 and
accompanying text.
356 See LaCroix, supra note 355, at 585-88; Moss, supra note 324.
357 Charles Lane, et al., The Newest War, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 18.
358 See Gina Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990,
at A13 (of 60 women charged, 81% were women of color); see also Roberts, supra note
104, at 1421, n.6 (citing a memorandum prepared by the ACLU Reproductive Freedom
Project: "Of the 52 defendants [women prosecuted for giving birth to babies testing positive
for drugs], 35 are African-American, 14 are white, 2 are Latino, and 1 is Native
American."); McNulty, Note, supra note 140, at 292-99.
359 See Roberts, supra note 104, at 1445.
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devalued by the ideology.360 Motherhood by women of color and poor women
is discouraged at law. 361
The rationale behind the prosecutions, bills, and statutes seems to be that
offered by Tony Tague. Tague supported his prosecution by stressing the
deterrent effect of criminal law. He said that strong drug law enforcement is
"the first step in protecting the newborn from the mother's selfish and
destructive conduct." 362 This is the motherhood ideology. His version of the
ideology assumes, of course, that persons addicted to drugs or alcohol, whether
men or women, act voluntarily. As Judge Reilly of the Court of Appeals wrote,
"[t]hat argument ignores the underlying problem of addiction and the
compulsive behavior it generates." 363 Yet women can be prosecuted, in the
name of the fetus, because they are pregnant.
Second, although Tague speaks of "the newborn," he speaks to the
pregnant woman. She must, he says, act for the fetus, as if she alone can
protect the child-to-be from social evils. This is not a new concept;364 it is part
of the ideology. It is, however, a new concept at law. Judge Reilly, at least,
recognized that when he stated that "[t]his Court... is bound by the existing
framework of our laws to refrain from transforming into a criminal act what is
now essentially a moral obligation by the pregnant woman to her developing
fetus." 365 Judge Reilly, however, appears to speak for the minority. The ideal
is being transformed into law and, as such, mandates obligation and self-denial.
Third, whether or not Tague said it, when the state recognizes fetal
personhood by prosecuting under old statutes or by enacting new ones, it acts
to protect itself as well as innocent fetuses. The Wilson Bill paired the policy
interests of preventing costs in terms of human suffering with that of dollar
cost. The statutory text includes the following set of findings:
(4) the initial cost of providing care to infants suffering maternal substance
abuse is over $13,000,000,000 annually;
360 Id. at 1436.
361 See McNulty, Note, supra note 140.
362 People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
363 Id.
364 HALLER & HALLER, supra note 13, at 134 (quoting EMMA F. DRAKE, WHAT A
YOUNG WIFE OUGHT TO KNOW 119 (1902)). Placing sole responsibility on pregnant women
for avoiding social evils has a now-humorous precedent. In the nineteenth century, the
pregnant woman was warned to avoid the taint of alcohol and tobacco on her husband's
breath. The belief was that these fumes would influence the unborn child's future habits.
"Many a little one is wailing through its infancy, and if it have strength yet will it all its life
suffer from its antenatal and postnatal poisoning; and the chances are that as soon as it is old
enough it will take up the habit which is already acquired, to pass down along the line a
more enfeebled heritage." Id.
365 Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 55 (Reilly, J., concurring).
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(5) the human cost in suffering and loss to society in terms of wasted potential
of both the abusing mother and especially the abused and innocent child is both
incalculable and avoidable;
(6) it is essential as a matter of both compassion and avoidance of unaffordable
public expenditure that a maximum effort be made to prevent the recurrence of
substance use during pregnancy. 3 66
This is the same syllogism we have heard before.367 Women are mothers. As
mothers, women serve an important role in society. Because society has a
strong interest in women as mothers, society can require women as mothers to
take responsibility for its drug problem, and can do so by restricting access to
the institution of motherhood.
d. Child Neglect and Abuse Laws: Removing Children from Bad Mothers
The use of civil neglect and abuse laws is premised on the same syllogism.
The underlying story is the same. If a woman uses drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy, the state steps in to protect the fetus or infant, and despite her
addiction, the woman is blamed for voluntarily harming her child. The
construct of conflict also replicates that of the criminal prosecution cases. The
express issue is fetal personhood. The corollary, implied by the motherhood
ideology, is maternal de-personhood. The real difference between the criminal
prosecutions and the civil neglect cases is that the courts are more willing to
recognize fetal personhood for purposes of civil neglect cases. Consequently,
the state has a higher success rate in the courtroom, and women have a greater
chance of losing their children and their liberty.
In terms of legal analysis, these cases are argued on one of two theories.
Under the first theory, conduct during pregnancy is considered probative of
future mistreatment. In these cases, the court purports to focus on the child's
future well-being.368 Under the second theory, the fetus is tacitly or expressly
366 S. 1444, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(4)-(6) (1989). The Act further provides that
"it is essential to reduce the incidence of substance abuse by pregnant women and the birth
of infants addicted... or impaired... both for the sake of the mother and ... infants...
and to reduce the unaffordable costs in tax dollars." Id. § 2(a)(1 1).367 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
368 In at least two cases, the courts have said that prenatal conduct alone is insufficient
to make a finding of neglect. But these courts go on to use the fact that the women are not
enrolled in rehabilitation programs as the additional factor necessary to sustain a neglect
finding. In re "Male" R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fam. Ct. 1979). "[I]t is far from clear that
such impairment [withdrawal symptoms upon birth], caused as it was by pre-natal maternal
conduct, would be sufficient, standing alone, to support a finding of neglect." Id. at 824.
The court cited the additional fact that Billie R. had failed to enroll in an alcohol or drug
program. Despite the fact that the court could not establish actual neglect (because Billie R.
never had custody), it concluded that "as a result of her 'drug abuse,' respondent is unable
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accorded personhood status. In these cases, the focus is on the woman's
conduct during pregnancy. 369 A California court using the second theory
stated, "Troy was born with a detrimental condition caused by Mother's
unreasonable acts of ingesting dangerous drugs while pregnant with him. This
fact created a legal presumption that he is a person" who may be judged a
dependent child of the court.370 A New York court was less willing to presume
harm. "[A] mother's pre-natal conduct alone cannot be the basis of neglect
finding. Nor is it enough to claim abuse without showing a specific detriment
to the new-born. The mother's pre-natal conduct must be connected to a post
to properly care for her child." Id. at 820. In re Stefanel Tyesba C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280
(App. Div. 1990), the Family Court dismissed the neglect petitions "because prenatal
conduct cannot form the basis of a finding of neglect." Id. at 282. The appellate division
reversed and held that "the petitions sufficiently alleged causes of action for neglect based
on the mothers' admitted use of drugs during their pregnancies, the childrens' positive
toxicology for cocaine at birth and the failure of mothers to be enrolled in a drug
rehabilitation program at the time the petitions were filed." Id.
369 In re Stephen W., 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he question is
whether the facts alleged (urine screen was positive for opiates and infant displayed
symptoms of opiate drug withdrawal) are legally sufficient to state a cause of action to
declare a child a dependent of the juvenile court. We answer this question in the
affirmative."); In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922, 925 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (In this case, the
state had a compelling interest in protecting Valerie, a living child born with a dangerous
drug in her system, because her mother used that drug eight to ten hours before her birth.
The fact that Valerie was at risk because of her mother's actions before her birth did not
negate or dilute this compelling state interest.); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980) ("We hold that a newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a
consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected
child."); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (Fain. Ct. 1990) ("The court
finds that the condition of the subject child at birth is the precipitating event warranting
judicial intervention."); In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Far. Ct. 1985)
("Although the proof in the instant proceeding is insufficient to establish that the
Respondent's abuse of alcohol, during pregnancy, actually caused fetal alcohol syndrome at
the time of birth, the Court, nevertheless, holds that such proof was sufficient to establish an
'imminent danger' of impairment . . . to the unborn child."); Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Fain. Ct. 1980) ("It is a basic rule of common law that
one's actions instant may have consequences at a later time .... Just as a cause of action
against the doctor only arises if the child is born with a defect [citations omitted], the
petition against the mother is only sustainable if the Petitioner proves that the child tested
with a positive toxicology after its birth."); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 935-36 (Ohio
Comm. P1. 1986) (Nora Ruiz admitted using heroin during the last two weeks of pregnancy
and Baby Luciano's urine screen revealed cocaine and opiates. The court held that "a
finding that a child is abused may be predicated solely upon the prenatal conduct of the
mother.").
370 In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (Ct. App. 1989).
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birth risk of harm." 371 The effect of both decisions, however, is to create a
"reasonable pregnant woman" standard of behavior. That is, these statutes are
being used to create a duty to the fetus, even if the fetus is not expressly being
accorded personhood status.
In In re Troy D.,372 the court all but recognized fetal personhood. The
woman, Kelly D., argued on appeal that the court could not sustain the
dependency petition because it was based on conduct with respect to a fetus.373
The court agreed, 374 but followed the trial court's reasoning that "the mother
conducted herself in a manner that was dangerous to the child prior to the
child's birth but with full knowledge the child would be born," 375 and found
that "the petition was concerned with the protection of a living child, not with a
fetus." 376 In other words, although a fetus does not have the same legal status
as a child under the child dependency statute, a pregnant woman must behave
reasonably before the child's birth in order to protect that unborn child. This
imposes, whether the court admits it or not, a duty to the fetus.377
Some of the reported child neglect cases expressly recognize the fetus as a
child. 37 8 Under this approach, it is easier to find that conduct during pregnancy
may itself constitute neglect. A few courts have taken the next step and
371 In re Milland, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 998 (Faro. Ct. 1989) (citations omitted). Some
written state policies provide that medical evidence of prenatal drug use is but one factor,
among many, to be considered in assessing whether a child is abused or neglected. See,
e.g., Judith Larsen, Robert Horowitz & Ira Chasnoff, Medical Evidence in Cases of
Intrauterine Drug and Alcohol Exposure, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 279 (1981).
372 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989).
373 Id. at 872.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 874. A good critique of this reasoning can be found in the opinion of a New
York court addressing a similar petition. "To carry the law Guardian's argument to its
logical extension, the State would be able to supersede a mother's custody right to her child
if she smoked cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical
labor or did not exercise enough. The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute [sic]
entirely unacceptable violations of the bodily integrity of women." In re Torres, No. N-
3968/88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
376 In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
377 It is doubtful the court would recognize a wrongful death claim against a woman
whose pregnancy terminated as the result of drug use. In this sense, the court is not
recognizing fetal personhood.
3 78 In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (Faro. Ct. 1985) (Danielle Smith was
born with fetal alcohol syndrome. The court held that "an unborn child is a 'person'" and
concluded that Danielle Smith was a "neglected child."); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939
(Ohio Comm. Pl. 1986) ("[A] viable fetus is a child under the existing child abuse statute,
and harm to it may be considered abuse under [the statute].").
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recognized a "right to begin life with a sound mind and body." 379 Since the
other side of fetal right is maternal duty, a right to begin life with a sound mind
and body places a huge onus on the pregnant woman in light of the acquired
knowledge about fetal development. 380 Courts are using this knowledge to
support recognition of fetal rights, 381 but the decisions rely upon assumptions
about motherhood.
The courts rely heavily on toxicology reports and the testimony of medical
experts in finding that conduct during pregnancy amounts to child neglect.382
However, the courts are not necessarily following medical advice.383 In In re
Stephen W,384 the California appellate court agreed "with the reasoned
analysis in Troy D. ,"385 and held that the "facts concisely describ[ing]
Stephen's medical condition at birth, and particularly that he suffered
withdrawal as a result of what appeared to be the mother's use of opiates
379 In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("Since a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body [citations omitted], we believe it is
within this best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right."); In re
Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Far. Ct. 1990) (quoting John E.B. Myers,
Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. Rav. 1, 60 (1984)
("Mhe unborn child possesses a right to a gestation undisturbed by wrongful injury and the
right to be born with a sound mind and body free from parentally inflicted abuse or
neglect.")); Dep't of Social Servs. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Far. Ct. 1989)
(recognizing "the legal right of every human being to begin life unimpaired by physical,
mental or emotional defects resulting from the neglectful acts of the parent [citation
omitted]"); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 939 ("a child does have a right to begin life with a
sound mind and body.").
380 See generally Harold Kalter, Ph.D. & Josef Warkany, M.D., Congenital
Malformations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 424 (1983); Suzanne M. Lynn, Technology and
Reproductive Rights: How Advances in Technology Can be Used to Limit Women's
Reproductive Rights, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 223 (1982).
381 See In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (referring to numerous
medical studies documenting the harmful effects of cocaine use during pregnancy).
382 Of the nine civil child neglect cases cited, see supra notes 368-81 and
accompanying text, six cited positive toxicology screens as a basis for finding neglect: In re
Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Far. Ct. 1990); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Stephen
W., 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280
(App. Div. 1990); Dep't of Social Servs. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Far. Ct. 1980);
In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935. Each of these cases relied on testimony regarding symptoms
indicating drug or alcohol exposure during gestation.
383 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Although medical experts testified that it is impossible to tell whether cocaine metabolites
pass to the child before or after birth, the court found that Jennifer Johnson had delivered a
controlled substance through the child's umbilical cord after childbirth.
384 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1990).
385 Id. at 324.
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during pregnancy" 386 were sufficient to take Stephen W. from his mother. But
in doing so, the court ignored the California Medical Association which
appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of Rayla W., the mother. 387 The opinion
reverberates with the punitive nature and the high moral tone of these
proceedings. This is particularly clear in the court's finding that "the mother
conducted herself in a manner that was dangerous to the child prior to the
child's birth but with full knowledge the child would be born."388 As noted
earlier, this assumes, in defiance of medical knowledge, that all substance
abusers act voluntarily. In addition, as Rayla W. argued, "[s]uch petition places
moral blame on the status of drug users without any factual showing of the
inability to parent." 389 These cases are not only about protecting fetuses. They
are also about describing women as sinners. 390
When the courts remove a child from parental custody based on conduct
during pregnancy, they "create rights in the fetus enforceable against the
mother." 391 The outcome is that fetal rights can be cited to impose significant
control on the woman during pregnancy. Fetal rights advocates have proposed
the "use of court orders to the mother to conform her conduct, at least where
alcohol or drug abuse is involved." 392 This would include "requiring the
mother to see a doctor at fixed intervals for periodic testing." 393 If the woman
fails to submit, she could be found in contempt of court. 394 Proposals for fetal
abuse statutes would authorize courts "to compel parents and prospective
parents to enter alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation programs,395 and in the
extreme, to take 'custody' of the fetus to prevent mental and physical harm."396
In fact, several states have already enacted statutes397 or introduced bills398
that specifically extend the protection of child neglect laws to fetuses. 399 The
386 Id. at 323.
387 Id. at 322 n.9.
388 Id. at 324 (quoting In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
389 Id. at 325.
390 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 168 (describing another example of blaming
women for social problems: "If a welfare patient [seeking prenatal care] could not afford
the diet prescribed, many clinics still treated her noncompliance as a moral problem of self-
control rather than as a problem of economics.").
391 In re Stephen W., 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 324 (Ct. App. 1990).
392 Stearns, supra note 232, at 627-28.
393 Id.
394 Id.; Rickhoff & Cukjan, supra note 291, at 293-94.
395 See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text.
396 Shaw, supra note 252, at 100.
397 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23, 2053 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-64-3.1 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992).
398 H.B. 416, Delaware, 135th Gen. Assembly (1989); S.B. 657, Maryland, 401st
Legis. Sess. (1991); H.B. 1000, Maryland, 401st Legis. Sess. (1991).
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Minnesota legislature has not only required doctors to report if they have
reason to believe a woman is pregnant and has used a controlled substance for a
nonmedical purpose, but it has also authorized local welfare agencies to seek an
emergency admission "if the pregnant woman refuses recommended voluntary
services or fails recommended treatment." 400 At least one court has approached
the idea of involuntary medical treatment under child neglect laws, 40' while
several have taken custody of a fetus,402 and therefore of the pregnant woman.
The regulation of women as wombs is more than theory.
The construct of maternal-fetal conflict is well-developed under child abuse
and neglect laws. The conflict occurs on several levels. The right of a fetus to
begin life with sound mind and body requires not only subordinating the
pregnant woman, but also profiling a particular group of women-substance-
addicted women-as "bad mothers." 403 Woman and fetus are defined as legal
and moral adversaries. 404 Finally, fetal rights have been assigned social and
political power in a way that subtracts from that of women as a class.
e. Conditioning Benefits on Good Conduct During Pregnancy
Although laws do not expressly require pregnant women to comply with
social workers' prenatal care recommendations in order to receive government
benefits, conditional benefits have been proposed and seem possible in light of
current regulations. 40 5 In other words, the government could predicate receipt
of certain benefits upon compliance with standard prenatal care instructions,
399 For a critique of these statutes, see Robin-Vergeer, supra note 283.
400 MNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1992).
401 In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (Social workers
urged Laureen Smith to seek treatment for alcohol abuse during her pregnancy, but she
failed to do so. Upon the child's birth, the child was placed in foster care and the court
ordered Ms. Smith "to complete a residential alcohol treatment program at a specified
facility and to refrain from the abuse of alcoholic beverages."); see also, In re Stephen W.,
271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (Ct. App. 1990) (The court ordered parents to submit to drug
testing to "prove they remain drug free until the hearing."); In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556
N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (App. Div. 1990) (The court did not order the pregnant women to seek
rehabilitation for cocaine addiction, but it did base its finding of neglect in part on their
failure to be enrolled in a drug rehabilitation program.); In re "Male" R., 422 N.Y.S.2d
819, 821 (Far. Ct. 1979) (The court did not directly order Billie R. to submit to treatment
for her addiction to the barbituate, Tuinal, but it based its neglect finding in part on her
unsuccessful participation in a drug program.).
402 See Kolder, supra note 159, at 1193.
403 See supra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
404 See Stearns, supra note 232.
405 See, e.g., Hillary Clinton's Plan for Prenatal Care, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 26,
1992, at A6 (suggesting that women who do not seek prenatal care be denied welfare
benefits as "the ultimate step" in getting expectant mothers to see health care professionals).
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drug or alcohol rehabilitation, regular testing, and consent to medical
treatment.
Government benefits have been conditioned on conceding reproductive
choices to the state in the past. In the forced sterilization cases mentioned
above, women had to "agree" to be sterilized in order to receive government
support.40 6 In several of the neglect cases, favorable custody determinations
were premised in part on whether the woman had followed recommendations
made by a social worker during the woman's pregnancy. State legislatures are
considering and enacting a variety of programs to address the needs of
substance-addicted women and infants. 407 It might seem a small step to
condition access to these programs on compliance with government orders.
Entitlement to WIC or AFDC benefits408 could also be made conditional. 409
The prevailing assumptions at law about the primacy of fetal rights appear to
support coerced compliance.
This potential extension of the regulatory scheme assumes that poor women
have access to prenatal care. It is the easiest and most cost-effective way of
reducing risks such as those associated with low-birth weight.410 But, in fact,
women who live in poverty have difficulty obtaining prenatal care.411 This
failure to acknowledge the reality of poor women's lives can be compared to
similar failures with regard to women addicted to drugs and alcohol. It
indicates that control of women, not preventing harm, is the real issue.
f. Fetal Protection Policies
One of the most insidious forms of reproductive regulation is the fetal
protection policy. The fetal protection policy is the attitude, put into writing
406 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
408 McNulty, Note, supra note 140, at 296.
409 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-644 (1991); ORE. REV. STAT. § 430.925
(1990); S.B. 1173, Cal. 1989-90 reg. sess. (1989); S.B. 190, 86th Gen. Assem., Mo.
(1991); S.B. 1197, Pa., 175th Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 reg. sess. (1991).
410 See AMEmCAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION TO PREVENT INFANT MORTALITY (July 1988); see also L. Rachel
Eisenstein, Prenatal Health Care: Today's Solution to the Future's Loss, 18 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 467 (1991); J. Athole Lennie, Joseph R. Klun & Tony Nauser, Low-Birth-Weight
Reduced by the Obstetrical Access Project, 8 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 83 (1987).
411 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, The Nation's Investment in Children: An Analysis of
the Presidents FY 1990 Budget Proposals (1989); PREVENTING INFANT MORTALITY:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF A NATIONAL PROBLEM: HEARINGS ON S. 1209
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMrrTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
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and backed by the courts, that women can be controlled, excluded, and
marginalized in order to protect fetal and other interests.
Until recently, employer rules which excluded women of childbearing age
from jobs that exposed them to toxic substances were legal. 412 But the Supreme
Court in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls413 held that the fetal
protection practice of the employer to exclude women with childbearing
capacity from lead-exposed jobs violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
Title VII. "Johnson Controls' professed moral and ethical concerns about the
welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ [bona fide
occupational qualification] of female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of
future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and
raise them rather than to the employers who hire these parents." 414
Although the Supreme Court's language is broad and general, parental
choice here is tied to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 415 So, while some
fetal protection policies are illegal, the actual prohibition extends only to those
employers covered by Title VII.4 16 And of Title VII employers who will now
refrain from excluding women outright, but will instead provide them with
"counselling and education" about health risks, 417 there is "concern that the
counselling could become coercive." 418 Thus, fetal protection policies may
survive in more than spirit.4" 9
The protectionist attitude behind fetal protection policies is similar to that
of Justice Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon.420 It describes women as biologically
determined to serve only as childbearers, implying that they are not necessary
in the public sphere, at least not in the workplace. It assumes that women
cannot and should not make decisions for themselves. 42 In fact, such thinking
412 United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
413 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
4 14 Id. at 1207.
415 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
416 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks.., but such term does not include (1) the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States .... "
417 David 0. Stewart, Unleaded, 77 A.B.A. J., at 38, 40 (1991) (quoting Stanley
Jaspan who argued before the Court on behalf of Johnson Controls).
418 Id. at 40 (quoting Marcia Berzon, attorney for plaintiffs).
419 In March 1991, two Seattle waiters were fired after refusing to serve a pregnant
woman a strawberry daiquiri. The waiters received national attention and became local
heroes for their efforts. Barbara Kantrowitz, et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK,
April 29, 1991, at 52.
420 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
421 Becker, supra note 30, at 1229.
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assumes that others, employers or the state, should decide for women that fetal
interests are more important than the interests of women, and that limited
autonomy for women "is a small price for mothers, potential mothers, and
society to pay." 422 Perhaps the most damaging aspect of this attitude is that
such an attitude ignores the effects it has on women. It reinforces the dilemma
of disempowerment-that women bear the responsibility for societal problems
and the next generation, but they do not deserve the authority to act
responsibly.423
g. Fetal Rights Acts
The most far reaching regulation of pregnant women is the Fetal Rights
Act. The current form of the Fetal Rights Act is a state policy statement that
life begins at conception. The effect of this policy, if enacted, would be
recognition of fetal personhood for all purposes, not just for the purposes of
applying child neglect statutes. It would construct the maternal-fetal conflict in
all contexts, and would provide justification for subordinating the interests of
pregnant women in every situation.
Presumably, a statute asserting fetal rights for all purposes would violate a
woman's right of privacy. 424 A woman could not, for example, obtain an
abortion without violating the statute;425 she might be committing murder. The
Supreme Court narrowed a woman's right of privacy in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey426 by demoting the abortion decision from a fundamental right to a
liberty interest. But the Court did affirm a constitutionally protected right to
decide before viability. The United States Supreme Court, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,427 addressed a statute containing the assertion
that life begins at conception. The Court declined to address the
constitutionality of the statement because it served only as a preamble and did
not amount to a restriction on abortion.428 However, by allowing the preamble
422 Ronald Bayer, 60 MBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q. HEALTH & SoC'Y 422, 644
(1982) (quoting a representative from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers
Association).
423 See, e.g., Kim Dayton, Patriarchy, Patenalism and tze Masks of "Fetal
Protection," 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25 (1992).
424 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989).
425 See Johnsen, supra note 328, at 197-204; Harriet F. Pilpel, Hyde and Go Seek.- A
Response to Representative Hyde, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rv. 1101 (1982); David Westfall,
Beyond Aborion: The Potential Reach of a Hwnan Life Amendment, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 97
(1982).
426 See supra note 94.
427 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
428 Id. at 506.
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to stand, the Court left the door open for states to express the idea of fetal
personhood and of regulating pregnant women.429
Attempts have been made to pass fetal rights legislation at the federal level.
A number of "Human Life Bills" have been introduced during the last decade.
Among them were proposed legislation "[tjo provide that human life shall be
deemed to exist from conception," 430 a bill "[tlo amend the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to protect the rights of the unborn," 431 and a joint resolution "[piroposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States for the protection of
unborn children and other persons." 432 These bills were apparently attempts to
restrict a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. If a human
life bill were enacted now, however, it could present an even wider range of
restrictions on reproductive freedom. Such a bill could tap into the potential for
completely regulating pregnant women that recent laws have indicated.
3. The Evolving Ideology of Motherhood: Summary
The regulatory scheme, expanded to restrict choices implicated by
continued gestation as well as those surrounding conception, includes both
direct and indirect state intervention. As discussed, these interventions subtract
from the bodily integrity and decisional autonomy of the woman. To the extent
that the state invokes the parens patriae power to prevent harm to the fetus, the
state subordinates the interests of the woman to those of the fetus. To the extent
that the state regulates pregnant women to promote public health, safety, and
morals-an exercise of the police power-it subordinates the interests of the
429 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 81-21 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.35.0
(West 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986); UTAH CoDEANN. § 76-7-301.1(1) (1991).
430 S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Jesse Helms) (providing
that unborn are "persons" for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's right to life
guarantee); S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Hyde) (providing
that life begins at conception and that all human beings are persons for the purpose of
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment right to life); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
(deeming that human life begins at conception); J.R. 3225, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
(providing that unborn are "persons" until the Constitution is amended to protect the life of
the unborn).
431 S. 522, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Sen. Hatch) "Nothing
contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be construed to authorize the use of Federal
financial assistance for abortions and no such assistance shall be used to perform abortion
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."
Id. § 606.
432 H.J. Res. 62, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Rhodes) (including
"unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development" in the definition of
"person" for the purpose of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to life.
"Provided, however, that nothing in this article shall prohibit a law permitting only those
medical procedures required to prevent the death of the mother.").
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woman to those of the rest of society. In either case, when the state regulates
women as childbearers, it legislates the ideology of motherhood. Furthermore,
it eliminates the possibility of self-definition.
The ideology, in regulatory form, creates two other effects that run across
the direct-indirect organizational line: devaluing women as persons and
devaluing women as mothers. Both of these effects describe women in terms
other than humanist. That is, both effects are reductionist.
These regulations devalue women as persons by characterizing women as
wombs. These laws treat women not as persons but as fetal containers, wombs
surrounded by resources in human shape. The part of the ideology articulated
through these regulations is that of women as mothers raising their children to
contribute to the social order. 433 They are means to an end.434 Now, in order
to give these children a head start, their mothers are made guarantors that they
will begin life with sound minds and bodies. It is women, as individuals, who
bear this responsibility. It is women, as a group, who are devalued by the
experience of childbearing under law.
These regulations also devalue some women as mothers. Regulations that
infringe on women by race and class express the part of the ideology that
motherhood as an institution has the charge of transmitting social rules, as well
as moral and cultural values. Some women, according to these laws, are unfit
to accomplish this task. Because they depart from the norm, they are likely to
breed disorder.
When reviewed with a critical eye, the motherhood ideology as a
regulatory scheme discloses the current social concerns. Social concerns have
been translated by ideology into fears of woman-bred disorder, points at which
women have failed as buffers. Many of the laws express a faith that the road to
social order lies in genetic determinism. Many of the laws also reveal the
influence of pro-life doctrines. And many of the laws, especially indirect
regulations, reflect the fear generated by the war on drugs. In terms of history,
the cultural practice of using women as buffers against disorder is an old one,
but its current expression-state regulation of pregnant women-is new.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF DEFAULTING TO SCIENCE AND THE
INTERVENTIONIST MINDSET OF LAW
The regulation of pregnant women is an elaboration of the ideology of
motherhood and an unprecedented use of state power. The extension of state
power raises the question-why has the regulatory scheme expanded to restrict
choices implicated by pregnancy? Many have noted that the sphere of activity
433 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
434 See ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 43-45.
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protected from state intervention is shrinking.435 But, state regulation premised
on the socially-constructed ideology of motherhood is the key. It focuses the
heavy power of the state on women. This regulation allows the state to present
its restrictions on women as natural and the idea of self-definition for women as
unnatural. This regulation gives the regulatory scheme its shape and character.
There are, however, other forces propelling the formation of a regulatory
scheme at this time. In this section, I explain the regulation of pregnant women
as the intersection of the motherhood ideology and of two other forces. One I
call defaulting to science. It is the practice of letting developments in science
and technology436 define the issues in a way that creates an imperative to use
these developments. The other force is an interventionist mindset of law. This
is a willingness that stems from a failure to consider alternatives, to use state
power in a way that restricts individual choice and self-definition.
A. Defaulting to Science
Defaulting to science is another way of saying that we equate, without
thinking about it, science with progress. 437 New developments in science and
technology are being used in many cases simply for the sake of using them. We
default to science when we assume that if the technology is there, we should
use it, and then we act on this assumption without critical evaluation of the
wisdom of acting.438
435 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-9 (2d ed.
1988); Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Role of Court and Legislature in the Growth of Family
Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 699 (1989); William M. Kunstler, The Bill of Rights-Can it
Survive?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 5 (1990-91); Charles A. Reich, The
Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1412 (1991).
436 I use "science" and "technology" together, in part, to express the idea that they are
indivisibly paired by the same political and economic concerns for which they are
developed and deployed. See STANLEY ARONOW1TZ, SCIENCE AS POWER: DISCOURSE AND
IDEOLOGY IN MODERN SOCIETY 6-34 (1988).
437 Id. at 3-6 (citing examples where science and technology have been accepted as
progress despite great harm).
438 This generalization has a few welcome exceptions. For example, some federal
regulations provide procedures aimed at provoking critical evaluation of proposed research
projects. The FDA screens many products of science and technology. Moreover, there have
been moments where scientists have themselves paused for thought-for example, at the
Asimolar Conference scientists called for a moratorium on recombinant DNA work. This
proved short-lived. I am describing a mindset, a set of assumptions about science and
technology that have become a cultural practice.
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1. Development of the Practice of Defaulting to Science
In obstetrics, the practice of defaulting to science took shape during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the time when medical professionals
acquired their status and influence. 439 It was, as mentioned above,440 a time
when physician participation in childbirth became standard.441 As technology
for intervention became available, it raised the question of whether it should be
used. But that question was not addressed at the outset. As the means of
medical intervention became available, physicians simply used them as a matter
of course. By assuming that the new science or technology should be used,
physicians simultaneously created an imperative for its use.
History shows that the use of forceps and anesthesia in the delivery room
became standard for reasons that had little to do with reducing maternal and
infant mortality. 442 Hospital births became common, 443 and physicians used
technology to intervene simply because the equipment was available.444 When
physicians participated in home births, they intervened because they felt
pressured in the presence of others to do something, to "perform." 445 And
some physicians, if pressed for time and other patients were waiting, used
forceps, anesthesia, or both to direct labor into patterns under their control. 446
As the means of physician control became available, the experts
constructed a need for it. They characterized childbirth as a process where
harm might occur but for the use of forceps, 447 episiotomies, 448 ergot,449
anesthesia,450 and cesarean sections. 451 One of the first results of physician
439 EHIRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 69; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note
142, at 9; see also, LEAvrrr, supra note 178, at 172-82 (describing the increasing number
of hospital childbirths, due in large part to the enhanced reputation of the practice of
medical science). "However, in obstetrics it was more the image of science's potential, the
lure of what science could offer, than any proven accomplishments that attracted women to
the hospital." Id. at 373.
440 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
441 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. See also WERTZ & WERTZ, supra
note 142, at 46-47.
442 LEAvrrr, supra note 178, at 142-70 (discussing three reasons for continued
obstetrical problems, and focusing on the role of physicians in causing or increasing
women's problems).
443 LEAvrrr, supra note 178, at 174, 179.
444Id. at 182.
445 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 63-64.
446 Id.; LEAvrrr, supra note 178, at 120.
447 LEAvrrr, supra note 178, at 179.
448 Id. at 142, 152.
449 Id. at 147.
450 Id. at 122, 127-41 (twilight sleep debate); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at
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participation in reproduction was a changed understanding of childbirth, from a
natural but risky event, to a pathology.452 Similarly, as the means for
intervention in fetal development become available, pregnancy is coming to be
understood as a pathology. It is being characterized as a process where harm
might occur but for the imposition of medical treatment and behavior
restrictions on the pregnant woman. Science provides the reason for, as well as
the means of, taking control.
When we default to science, we cede control to the experts and institutions
who have the technology. Physicians exercise control by prescribing both the
problem-potential risks during pregnancy-and the solution-taking control of
the biological processes. Science, the need for information, and technology
developed by science become one and the same. But by assuming necessity, we
fail to consider fully the consequences of ceding control. When courts order
forcible medical treatment, and when judges and legislatures create legal
sanctions for certain behavior for the ostensible reason of preserving fetal
health, they may consider that imposing control over the biological processes of
pregnancy means taking control of the pregnant woman's body, but they fail to
consider that imposing control over a woman because she is pregnant means
defining women as fetal carriers and devaluing them as individuals. That
consideration is not subject to "scientific" proof. It is, however, fast becoming
a political truth.
2. Science as Neutrality
Science appeals as an authority because we take it to be uncompromising,
neutral, and disinterested. 453 We take science to be ahistorica 454 and
451 WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 161.
452 In "Kuhnsian" terms, once childbirth-as-pathology became accepted as a
paradigm, novel means of physician intervention in the childbirth process were readily
accepted and, as stated, justified as necessary. They merely confirmed the paradigm. And at
the most, new means of intervention such as the use of anesthetics required a reformulation
of the paradigm. Physician control, then, may be described as a micro-version of what
Kuhn calls "normal science." THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REvOLUTIONS, 23-30 (2d ed. 1970). See also, EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at
111; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 142, at 136, 141, 165.
453 See ARONOWITZ, supra note 436, at 6 ("It is still true, however, that most students
of science, while acknowledging the influence of what is often labeled "cultural factors" in
the process of knowledge acquisition, insist that economic, political, and ideological
questions must be strictly demarcated from considerations bearing on the content of
scientific knowledge."); EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 77 ("It is this image of
uncompromising disinterestedness and objectivity which gives science its great moral force
in the mind of the public."); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 225-
29 (1986) (Harding identifies the three primary characteristics of the myth of modem
science as atomism, value-neutrality, and experimental observation.).
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apolitical. 455 We also treat science as authority because it is something
performed by experts. That is, science is something we cannot question
because we lack the requisite skills and training to do so.456 We must rely on
experts. We have been willing to rely on experts largely because we believe
that experts perform science according to neutral principles, and that they are
disinterested in the knowledge acquired through science. 45 7 Neutrality is
considered necessary to rational individualism and a just society-it has moral
force.458 According to western logic, knowledge derived from neutral
principles carries weight as truth.459
Defaulting to science depends on our willingness to make a large set of
assumptions. When we defer to science as truth, we assume that neutrality is
454 See KUHN, supra note 452 (questioning the role of history in the image of science,
and in doing so, describing a scientific community largely separated and autonomous from
other intellectual and political pursuits of the historical period in which new theories
emerged).
455 But see HARDING, supra note 453 and ARONowrrlZ, supra note 436.
456 For example, despite the doctrine of informed consent, most patients do not ask
questions. They do not know what to ask and they are intimidated by the process. They feel
so alienated from their bodies because of the doctor's more technical (and therefore, they
assume, more valid) information that they simply accept the doctor's recommendation as
fate.
457 EHRENREICH & ENGLISH, supra note 178, at 69 (summing up the impact of the
image of science on the lay public: "The judgment of the 'results'-the graphs, columns of
figures, comparative measurements-is final."); see also HARDING, supra note 453, at 228
(identifying "the most powerful symbol of the new science" as "method" and analogizing
"rule by method" to nature's "rule of law"; as administrators of "rule by method," then,
scientists are assumed to act impersonally and their authority cannot be questioned).
458 See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 148-56, 171-
81(1989).
459 There are several understandings of "truth." Two are relevant here. One refers to
a "verifiable reality," as Professor Faigman calls it. Science typically uses this standard to
define empirical evidence. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1016-21
(1989). Yet another assumes in a more general way that truth is value-neutral knowledge,
the product of applying value-neutral principles to human social life. Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1057
(1990). I would question the validity of the second of these understandings. It assumes that
there are some human events that all persons would interpret in the same way. That is, it
assumes some level of universal experience. The effect, however, of applying "value-
neutral" standards is inapposite to the assumption of a universal experience-it identifies
persons and groups who have not had the experience described by the standard. Id. at 1062,
1086. "Verifiable reality" seems useful when presented as one of many types of truth. See
K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCINTIFc DISCOvERY 39 (1959) ("The system called 'empirical
science' is intended to represent only one world: 'the real world' or the 'world of our
experience.'") (citation omitted). But we default to science when we cite verifiable reality as
the "best" or only truth. It is then that we fail to consider and value human experience.
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possible, that scientific truth is derived from neutral principles, that only some
persons known as experts are capable of ascertaining these truths, and that the
experts act disinterestedly. 460 The most significant assumption we make is that
we lack the ability to question science. It is a matter of cultural practice, not
scientific method, that we not only assume that the experts have the learning
and training to perform science, but also that they should determine whether
and how the scientifically-produced knowledge should be used. It is at this
point that we default to science.
The regulation of pregnant women has come about by defaults occurring
within several institutions at once. I have described the default by experts, the
"go-ahead" attitude of scientists employing new technologies and scientifically-
developed information. I have also described the default that occurs as a
broader cultural practice. This practice first creates a social norm. The norm is
expressed when a woman consents to medical intervention in her pregnancy
because the decision accords with the assumption that technology is necessary
and good. At this point, the individual decision to defy the norm is still
possible. A woman could choose to refuse surgery, or to consume alcohol as a
protected right under the common law right to refuse treatment, 461 or under the
constitutional principles of bodily integrity and decisional autonomy. 462 But
when the default to science occurs at law, the concept of choice alters. Choice
can be discarded when scientific information or technology is recognized as a
state interest or imposed as a duty. Choice may disappear altogether, as under
direct regulation. Or it may become a smaller idea, something more like
directed behavior than self-constituting choice, under indirect regulation.
3. Default Upon Default
A slightly different effect of the practice of defaulting to science is that the
initial failure to address seriously the question of whether the information or
technology should be used perpetuates itself. That is, through science,
information or technology is derived. The derived technology or information is
implemented by default, not by decision. Simultaneously, its necessity becomes
lore, and it is assumed that more of the same is desirable, if not necessary.
Similar science will be more readily implemented. It rests on an assumption of
necessity already proven.
The availability of prenatal testing illustrates this effect. Because it is
available, amniocentesis is used. Amniocentesis provides valuable
460 See HARDING, supra note 453, at 30-57.
461 See Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261-63 (1990).
462 See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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information 463 but also presents risks. 464 Presumably some risk-benefit analysis
was performed when these technologies were first introduced, 465 but it became
standard so quickly as to belie thorough assessment of the risks and exploration
of alternatives, including that of not using the technology at all. 466
Amniocentesis may seem so obviously beneficial, and so low risk, that using it
as an example here appears inappropriate or paranoid. That illustrates the
point: the medical community and the general public have accepted prenatal
testing so completely that its necessity is common lore. The speed and
completeness of its acceptance followed from the assumption that if it is
"science," it must have utility. The acceptability of this test is no longer open
to question. 467
Now, the physician may describe the risks to each woman before
administering the amniocentesis, but because it has become part of common
463 See Gina Kolata, First Trimester Prenatal Diagnosis: A New Method of Prenatal
Diagnosis May Largely Replace Amniocentesis, 221 SCIENCE 1031 (Sept. 9, 1983).
464 Complications of amniocentesis include vaginal bleeding and amniotic fluid
leakage. The NICHD National Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, Midtrimester
Amniocentesisfor Prenatal Diagnosis, 236 JAMA 1471, 1471 (1976).
465 But see id. at 1471 ("Since the first reports of the use of midtrimester
amniocentesis for prenatal diagnosis of chromosomal and metabolic disorders... in 1967
and 1968, use of the procedure has grown to the point that approximately 3,000 women had
amniocentesis performed... in 1974 .... Surveys of use of the technique have focused
primarily on reasons amniocentesis was performed and accuracy of the diagnostic
procedure rather than on its safety.").
466 See T.A. Doran et al., The Antenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, 118 Am. J.
OB. & GYN. 314, 314-15 (1974) (summarizing the "rapid advances in antenatal diagnosis"
made possible by amniocentesis. Steel and Breg first successfully cultured amniotic cells in
1966. In the next five years, scientists reported the first in utero diagnosis of genetic and
biochemical disorders. During that same time period, amniocentesis became standard for all
pregnant women over 40.).
467 See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 463 ("A new technique ['chorionic villus biopsy'] for
obtaining fetal cells for prenatal diagnosis, now being tested in the United States and
Europe, may largely replace amniocentesis within the next few years, clinical researchers
predict." Chorionic villi biopsy permits prenatal screening for genetic and biochemical
defects, as does amniocentesis. The test can be made during the first trimester and results
obtained within a few days. Amniocentesis is performed during the second trimester,
followed by a two to three week wait for results.). See also Shaw, supra note 252, at 76-78
(describing chorionic villus testing as non-invasive, although it is performed by inserting a
catheter into the woman through the cervix, and using suction to remove a sample of
chorionic tissue surrounding the fetus. It is less invasive than amniocentesis, so that it could
be performed with less risk to women. Shaw suggests on that basis that "an argument could
be made for screening all pregnancies or at least offering the mother the option of CVB
even if no increased risks to the fetus are discerned [than those identified by the current
practice of using amniocentesis on pregnant women over the age of thirty-five]." Id. at 76-
77. In that sense, it is clearly more invasive.).
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lore that the procedure is necessary, most women will "consent" as a matter of
course. When the risks of testing are discussed, direct physical risks to the
fetus and woman are raised. However, perhaps the greatest unexplored risks of
prenatal testing are the ethical dilemmas raised by the revealed information. 468
Prenatal testing may reveal gender. It may also yield the presence of a physical
defect or disease. This information then raises the issue of whether anything
should be done to prevent, repair, or mitigate the defect, and if so, what should
be done. Although information that a disease or defect exists does not mean
that a treatment is available,469 many assume that something should be done.
Hence, proposals for selective abortion and forced in utero therapy arise.470
The desire to intervene in these cases probably originates from a sense of
humanity, a desire to prevent harm to others-fetuses. That seems good.
However, there is an impetus for intervention without full consideration of the
consequences. The practice of defaulting to science permits this intervention
without consideration.
The ethical discussion of whether to act on information gained has
occurred largely within the context of genome projects. 471 The concerns seem
removed from the more everyday context of prenatal care. It seems unlikely
now that thorough assessment of the risks and alternatives to prenatal testing
will ever be performed. In fact, there is a push to implement other, more
revealing types of prenatal testing.472 The authority of science lies in a claim to
468 See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 463 (reporting use of information gained from
chorionic villus biopsy to abort female fetuses in China and Russia); NICHD National
Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, supra note 464, at 1475 (describing risk of
diagnostic errors resulting in elective abortions); Wertz, supra note 142, at 248-52
(discussing the potential negative consequences of "information overload," increased sexual
stereotyping, and sex-selective abortions).
469 Examples include Tay Sachs, cystic fibrosis, and Huntington's.
470 See generally Hubbard, supra note 138; Mathieu, supra note 241; Robertson,
supra note 238; Shaw, supra note 252; Steams, supra note 232. The ability to perform in
utero therapy is creating its own need.
471 For a description of the Human Genome Initiative, see generally U.S. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MAPPING OUR GENES, THE GENOME PROJECTS: How BIG, How
FAST? (1988); Charles Marwick & Beverley Merz, Gene Mappers Form Collaborations,
260 JAMA 2477 (Nov. 4, 1988); Joseph Palca, Genome Projects Are Growing Like Weeds,
245 SCIENCE 131 (July 14, 1989). For ethical discussions, see generally JERRY E. BISHOP &
MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, GENOME (1990); EvE K. NICHOLS, HUMAN GENE THERAPY (1988);
DAVID SuzuKi & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS
AND HUMAN VALUES (rev. ed. 1990); W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy:
Scientific and Ethical Considerations, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 275-91 (1985); George Annas,
Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of the Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J.
629 (1990).
472 See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 252, at 76-78 (Restriction fragment length
polymorphisms are used to map the human genome. Its use for prenatal testing has already
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truth. When we default to science, we accept without question similar claims as
truth.
4. The Construct of Conflict
The maternal-fetal conflict has been constructed in large part by defaulting
to science. Scientific "truth" determines how we perceive and treat human
beings-medically, socially, and politically. Modem science presents human
life as "a system of 'organized complexity' whose driving force is the
molecular structure of the gene." 473 The greatest single truth derived from our
rapidly increasing knowledge of fetal development is that fetal life is complex
and physically vulnerable to its environment. That "truth" provides a rationale
for regulating pregnant women-it is environmental quality control. The
scientific description of human life as biologically determined provides the
rationale for elevating the importance of fetal life.
Science and technology also shape our understanding of pregnancy. As
forceps and the episiotomy transformed the understanding of childbirth from
natural event to pathology, technology such as the sonogram has changed the
literal picture of pregnancy. The earlier model for the woman-fetus relationship
was interdependence. Law followed this model. Unborn fetuses had very few
legal interests at law. 474 Now, doctors regard the fetus as a separate patient,
been suggested.). See Botstein, et al., Construction of a Genetic Linkage Map in Man Using
Restriction Fragnent Length Polymorphisms, 32 AM. J. HUMAN GENET. 314, 328 (1980). It
may be possible in a few years to identify every genetic trait prenatally. The argument that
such testing should be performed because it is possible carries much weight in a society
characterized by the practice of defaulting to science.
473 ARONOWrrz, supra note 436, at 15.
474 Fetuses were first accorded legal status in property law. Fetuses were considered
"lives in being" for purposes of taking property by intestacy, devise, or bequest but could
only actually take title if born alive. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C.
1946). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973). Until 1946, there was no tort
liability for injury sustained before birth. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139 (holding that a viable
fetus could recover for injury allegedly caused by doctors' negligence if born alive. This
was the first case to reject the rule precluding recovery for injury to a fetus.). A majority of
jurisdictions have recognized wrongful death actions for negligence that terminates a viable
pregnancy. A few jurisdictions have extended liability for non-viable fetuses. W.P.
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 368-69 (5th ed.
1984). Courts also used the live birth requirement in criminal cases. See Commonwealth v.
Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) ("Since at least the fourteenth century, the
common law has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a homicide .... [The
rule has been accepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that
has considered the question.").
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and the law recognizes the fetus as a being with independent interests. 475
The important point is that once the two-patient model is accepted, conflict
is assumed to be inevitable. This conflict is a cultural construct, not the result
of "pure science." Relationships in our society are only dimly understood in
terms of power and subordination. It is as if relationships characterized by
domination and subordination are inevitable and unchangeable. They are more
often described in terms of conflict and a balance of interests. It is true that our
package of values includes the equality principle, which seems to acknowledge
the need to eliminate subordination. But the equal protection doctrine is more
often valued as a means of addressing only the obviously harmful results of
subordination. 476 Hierarchy, not liberation, is the presumably immutable
starting point in describing relationships. This cultural understanding prescribes
the perception that in a woman-fetus relationship, the woman is in a position of
power relative to the fetus, and the fetus must be protected in order to prevent
harm caused by the woman's abuse of power. Since it is easier to perceive a
power relationship and conflict between identifiably separate interests, the two-
patient model enhances the construct of conflict.47 7 But the model is being
accepted with little consideration being given to the potential harm of
describing pregnancy as the source of conflict.
Generally, the effect of using a two-patient model for pregnancy is that
attention shifts to the fetus. This may have the good of promoting fetal health,
but in some situations it detracts from the woman's interests. Cases discussed
in Part II illustrate this point.478 Where petitions for court-ordered medical
treatment are sought, judges usually grant the petition. The decision to grant
the petition appears almost reasonable if one considers the information received
475 Barbara Katz Rothman has suggested that the model of motherhood as "the
physical embodiment of connectedness" challenges liberal philosophy, which focuses on
individuality and separation. ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 59. Perhaps, if anything, the
predominance of liberal philosophy makes it impossible for us to imagine and appreciate
that interdependence exists.
476 See Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76
VA. L. Rnv. 95, 102-03 (1990) (describing civil rights in the purview of the dominant
discourse as "the study of communities in conflict; its objective is the management of
tension").
477 I am not saying that the construct of conflict began recently, only that recent
developments in the scientific and social understanding of pregnancy have expanded and
sharpened the construct. The debate through the centuries about whether a fertilized ovum
contained a soul suggests a maternal-fetal conflict. See John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost
Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALrrY OF ABORTION 1-59 (John T. Noonan, Jr., ed.
1970) (presenting the Christian humanist perspective on the philosophical debates over the
legality of abortion through western history).
478 See In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233 (D.C. 1986); In re A.C., 533
A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988), on reh'g, 573 A.2d 1235
(D.C. 1990); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
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and the setting in which the judge must make a decision. The doctor informs
the judge that she has the ability to prevent harm to the fetus or to correct a
defect. Allowing the doctor to prevent harm seems like a humane response, one
that is reinforced by the cultural practice of assuming that if we have the
science, we should use it. It is also reinforced by the perception that the fetus is
an innocent bystander, threatened by the other patient's noncooperation. Where
child neglect petitions are sought, the doctor testifies that the pregnant woman
had the ability to prevent the harm by not drinking or by not taking controlled
substances. Again, the fetus is seen as victim. This response is reinforced by
the assumption that if we have the information, we should act on it.
Scientifically acquired information translates too quickly into additional rights
or duties when we default. It is only a secondary thought that, in order to
prevent the fetal harm or repair the defect, the woman's interests must be
considered. As the cases indicate, many assign the woman's interests little
weight.
I have argued that the devaluation of woman's interests is attributable in
part to the practice of defaulting to science. If one subtracts the assumption that
science should be used, it becomes easier to imagine that one's first response to
the question of forcible medical treatment or imposing sanctions for drug use
during pregnancy might be to think of the woman's interests. One might still
react to the potential for fetal harm, but the reaction is less adamant without the
assumption that one must act. There is more room for the concern that the
procedure might pose risk to the woman. Once the assumption that the
woman's interests can be discounted to protect the weaker fetus is taken away,
it even becomes possible to assume that the woman's autonomy interests are
too important to override. I am suggesting that, with regard to the science of
fetal development, the normative assumption that science should be used is
incompatible with the liberation of women.
B. The Interventionist Mindset of Law
The interventionist mindset of law is a readiness to use state power to
address perceived moral problems by regulating the individual. 479 Like the
assumption that science is progress, the interventionist mindset is accompanied
by a failure to critically evaluate the wisdom of so acting. Many have
commented on effects of this mindset-the regulatory state4 80 and the
479 "Mindset" refers to "patterns of perception" that have "become habitual, tempting
us to believe that the way things are is inevitable, or the best that can be in an imperfect
world." Delgado, supra note 6, at 2416-17.
480 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L.
REv. 407 (1990).
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devaluation of individual rights.481 In this section, I will describe the impetus
for using state power to address social problems as the moral failure of certain
individuals or groups, as a twentieth century mindset. The regulation of
pregnant women is one result of this mindset. The labeling of pregnant women
as "good mothers" and "bad mothers" signifies the sense of righteousness
behind the regulation.
The discussion here will center on the apparent use of state power for the
management of social problems and on the impetus to manage social problems
by restricting freedom of action rather than preserving it.
1. The Call to Law
The interventionist mindset at law occurs as call and response. During the
nineteenth century, there was, as discussed in Part I, a fairly clear line
between the private and the public spheres. Family and church provided a
broad moral authority. 482 State power was generally reserved for maintaining
public order and safety. Law might be used to defend the moral authority of the
family, and it might do so by reinforcing narrow gender roles for women, as in
Bradwell and Muller.483 But issues such as procreation, childrearing,
education, and the transmission of values were regarded as family matters, not
appropriate for state regulation. They were private, not in the constitutional
sense, but by social function.
During the twentieth century, as the socializing authority of family and
church has decreased, the law has become more salient. The state is now
regulating behavior that used to be considered private sphere matter. For
example, criminal law during most of the nineteenth century moved away from
using law to address moral issues as the influence of the Puritan ethic waned.
During the earlier part of the century law was used to address issues that are
more universally understood as crime without reference to a time-bound moral
code-crimes against property or crimes resulting in bodily harm or death. 484
The use of law as social management began in the late nineteenth century. The
481 See, e.g., Robert Nagel, The Formudaic Constitution, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 165, 205-
07 (1985); Charles Reich, supra note 435, at 1417-23.
482 The Social Purity Movement was in part a response to the perception that the
authority of church and family were distintegrating. Schlossman & Wallach, supra note
106, at 85-88.
483 See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
484 Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERIcAN LAW 257-58, 508-10 (1973);
Kermit L. Hall, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 185-88 (1989); David
Ray Papke, Lav in American Culture: An Overview, 15 J. AmER. CULTURE 3 (1992)
(exploring the general proposition that Americans are inclined to approach problems in a
legal framework).
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regulation of female prostitutes was part of this trend, 485 as was Muller v.
Oregon.486 That decision provides a striking example. The Supreme Court held
that states could restrict the working hours of women because "healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring." 487 Ironically, this decision was rendered
during the Lochner488 era, a time when freedom of contract was considered
essential to a free society. Liberty for men apparently depended on regulation
of women.489
The current regulation of pregnant women continues to use law as social
management. "Healthy babies" have become a social concern and a political
issue.490 Women who give birth to unhealthy babies are the perceived problem.
Law is used to address the issue by directly and indirectly restricting the
choices of pregnant women. A moral appeal, unenforceable at law, to a woman
as mother is no longer considered sufficient or politic.491 Women, perhaps due
to feminism, have acquired some authority to define themselves without
reference to their biological capacity to bear children. The Code describes this
transformation as a failure of motherhood as a private sphere instituiton. Thus,
a call is made to bolster the moral responsibility with fetal rights and maternal
duties.
485 See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
486 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See David L. Faigman, supra note 22, at 560 (identifying
Muller as the beginning of sociological jurisprudence)).
487 Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
488 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
489 See Faigman, supra note 22, at 561. Faigman points out that "Lochner and Muller
are consistent in that they embrace a similar theory of human relations, a theory made
explicit in Lochner but left unstated in Muller. This theory, generally associated with Social
Darwinism as popularized in the works of Herbert Spencer, dictated that freedom of
contract was to be protected against legislative intrusion except in certain categories of
cases," such as women and children. Id.
490 See, e.g., PREVENTING INFANT MORTALITY: INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF
A NATIONAL PROBLEM: HEARINGS ON S. 1209 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1987) ("And as a nation, we
value every life as special and important, no matter where the life comes from. Because of
our own moral code, we have the obligation and are justified in trying to make sure every
child born into our nation has a healthy start in life. We have seen from the evidence
presented in this report that there are many babies who never even get a chance to be born
healthy, whether out of ignorance on the part of the mother, lack of money for care before
and after pregnancy, or other reasons totally separate from the physical being of the newly
born child.").
491 See Note, supra note 161, at 1334-35 ("Changes in women's role within the
family and the broader shift in sexual power relations have altered the parameters of the
debate over reproductive freedom, shifting the emphasis from a maternal ethic of
responsibility to a model of conflicting rights.").
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2. The Response
The interventionist mindset is mclined to use law for social management,
and to do so in a way that reduces "choice" and "liberty " That is, the state
can act in at least two ways with regard to social problems.492 First, the state
can reinforce broad principles, such as privacy, speech, and religion, by
preserving freedom of action-including some harmful acts-m these arenas.
The assumption is that fostering these principles will strengthen individual or
community attempts to address the problems.493 Second, the state can dictate a
detailed moral code by applying those principles in politically selective ways
for the ostensible purpose of preventing harmful behavior. Increasingly, during
the past few decades, the latter method has been called for and used. 4 9 4
The interventionist mmdset, then, is partly a failure to consider
alternatives-alternative ways of understanding the problem, and alternatives to
using regulation as a solution. The call to regulation has become an automatic
response to social disorder. Underlying that response is the assumption that the
social disorder is attributable to a particular individual or group, such that
regulating those persons will solve the problem. That is, the mindset includes a
preconceived approach to solving social problems. First, formulate the problem
as the behavior of certain individuals, then use law to restrict the problematic
behavior.
One reason regulation has appeal as a solution is that it is cheap.
Regulation is cheap because it assigns responsibility for a problem to a
particular group of persons. It assumes that they must pay or change. It focuses
on their behavior, but does not look to the social, political, and economic
context in which the behavior occurs. Regulation allows us to avoid anything
but superficial evaluation of a problem. The interventionist mindset lets us
492 Charles Reich, supra note 435, at 1447
493 See d. at 1412. There are other responses, but the current concept of rights and
liberty dominate in law and imagination, making it difficult to assert alternatives. See, e.g.,
Man J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consrdenng the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV 2320 (1989); Robin West, Restructunng Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REv 441
(1992).
494 The proliferation of government agencies that promulgate regulations illustrates
this point: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the Federal Commumcations Commission (FCC), the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), the Endangered Species Act, the Natural Gas Act, and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Civil rights laws have also been described as a regulatory scheme.
See Richard A. Posner, An Econormc Analysis of Sex Discnrnanation Laws, 56 U. Cm!. L.
REV 1311 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of 7itle VlI, 136 U. PA.
L. REV 513 (1987); see also Nagel, supra note 481, at 204-07 (characterizing the Supreme
Court's formulaic approach to decisionmaking as regulatory).
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perceive the victims of social problems as the cause. Otherwise, we might have
to consider the possibility that illegal drug use, crime, and poverty are
manifestations of bigger problems that might require bigger, more expensive,
more inconvenient solutions. Some of these solutions might actually require the
reallocation of resources, the equitable distribution of power.
Another reason regulation is appealing is that it is easy. Regulation is
tangible proof that the state has done something. However, what is taken for
proof that the problem has been solved is often little more than the regulation
itself. Part of the mindset is a failure to review the effects of the regulation. 495
There is an assumption that regulation must be positive. In particular, there is a
failure to consider the effects of the regulation on the individual, on the group,
and on society as a whole.
3. The Dynamic
The inclination to use law as social management presents a dilemma. On
the one hand, it provides a seemingly easy way of addressing social disorder-
let government take up the moral slack. This presents the state with the
opportunity to expand its power. On the other hand, it leaves judges,
legislators, and administrators faced with complex and politically divisive
issues. The dilemma sets up two very different dynamics that produce a similar
effect-the complex problem is subjected to the simplifying effects of media-
influenced political process. When the problem has been reduced to simple
terms, cheap and easy regulation becomes a more credible solution.
One response to the dilemma of social management takes place at the gut-
level of politics. The issues-addiction and dependency, high crime rates, and
poverty-become political footballs. They become a source of power for
politicians or groups who publicize the issues in simplistic terms in order to
gain support for their ideology or their office. This has been apparent in the
"fetal-abuse" cases. Prosecutor Tague not only charged Ms. Hardy with
delivery of illegal substances to a minor, but he spoke far and wide on the need
to punish pregnant women addicted to drugs in order to deter others from
harming fetuses. 496 Judge Wolf not only sentenced Brenda Vaughn to 180 days
in jail, he announced that he personally was going to ensure the health of her
baby by imposing the sentence. More has been said in these cases about fetal
life than about the realities of drug and alcohol dependency, the lack of access
to rehabilitation and prenatal care, and the discriminatory prosecution of
women of color. This allows the prosecutor, judge, or legislator to come to the
rescue of fetus and society by cleverly describing the problem to fit existing
495 See Sunstein, supra note 480, at 408.
496 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 334.
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law, as in the Hardy case, or to come up with a straightforward solution-like
requiring pregnant women to avoid certain risks, as in the Vaughn case.
The other response is intentionally less visible. The second type of
simplification occurs by the use of formulas developed to distance the judge,
legislator, or administrator from the controversial nature of the issue.
Generally, courts develop these formulas with the ostensible purpose of
guaranteeing a neutral outcome. Legislators and administrators often adopt a
formula to validate their lawmaking. 497 However, formulaic lawmaking
actually facilitates value-based social administration. It directs attention to the
form and the results of lawmaking, rather than to the process and substance of
the laws. 498 Once a neutral-sounding test, standard, or rule has been
articulated, we relax in the belief that the formula dictates a neutral, objective
outcome. That is, neutral-sounding formulas mask the value judgments made
while applying the formula.
The formulaic approach to constitutional decisionmaking is a twentieth
century development.499 The approach developed as constitutional standards
came to be used extensively to distinguish between acts that should be subject
to state regulation and acts that should remain free from government
interference. Now, instead of a rigid social structure, we have the freedom of
expression, religious freedom, equal protection, the right of privacy, the
concepts of police power and parens patriae, and important or compelling state
interests. Despite the use of formulas to limit the scope of these legal doctrines,
they have proven plastic, so that it now seems frighteningly easy to shrink the
sphere of protected privacy, and to establish a regulatory scheme.500
Privacy, as discussed in Part IMl, invokes a balancing test.50 1 In formulaic
terms, the state cannot restrict the woman's interests in bodily integrity and
decisional autonomy unless it has a sufficient state interest. Empowerment is
inextricably tied to privacy; autonomy is impossible for the subordinated. In
other words, those deprived of power cannot make real choices. Yet, the
formula does not expressly incorporate an equality principle,502 rather it simply
assumes that each person has the ability to choose from the same set of options.
Thus, where this type of equality does not exist, the outcome is imbalance,
obscured by the formula.
497 See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (Miechie 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
58.5-1 (Burns 1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.029 (1992); S.D. CODFID LAWS ANN. § 34-
23A-5 (1986).
498 Nagel, supra note 481, at 195.
499 Id. at 165.
500 See id. at 202-03; Reich, supra note 435, at 1430.
501 See supra notes 232-48 and accompanying text.
502 For an approach to autonomy that explicitly incorporates equal protection, see
Roberts, supra note 104, at 1476-82.
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The problem is that attention shifts to the structure, the formula.50 3 It
patently provides for two sides to be heard in the balancing. The formula
appears neutral. It was crafted by judges who purport to stand in the place of
Blind Justice. So, like science, it is assumed to be a truthfinder. The interests at
stake become merely items to be plugged into the formula. The formula,
however, ignores the process through which interests become important enough
to be weighed. That process is political. Nor does the formula adjust for shifts
in political power that affect the outcome. For example, consider the debate
over the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. When the Supreme
Court decided Roe v. Wade50 4 and recognized that women have certain
authority over their own lives, women as a group were politically ascendant.
Women's autonomy interests were accorded significant weight when the
formula was applied. Since then, the political balance has shifted to
conservative, and so have the outcomes under the formula. 505
The debate has focused largely on whether recent decisions erode the Roe
trimester analysis. The trimester balancing test has become both an icon and a
bugaboo. For some, Roe is an icon for sexual equality and the concomitant
right of women to control their bodies and their lives. For others who are pro-
life it represents a disregard for humanity. Roe has become a bugaboo in the
way it has shaped the debate. The ostensible debate is about the formula, yet
the formula has taken on such significance that any time it is modified victory
is declared for one side and defeat for the other. But the formula only explicitly
addresses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. It does
not say that women have an interest in controlling their lives. The formula does
not overtly acknowledge the impact of state restrictions on women as a group,
or on society. But that is what the debate is really about-who controls the
formula.
The debate takes similar shape when state restrictions infringe upon choices
other than pregnancy termination. In the discussion over the regulation of
pregnant women, much of the legal analysis has centered on whether the Roe v.
Wade trimester analysis is appropriate in a forced medical treatment or drug
use case. The formula and weight used in these situations indicates that those
who would regulate women are in control. The list of state interests deemed
sufficient to override choice has expanded. As the cases in Part III show, the
courts may now regard potential life, a future right to be born with a sound
503 See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 22, at 575-76 (critiquing Justice Blackmun's
opinion as a judicial exercise in skirting the issue. "Using the trimester framework, the
Court finesses the perhaps intractable problem of expounding the many conflicting
principles and value choices comprising the fundamental right of privacy in the abortion
context.").
504 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 See supra note 94. The Court has not only reweighted the interests in favor of state
control, it has also changed the formula from strict scrutiny to an undue burden analysis.
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mind and body, and a maternal duty to care for the unborn child as valid state
interests. 506 The list of individual interests has not expanded, while the number
of regulations has.
The problem with the interventionist tendency to simplify by focusing on
the formula is that the terms of the formula constrain the debate. It is difficult
for those trying to eliminate subordination to gain ground with a formula that
assumes equality. A debate about the formula enhances the authority of those
who control the formula. It predetermines the issue-control, and the
conclusion-regulation. 50 7
C. Converging Forces: The Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of
Defaulting to Science, The Interventionist Mindset of Law
The regulation of pregnant women is converging at the intersection of the
ideology of motherhood, the practice of defaulting to science, and the
interventionist mindset of law. A synergy among these forces exists that makes
it difficult to attribute specific parts and moments of the regulatory scheme to
any one force. I simply want to evoke some sense of the dynamic in play.
The ideology of motherhood, as mentioned in the introduction, focuses the
power of the state on women, and does so in a way that categorizes women as
mothers. Science as authority provides a neutral-sounding rationale for using
state power. The readiness to use state power to subordinate, rather than to
liberate, enhances the standardizing and punitive power of the motherhood
ideology.
For example, when physician participation in childbirth became standard,
the doctor gained control of the birth process. And obstetrics, the science of
pregnancy, gained the authority to raise questions about medical intervention
and answer them affirmatively. Obstetrics became a participant in the ongoing
project of defining women as childbearers because of the practice of defaulting
to science. The ideology is co-opting.
When we assume that science is neutral and disinterested, that it is
apolitical and has authority only as a source of truth, we become blind to
another truth-that knowledge is power. When we recognize science as truth
and authority, we institutionalize it. The practice of defaulting to science has
become canon. And when we fail to understand that institutions in a power-
imbalanced world perpetuate hierarchy, we cede the autonomy of those
marginalized by the hierarchy to those who control the institutions. By giving
the institution of science the authority to raise questions and to answer them,
506 See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text.
507 See Ikemoto, supra note 144, at 498-99.
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we subtract from the ability of the individual to do so.508 We remove the
individual from the dialogue. Thus, when obstetricians raise the question of
whether or not to perform cesareans and obstetricians decide to perform them,
then the notion that good mothers should consent to surgical intervention is
added to the ideology.
The norm requires respect from individuals. When a woman acts or
chooses in a way that defies that expectation, her act or choice is devalued.
Because we default to science, when obstetrics speaks, we assume the message
is rational. When obstetricians say a purse-string operation is necessary to
prevent miscarriage, we assume consent to the operation is the rational choice
of every woman. The woman who refuses consent, who defies the "truth" that
her refusal endangers the fetus despite her doctor's concern, must be thinking
irrationally. In ideological terms, the woman has failed to listen to reason, and
her decision is selfish; a woman who makes a selfish choice is an unnatural
mother.
With regard to the regulation of pregnant women that is not imposed as
medical treatment, but is more clearly punitive in nature, authority still issues
from the institution of science. That is, scientifically acquired knowledge about
fetal development, about the effects of drugs, alcohol, and other toxins and
behaviors, provide the reason for directing state power at women. It casts the
use of power in a reasonable light. It contributes to the normative, conformist,
fault-imposing character of authority in a hierarchical state. The indirect
regulations also result when the ideology of motherhood is applied in
conjunction with the authority of science.
The interventionist mindset reinforces the notion inherent in the
motherhood ideology that "the problem" defined by science is attributable to
women, not to the institutions of power. In response to the call to law, women
who defy the norm are sanctioned by the state. The irrationality of the response
is not obvious, however, because the process of responding with regulation is
apparently neutral. The process of applying neutral-sounding formulae shifts
attention to the structure of the process rather than to its substance and results.
It seems rational to find that the state's interest in protecting potential or fetal
life outweighs the woman's interest in autonomy, when one does not have to
think about how those interests were identified and assigned a weight.
508 See ARONOWrrz, supra note 436, at 3-34 (discussing "science and technology as
hegemony"); Harding, supra note 453, at 16. See generally ANDREv FEENBERG, CRrnIcAL
THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY (1991).
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V. THE UNIVERSAL STANDARD OF GooD MOTHERHOOD AND THE
COMPLEX OF DEVALUED MOTHERHOOD MODELS
The ideology of motherhood directs the power of the state at women with
regard to pregnancy, and it does so by linking two other faces of patriarchy-
the practice of defaulting to science and the interventionist mindset of law. This
makes "fetal interests" a code word for legalized subordination. The resulting
"Code of Perfect Pregnancy" becomes part of the ideology. Motherhood
becomes a code used to limit access to power to the few who hold the key.
The ideological construct of motherhood consists of multiple models. This
article has focused on the "Good Mother" model, but has only suggested that
other models operate simultaneously. These are the negative models, the ones
that form the "Bad Mother."
The Good Mother tends to be used as a universal standard. It is applied to
all women in a way that ignores the social reality in which they live. The
regulatory approach constrains us to talk in terms of fetal rights and maternal
duties. It permits no exploration of conflicts resulting from the unequal
distribution of political power and social goods. The regulatory approach does
not require those applying the standard to remember that poor people have little
access to prenatal care or that certain medical procedures violate religious
convictions. Nor does it take into account that some patient decisions originate
from fear and misunderstanding perpetrated by the medical professionals, that
persons addicted to drugs or alcohol cannot simply stop, and that pregnant
women are seldom admitted to substance abuse rehabilitation centers. 509 This
approach does not require those applying the standard to explore how they have
experienced race, class, and gender, or how the experience of subordinating
might lead them to assume that certain women will be good mothers and
certain women will not.510 Nor does the use of "fetal rights" reflect the wrongs
suffered by women when regulation is imposed. In other words, the universal
standard does not allow us to look beyond "bad mothers" for the "real" causes
of social problems.
The result is a regulatory scheme that tells women to be good, to act
selflessly, to protect children, and to ensure a healthier, more economically
509 See Mari Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1764 (1990) (arguing that we should listen "long and hard to less
privileged voices" to rectify "historical devoicing." Such listening is "restitutional,
reparational, rectifying, and reconstructive. It is the antidote to... the situated knowledge
of the golden few.") (citation omitted).
510 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the
Legacy of White Patnarchy in an American Indian Cultural Contaxt, 24 GA. L. REv. 1019,
1021 (1990) ("[This common tendency 'to treat one's own perspective as true, rather than
as one of many possible points of view,' is particularly complicated by the continuing and
pervasive legacy of four centuries of white patriarchy in our society.") (citation omitted).
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productive future for society. In terms revealed by explicating the general
standard, the regulatory scheme tells women to subordinate their own interests
to those identified by others as more important.511 The possibility that their
failure as individuals is a conclusion imposed by the dominant culture is not
admissible. Those who cannot be good given their social reality, or those who
cannot be perceived as good given the cultural stigmas attached by those who
control the standard, are blamed for the problems.
A description of the other mother models requires a complex analysis of
the motherhood construct along race, class, and other lines of subordination.
That is part of the continuing project. However, I would like to suggest the
beginnings of such an analysis in order to push the project of enacting a
concept of liberty that denies the possibility of subordination.
The ideology of motherhood has a very particular form. First, it
distinguishes between white middle- and upper-class women, and women
oppressed by race, poverty, cultural elitism, heterosexism, etc. White middle-
and upper-class women are part of the sector that defines the norms. Thus,
these women are the Good Mothers. Even the white middle- and upper-class
women who defy the norms are not necessarily Bad Mothers under the
ideology. The "bad" label is generally reserved for members of the outgroups.
Thus, those who defy the norm are usually considered Good Mothers gone
astray.
The ideology holds outgroup women to the Good Mother standard and, at
the same time, to often contradictory and always devalued models of
motherhood particular to women of color, poor women, and women from other
oppressed groups such as lesbians. There is a complex of devalued mother
models working against outsider women.
Outgroup members are presumptively not Good Mothers. But they are
presumed to fit within one or more of the devalued mother models. An
outgroup woman can never completely conform to the Good Mother model
because of her race, class, culture, or other orientation. Even the outsider who
conforms to that extent is never a Good Mother. She will still be devalued.
Some may say that she is extraordinary because she overcame her race or class,
but not because she overcame racism, classism, cultural elitism, or
heterosexism, to become a Good Mother. But the indicator of her outgroup
status will not be part of her achievement.
A member of an outgroup who does not conform to the Good Mother
standard to the extent that she is not privileged may still be a Good Black
Mother, or a Good Welfare Mother, or a Good Hispanic Mother, or a Good
Asian Mother, but under the ideology, those models are not quite as good as
the Good Mother. Thus, there is a Good Black Mother model, but there is no
511 This is similar to the effect of not acknowledging procedural racism described by
Richard Delgado. See Delgado, supra note 476, at 105-09.
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such thing as valued Black motherhood. The devalued goodness of these
models confirms the superiority and justifies the privilege of the in-group.
Those women who cannot conform to any of the good mother standards
are the Bad Mothers. That is, their noncompliance is presumptively willful and
morally incorrect. These women are not bad mothers simply because they have
failed to fit existing Good Mother models, but also because they do fit existing
Bad Mother models. They confirm the expectations of failure that justify white
middle-class privilege.
These devalued mother models operate in even more complex ways. If an
outgroup woman conforms to a good outgroup mother model, she may
overcome her presumed potential for bad motherhood, but not necessarily.
Thus, Black women are perfectly acceptable as surrogate gestators for white
women's children. That is one Good Black Mother model. However, she may
still be regarded as only capable of raising her own children to be juvenile
delinquents. When Black women raise "good" children, the children are more
often than not regarded as extraordinary; they are said to be extraordinary
because they have overcome the blackness of their mothers, not because of
what they have achieved in the presence of racism. 512
This is not a conclusion. It is the beginning, I hope, of a continuing
project. It is time to break the Code.
512 See, e.g., BoYz IN Ti- HooD (Columbia Pictures, 1991).
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